to pbrarg of Flying Officer VJ.R. Pearce R ' Iff IMPROVEMENT OFTHE UNDERSTAND ING,ETHICS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN BY R. H. M. EL WES WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY FRANK SEWALL, A. M. is I N.WALTER DUNNE,PUBLISHER WASHINGTON & LONDON '>.-/ ,•• " - mm "•*£« X~ ^•^^^•^m(—^m^ The book being interdicted was printed with false titles once in Leyden and twice in Amsterdam in 1673. The <( Ethics, J> although begun probably before 1661, was not printed until after the author's death in 1677, and then in a volume entitled <( Opera Posthuma. )} These em braced besides the (< Ethics w other treatises written about the same time. They were the <( Treatise on the Improve ment of the Understanding * embracing the method intro duced in the <( Ethics w ; and the « Tractatus Politicus w in which the absolutism of Hobbe's (( Theory of Government " is criticised ; also some <( Letters from Learned Men " and the author's replies and a (( Compendium of Hebrew Grammar. w ((A Treatise on God, on Man and His Hap piness » with notes on the (( Tractatus T he o logic o- Politicus ° INTRODUCTION ix was quite recently discovered and published in 1852 at Halle: also a <( Tract on the Rainbow, w Spinoza's sole scientific treatise, with a (( Collection of Letters J> and a * Biography w was published in Amsterdam in 1862. The <( Ethics M proper is entitled : (< Ethica : ordine geome- trice demonstrata, et in quinque partes distincta, in quibus agitur ; I. de Deo ; II. de natura et origine mentis ; III. de natura et origine affectuum ; IV. de servitute humana sen de affectuum viribus ; V. de potentia intellectus seu de libettate humana* The treatment is mathematical proceeding as in Euclid from Definitions and Axioms to Propositions deduced therefrom. Thus Part First embraces the Definitions: I. Cause sui; II. the Finite; III. Substance; IV. At tribute; V. Modes; VI. God; VII. Freedom; and VIII. Eternity. Then follow the Axioms, and Propositions, and Corollaries. It will be seen that although entitled (< Ethics® the trea tise covers the whole range of metaphysics, theology, and epistemology, and yet that the ethics forms the culmina tion of the whole system, inasmuch as it looks to estab lishing a clear demonstrable nexus between God and the human conduct. From the ontological proof, if proof at all it can be called, of the existence of God from his nature, or from his being of (< such an essence as can only be conceived of as existing, >J and thus from God's being and existence as necessary, he derives all the laws of existence, of creation, of nature, and of man's conduct as fixed in an eternal necessity. But God's necessity must at the same time be _^erfect_faejedojn> since it cannot be con strained by any things except itself, inasmuch as there can be no <( other }> to the One absolute substance. The only (( other )} to the One self-existent and self-caused substance must be that of the finite « affections » and « modes » of the infinite attributes possessed by the One substance. These attributes are summed up in the two universal ones, Extension and Thought, which are not, as in Des cartes, two subordinated or created substances, but are merely two aspects of one and the same only substance. So that God as the one substance is at once all extended 'X, x SPINOZA body and all thought. Particular things having a limited or finite existence, whether in thought or extension, are but modes or affections of one or the other of these chief attributes. Their life or being is distinguished from the life of God as (< being in alio w as distinguished from * being in se." But the (< being in alio » is subject to limi tations and restrictions from other (< being in alio * / it is thereby subject to passion, to feeling, to desire, to will, to emotions of pleasure, appetite, want, and pain. Its desire is to complete its being. The sense of this com pletion is joy ; the sense of its absence is sadness. These emotions, joy and sadness, will and appetite, are all called (< affections of thought, )J but of the thought as natura naturata^ or the created (( mode, w and not of the thought in God, or natura naturans. With this limitation of the affections as of <( being in alio, }) or subject to im perfection and constraint, comes also, and, indeed, as its cause, ignorance or the lack of the adequate or perfect knowledge. It is this lack of the perfect knowledge of the whole which causes these affections and passions to wear in man's temporal experience the appearance of what is evil. This delusion of evil is the bondage of passion or of the affections, the servitus humana, treated of in Part IV., in which division of the work, the ethics truly begins. From this bondage there is liberation and redemption only through the more and more perfect knowledge of God with the consequent vision of all things sub specie ceternitatis, or in their relation to the divine perfection. This satisfaction in the relations of the lim ited <( being in alio }> amounts to an extension or completion of life, and is termed joy; and the experience of this joy with the knowledge of its source, or of the completeness of life in the divine, is love. The highest attainment of the human mind is the "in tellectual love of God,® which is the contemplation of the divine perfection in which all the seeming limitations and imperfections of the finite are lost in the harmonious unity of the infinitely many in the One. This knowledge is itself virtue since to know a thing to be good is to love it, and only that can be seen to be good which is a INTRODUCTION xj part of the common or universal good. In this (< intel lectual love, w or the love of knowing the good, even God may be said to love himself in loving mankind ; and man in the same love rejoices in virtue « not because it en ables him to govern his lusts; but because he does rejoice in it, therefore to govern his lusts is possible. » The mortal part of man is the affections and modes of his « being in alio* including the imagination and the memory of his earthly mind. The immortal part is that idea which expresses the essence of the body under the idea of eternity, or as God sees it, and which therefore can never perish but survives death, although it passes from all the limitations and consequent emotions and memory of a temporal world. The later critics found Spinoza's logic to be far from irrefutable, and the ordinary reader will not fail to detect instances of his reasoning in a circle where he seems to be convinced that he is offering an infallible demonstra tion. Skepticism will find it easy to challenge even his first certainty and to agree with Voltaire's verdict: «Vous foes tres con/us Baruch Spinoza: mais etes vous aussi danger eux qu 'on le dit ? Je souhais que non: et ma raison c'est que vous etes confus, que vous avez e'crit en mauvais latin, et qu'il nyy a pas dix personnes in Europe qui vous lisent d'un bout a I'autre quoique on vous ait traduit en francais* The, in one aspect, sublime idea of the « intellectual love of God » may in another aspect be interpreted as only an expression of an infinite self-love on the part of deity contemplating with delight his own perfection and granting this contemplative joy only to those finite crea tures who cast themselves into the abyss of his infinity at the sacrifice of their own individuality. On the other hand when viewed in his relation to his time and to the traditions, religious and philosophical, with which the aspirations of his youthful and generous nature had to contend, coupled with the gentle and self-sacrificing traits exhibited in his conduct with friends and foes and his heroic contention for the freedom of thought and belief, the contribution of Spinoza to the humanizing influence xii SPINOZA of philosophy cannot be denied, nor the existence in his theory of truth germs of vast significance. It is not strange that the epithet attached to Spinoza by Novalis — <( the God-intoxicated, » should have come to be held the most truly descriptive of this philosopher who found in his Euclidian demonstrations a vision of God as real as that accorded to the ecstasy of the medi- daeval saints; or that Hegel should say that, better than to call him an atheist were it to call him an acosmist, as one who in his vision of that which is the union of the world and God loses all sight of the world in the fuller vision of God. CONTENTS PAGE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING . i Of the ordinary objects of men's desires i Of the true and final good 4 Certain rules of life 5 Of the four modes of perception 6 Of the best mode of perception 8 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas . . . . 10 Answers to objections I3 First part of method. Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas I5 And from false ideas 22 Of doubt ... 26 Of memory and forgetfulness 28 Mental hindrances from words — and from the popular confu sion of ready imagination with distinct understanding . 29, 30 Second part of method. Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas 3I Its means, good definitions. Conditions of definition ... 32 How to define the understanding 36 THE ETHICS . 39 PART I. CONCERNING GOD qo Definitions 39 Axioms 40 Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications . 40 Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common 40 Prop III. Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the cause of the other 41 Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attri butes of the substance, or by the differences of their modi fications 4! Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute ... 41 Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance . xiv SPINOZA THE ETHICS — Continued. PART I. CONCERNING God — Continued. Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance . 42 Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite . . 42 Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes 45 Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself 45 Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists 45 Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided . . 48 Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible . 48 Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived 49 Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God noth ing can be, or be conceived 49 Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways — that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect 53 Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone 54 Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things 57 Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal 57 Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same 58 Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute na ture of any attribute of God, must always exist and be in finite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute 58 Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite thiough the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite .... 60 Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an at tribute modified by a modification, which exists neces sarily and as infinite 60 Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence 60 Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the exist ence of things, but also of their essence 61 Prop. XXVI. A thing, which is conditioned to act in a par ticular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned CONTENTS xv THE ETHICS — Continued. PART I. CONCERNING GOD — Continued. by God ; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act 61 Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself uncondi tioned 62 Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for exist ence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act, un less it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity 62 Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature ... 63 Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function in finite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else 64 Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or in finite, as will, desire, love, etc. , should be referred to pas sive nature, and not to active nature 64 Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause 65 Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained 66 Prop. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence . 70 Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists 70 Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow 7o APPENDIX 7O PART II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND ... 78 Preface 73 Definitions 73 Axioms 79 Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a think ing thing 79 Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an ex tended thing 80 xvi SPINOZA THE ETHICS — Continued. PART II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND — Continued. Prop. Ill In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence 80 Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one . . 81 Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects, or the things perceived, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing , 81 Prop. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute 82 Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things 82 Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God 83 Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually exist ing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity . 84 Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man — in other words, substance does not con stitute the actual being of man 85 Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing 87 Prop. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be per ceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind 88 Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of exten sion which actually exists, and nothing else .... 88 CONTENTS xvii THE ETHICS— Continued. PART II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND — Continued. Digression on the nature of bodies — Axioms I., II. Lem mas I. — III 90 Axioms I., II 9! Definition — Axiom III. — Lemmas IV., V 92 Lemmas VI., VII 93 Postulates 94 Prop. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so, in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impres sions 04 Prop. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas 94 Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the na ture of the human body, and also the nature of the exter nal body 95 Prop. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the hu man mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way as to exclude the existence of the said external body 95 Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterward imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also 97 Prop. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected . • 99 Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body 99 Prop. XXL This idea of the mind is united to the mind, in the same way as the mind is united to the body . . 100 Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modi fications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifi cations . I00 Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body Ior Prop. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an ade quate knowledge of the parts composing the human body 101 xviii SPINOZA THE ETHICS — Continued. PART II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND — Continued. Prop. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body IO2 Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any ex ternal body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body .... 102 Prop. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself 1O3 Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused 103 Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowl edge of the human mind 104 Prop. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration of our body IO4 Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves Iog Prop. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true I05 Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false 106 Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or ade quate and perfect, is true 106 Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowl edge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve IO6 Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas . 107 Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all, and is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing 107 Prop. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately 107 Prop. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind 108 Prop. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas, which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate 109 CONTENTS xix PAG a THE ETHICS — Continued. PART II OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND — Continued. Prop. XLI. Opinion is the only source of falsity, reason and intuition are necessarily true 112 Prop. XLII. Reason and intuition, not opinion, teach us to distinguish the true from the false 112 Prop. XLI 1 1. He who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived 112 Prop. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary 114 Prop XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particu lar thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eter nal and infinite essence of God 115 Prop. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect 116 Prop. XLVI I. The human mind has an adequate knowl edge of the eternal and infinite essence of God . . .116 Prop. XLVI II. In the mind there is no absolute or free will ; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity 118 Prop. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition, or affirma tion and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves ng PART III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS . 127 Definitions 128 Postulates 129 Prop. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in cer tain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active ; and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive 129 Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest, or any state different from these, if such there be 130 Prop. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from ade quate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas 134 Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself 135 Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other 135 Prop. VI. Everything in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being 135 xx SPINOZA THE ETHICS — Continued. PART III. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS — Continued, Prop. VII. The endeavor, wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question 136 Prop. VIII. The endeavor, whereby a thing endeavors to persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an in definite time 136 Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavor it is conscious . . .136 Prop. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto 137 Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind 137 Prop. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to con ceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body .139 Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which di minish or hinder the body's power of activity, it en deavors, as far as possible, to remember things, which exclude the existence of the first-named things . . . 139 Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterward affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other 140 Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire .140 Prop. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive that a given object has some point of resemblance with an other object, which is wont to affect the mind pleasur- ably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate . 141 Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it . . .142 Prop. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future, as by the image of a thing present 143 CONTENTS xxi THE ETHICS —Continued. PART III. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS — Continued Prop. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved, he will feel pleasure .... .144 Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure I44 Prop. XXL He who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover, ac cording as it is greater or less in the thing loved . 145 Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love toward that thing. Contrariwise, if we con ceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred toward it . . . . I45 Prop. XXIII. He who conceives that an object of his hatred is painfully affected will feel pleasure. Con trariwise, if he think that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred I46 Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an .object of our hate, we shall feel hatred toward him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love toward him . .147 Prop. XXV. We endeavor to affirm, concerning ourselves and concerning what we love, everything that we con ceive to affect pleasurably ourselves or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavor to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object I47 Prop. XXVI. We endeavor to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and contrariwise, we endeavor to deny concerning it everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably I47 Prop. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion .... 148 Prop. XXVIII. We endeavor to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain . . . 149 xxii SPINOZA PAGB THE ETHICS— Continued. PART III. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS— Continued. Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavor to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrari wise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from 15° Prop. XXX. If anyone has done something which he con ceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of him self as a cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done any thing which he regards as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain 150 Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul i5r Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavor to bring it about, that the man in ques tion shall not gain possession thereof 152 Prop. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavor, as far as we can, to bring it about that it should love us in return 153 Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected toward us, the greater will be our complacency 153 Prop. XXXV. If anyone conceives that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friend ship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred toward the loved object and with envy toward his rival 154 Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein 155 Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater • . . 155 Prop. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in propor tion to the strength of his former love 156 CONTENTS THE ETHICS —Continued. PART III. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS — Continued. Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavor to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit y him 157 Prop. XL. He who conceives himself to be hated by an other, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return I58 Prop. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by an other, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return I59 Prop. XLIL He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honor will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude . . . .159 Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love . . .160 Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love; and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it !6O Prop. XLV. If a man conceives that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person l6l Prop. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accom panied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation, the man will feel love or hatred not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation, whereto he belongs 161 Prop. XLVI I. Joy arising from the fact that anything we hate is destroyed or suffers other injury, is never unac companied by a certain pain in us .".... T6i Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred toward, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause; and will be diminished in pro portion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion l62 Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred toward a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt toward a thing acting by necessity ^ Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear ' . xxiv SPINOZA THE ETHICS — Continued. PART III. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS — Continued. Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently af fected at different times by the same object .... 164 Prop. LII. An object, which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long as an object which we con ceive to have some property peculiar to itself .... 165 Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure ; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity . . . 167 Prop. LIV. The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity 167 Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat 167 Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are kinds of objects, whereby we are affected 169 Prop. LVI I. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other 171 Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are pas sivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us, in so far as we are active 172 Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain 173 Definitions of the Emotions 175 General Definition of the Emotions 187 PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS 189 Preface 189 Definitions 192 Axiom 194 Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true 194 CONTENTS xxv THE ETHICS — Continued. PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE — Continued. Prop. II. We are only passive in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts 195 Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes 195 Prop. IV. It is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of un dergoing no changes, save such as can be under stood through his nature only as their adequate cause 195 Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing, are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavor to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own 196 Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can over come the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him . . .197 Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or de stroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion 197 Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof 198 Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us . . . .198 Prop. X. Toward something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval ; so too by the re membrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that it has long passed away . . . .199 Prop. XL An emotion toward that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion toward that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary 200 Prop. XII. An emotion toward a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we con ceive is possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than an emotion toward a thing contin gent 200 xxvi SPINOZA THE ETHICS— Con tin ued. PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE — Continued. Prop. XIII. Emotion toward a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion toward a thing past . 201 Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion .... 201 Prop. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil can be quenched or checked by many other de sires arising from the emotions, whereby we are assailed 201 Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment . 202 Prop. XVII Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are at present .... 202 Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain . . 203 Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessa rily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad 205 Prop. XX. The more every man endeavors and is able to seek what is useful to him, in other words to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue ; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power 205 Prop. XXI. No one can rightly desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wish ing to be, to act, and to live, in other words, to actually exist 206 Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this en deavor to preserve one's own being 206 Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a partic ular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be ab solutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action, because he understands 207 Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in ac cordance with the dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself 207 CONTENTS xxvii THE ETHICS— Continued. PART JV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE — Continued. Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else 207 Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavor in obedience to rea son is nothing further than to understand ; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to un derstanding 208 Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding . . 208 \ Prop. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God . . 209 Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of ac tivity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, un less it has something in common with our nature . . 209 Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the qual ity which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us, in so far as it is contrary to our nature . . .210 Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good 210 Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony 211 Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions or passive states ; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant 211 Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another 211 Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature . . 213 Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein 214 Prop. XXXVII. The good, which every man who follows after virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God 215 Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man ; and is so in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or of affecting other bodies in an in creased number of ways ; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man . 219 xxviii SPINOZA THE ETHICS— Continued. PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE— Continued. Prop XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad . 219 Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or *H causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad . . . 221 Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good; contrari wise, pain in itself is bad 221 Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad 221 Prop. XLIIL Stimulation may be excessive and bad ; on the other hand grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad 221 Prop. XLIV, Love and desire may be excessive . . . 222 Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good .... . 223 Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavors, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., toward him .... 224 Prop. XLVI I. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in them selves good 225 Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparage ment are always bad 225 Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud 225 Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is in itself bad and useless 225 Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom 226 Prop. LII. Self -approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible . . 227 Prop. LIIL Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason .... 227 Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm .... ... 228 Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self ... 228 Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit 228 Prop. LVI I. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded 229 Prop. LVIII. Honor (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom 230 CONTENTS xxix THE ETHICS — Continued, PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE — Continued, Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotions, wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason 231 Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is, not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to man as a whole 233 Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive 233 Prop. LXI I. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future 234 Prop. LXIII. He who is lead by fear, and does good in order tp escape evil, is not led by reason . . . .235 Prop. LX1V. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge 236 Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pur sue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils 236 Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future 236 Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life .... 237 Prop. LXV1II. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good or evil 237 Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them 239 Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the igno rant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favors from them 239 Prop. LXX I. Only free men are thoroughly grateful, one to another 2«o Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith ... 240 Prop. LXXII I. The man who is guided by reason is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent . 240 Appendix on the Right Way of Life 241 xxx SPINOZA PAGE THE ETHICS — Continued. PART V. ON THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM 250 Preface .... 250 Axioms 253 Prop. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are ar ranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifi cations of the body, or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body . 253 Prop. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred toward that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit, which arise from these emotions be destroyed . 254 Prop. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof 254 Prop. IV. There is no modification of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception . 254 Prop. V. An emotion toward a thing which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion 256 Prop. VI. The mind has greater power over the emo tions, and is less subject thereto, in so far as it under stands all things as necessary 256 Prop. VII. Emotions, which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects, that we regard as absent 257 Prop. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused 258 Prop. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes, which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto, and less affected toward each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion, attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause 258 Prop. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order 258 Prop. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and affects the mind more 261 CONTENTS xxxi PAGE THE El HICS — Continued. PART V. ON THK POWKR OF THE UNDERSTANDING — Continued. Prop. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand than with others . . 261 Prop. XIII A mental image is more often vivid, in pro portion as i+ is associated with a greater number of other images 261 Prop. XIV, The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God . . 262 Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions 262 Prop. XVI. This love toward God must hold the chief place in the mind 262 Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain 262 Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God 262 Prop. XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavor that God should love him in return 263 Prop. XX. This love toward God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy ; contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love 263 Prop. XXI. The mind can onlv imagine anything, or re member what is past, while the body endures . . 265 Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity 266 Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it some thing which is eternal 266 Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God 267 Proo. XXV. The highest endeavor of the mind, and the highest virtue, is to understand things by intuition . . 267 Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by intuition, it desires more so to derstand things 267 Prop. XXVII. From intuition arises the highest possible mental acquiescence 268 Prop. XXVIII. The endeavor or desire to know things by intuition cannot arise from opinion, but from reason . 268 xxxii SPINOZA THE ETHICS— Continued. PART V. ON THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING — Continued. Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of con ceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity 268 Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent neces sarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God 269, Prop. XXXI. Intuition depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal ... 269 Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by intuition, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause 270 Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuition, is eternal 271 Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions 271 Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellec tual love 2Hj Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind toward God is that very love of God, whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind re garded under the form of eternity ; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love, wherewith God loves himself . . . 272 Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is con trary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away . 273 Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by reason and intuition, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death .... 273 Prop. XXXIX. He who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities possesses a soul whereof the greatest part is eternal 274 Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive ; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect 275 Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things, which in Part IV. we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness 276 CONTENTS xxxiii THE ETHICS — Continued. PART V. ON THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING — Continued. Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but. contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts . . . 277 SPINOZA'S CORRESPONDENCE (ABRIDGED) ... 279 Letters I. — XXV. A. (1661-1676). Between Spinoza and Henry Oldenburg 279 Letters XXVI.— XXVIII. Between Spinoza and Simon de Vries ... 314 Letters XXIX., XXIX. A. (1663). From Spinoza to Lewis Meyer .... 321 Letter XXX. (1664). From Spinoza to Peter Balling . .329 Letters XXXI.— XXXVIII. (1664-65 ). Between Spinoza and William Blyenbergh 335 Letters XXXIX.— XLI. (1666). From Spinoza to Christian Huyghens, on the unity of God 336 Letters XLI.A., XLII. (1665-66). From Spinoza to a cor respondent probably identified with John Bresser . . 364 Letter XLIII. (1666). Spinoza to I. v. M. on a problem connected with games of chance (omitted). Letters XLIV.— XLVI. (on scientific subjects, and omitted), and Letter XLVII. (1667-71). From Spinoza to a cor respondent probably identified with Jarig Jellis . . . 368 Letter XLVIII. (1671). From Lambert de Velthuysen to Isaac Orobio against Tractatus Theologico - Politicus (omitted). Letter XLIX. (1671). Spinoza's answer to XLVIII., ad dressed to Isaac Orobio 369 Letter L. (1674). From Spinoza to Jarig Jellis, on Hobbes, etc- 374 Letters LI., LII. (1671). Between Spinoza and Leibnitz . 376 Letters LIII., LIV. (1673). Between Spinoza and Fabritius 379 Letters LV.— LX. (1674). Between Spinoza and Hugo Boxel on Ghosts 381 Letters LXL— LXXII. (1674-76). Between Spinoza, E. W. von Tschirnhausen and G. H. Schaller 395 Letters LXXIII., LXXIV. (1675). Between Spinoza and Albert Burgh 4I6 Letter LXXV. (1675 ?) From Spinoza to Lambert de Vel .426 ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDER STANDING. AFTER experience had taught me that all the usual sur roundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing- that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to com municate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else; whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. I say (< I FINALLY resolved, w for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain. I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so placed, and I gave them my whole atten tion, I should equally fail. I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a cer tainty concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual plan of my life ; with this end in view I made many efforts, but in vain. For the ordinary sur roundings of life which are esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may be classed under the three heads — Riches, Fame, and the Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any different good. By 2 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other ob ject; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled. The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their own sake, inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good. In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end to which all actions are directed. Further, the attain ment of riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and, consequently, the more we are incited to increase both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness. Fame has the further drawback that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and seeking what they usually seek. When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new — nay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would have to be aban doned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be will ingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. However, after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment. Further reflection convinced me, that if I could really get to the root of the matter, I should be leaving certain SPINOZA 3 evils for a certain good. I thus perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy, however uncertain it might be ; as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek such a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. All the objects pursued by the multitude, not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not seldom of those who possess them, and always of those who are possessed by them. There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. Exam ples are no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. Lastly, there are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through over indulgence in sensual pleasure. All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly to depend on the quality of the object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it — no sadness will be felt if it perishes — no envy if it is possessed by another — no fear no hatred, in short no disturbances of the mind. All these arise from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. But love toward a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength. Yet it was not at random that I used the words, (< If I could go to the root of the matter, >J for, though what I have urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame. One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects of desire, and seriously con sidered the search for a new principle; this state of 4 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. Although these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet afterward, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, they became more fre quent and more lasting; especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means they will be under restraint, and, far from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which they are sought, as I will show in due time. I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good, and also what is the nature of the highest good. In order that this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms good and evil are only ap plied relatively, so that the same thing may be called both good and bad, according to the relations in view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature. However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a char acter. Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other individ uals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid char acter. What that character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature. This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to such a char acter myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to it with me. In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so that their understanding and desire may SPINOZA 5 entirely agree with my own. In order to bring- this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character, and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger. We must seek the assist ance of Moral Philosophy * and the Theory of Education ; further, as health is no insignificant means for at taining our end, we must also include the whole science of Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by con trivance rendered easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the science of Mechanics must in no way be despised. But, before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in the best possible way. Thus it is apparent to every one that I wish to direct all sciences to one end and aim, so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named ; and, therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as useless. To sum up the matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to this one end. Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path, we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit, the following : I. To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to comply with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose. For we can gain from the multitude no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception of the truth. II. To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for preserving health. * I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary for our purpose ; I lay no stress on their order. 6 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING III. Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to follow such general customs as are con sistent with our purpose. Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. In order to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect. Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowl edge may be reduced to four: I. Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he pleases. II. Perception arising from mere experience — that is, from experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains unassailed in our mind. III. Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when from some effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present. IV. Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause. All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples. By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other matters about which I have never felt any doubt. By mere experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. I know by mere SPINOZA 7 experience that oil has the property of feeding- fire, and water of extinguishing it. In the same way I know that a dog is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life. We deduce one thing from another as follows : when we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence clearly infer that the mind is united to the body, and that their union is the cause of the given sen sation; but we cannot thence absolutely understand the nature of the sensation and the union. Or, after I have become acquainted with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears, and can draw other conclusions of the same kind. Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence ; when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a third, are parallel to one another, etc. The things which I have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few. In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows: Three numbers are given — it is required to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters ; others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be multi plied by the third, and the product divided by the first, the quotient is 6 ; when they see that by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth number proportional. Mathe- 8 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING maticians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers or, if they do see it, they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively, without going through any process. In order that from these modes of perception the best may be selected, it is well that we should briefly enu merate the means necessary for attaining our end. I. To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general. II. To collect in this way the differences, the agree ments, and the oppositions of things. III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified. IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man. We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining. We shall then be in a position to see which mode of percep tion we ought to choose. As to the first mode, it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration ; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. We may, therefore, clearly con clude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character. For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way. The second mode of perception* cannot be said to give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, for * I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience, and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics, and by recent philoso phers. SPINOZA 9 we shall never discover anything- in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of the things in question be known first. Wherefore this mode also must be rejected. Of the third mode of perception we may say in a man ner that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it enables us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at. The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate es sence of a thing- without danger of error. This mode, therefore, must be the one which we chiefly employ. How, then, should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning things previously unknown ? I will proceed to explain. Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity — that is, in order to discover the best method for finding out the truth, there is no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. By such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowl edge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about in a similar way. For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made ; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron. But as men at first made use of the instru ments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labor and greater perfection ; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of 10 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, with small expenditure of labor, the vast number of complicated mechanisms which they now possess. So, in like manner, the intellect, by its na tive strength,* makes for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intel lectual operations, and from these operations gets again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investiga tions further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom. That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for finding out the truth, and of the natural in struments so necessary for the construction of more com plex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus proceed with my demonstration. A true idea (for we possess a true idea) is something different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle. The idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a centre, as a circle has ; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia formalis} is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective essence (essentia objectiva). And, again, this second subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real, and capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely. For instance, the man Peter is some thing real ; the true idea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter. Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will also be capable of being understood — that is, of being the subject of another idea, which will contain by representation (objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually * By native strength, I mean that bestowed on us by external causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy. SPINOZA u (formaliter). And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; and so on, indefinitely. This every one may make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, etc. Hence it is plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of Peter. This is the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. This is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of a triangle. But, with these ideas, the contrary is the case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know. Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. Further, it is also evident that, for the cer titude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we know. Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: for certainty is identical with such subjective essence. Thus, as the truth needs no sign — it being sufficient to possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in order that all doubts may be removed — it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth itself, or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for all these expressions are synony mous. Again, method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning or understanding — I mean, method is not identical with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions and by investigating its nature in order 12 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING that we may thus know our power of understanding, and may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental exertion. Whence we may gather that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that as there can be no idea of an idea — unless an idea exists previously,— there can be no method without a pre-existent idea. Therefore, that will be a good method which shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea. Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two ideas is the same as the ratio between the actual realities cor responding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other objects — in other words, that method will be most perfect which affords the standard of the given idea of the most perfect being whereby we may direct our mind. We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh instru ments for pursuing its inquiries further. For we may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument ; and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all other perceptions. In this, one part of the method consists. Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the comprehension of a greater number of ob jects, and that it will be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the absolutely perfect being or becomes conscious thereof. Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature ; by increased self-knowledge it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for its own SPINOZA 13 guidance; and, by increased knowledge of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. And this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated. We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same case as its correlate in the world of real ity. If, therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence, which would in every way cor respond to the objective reality, the subjective essence would have no connection with any other ideas — in other words, we could not draw any conclusion with regard to it. On the other hand, those things which are connected with others — as all things that exist in nature — will be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities — that is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments for proceeding with our investi gation will increase. This is what we are endeavoring to prove. Further, from what has just been said — namely, that an idea must, in all respects, correspond to its cor relate in the world of reality — it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas. It may, perhaps, provoke__Jastonishment that, after having said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not self-evident. We may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of our reasoning. If our reasoning be sound, we must take as a starting point a true idea. Now, to be certain that our starting point is really a true idea, we need a proof. This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second, the second by a third, and so on to infinity. To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance any one had adopted this method in his investigations of nature — that is, if he had acquired new ideas in the i4 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING proper order, according1 to the standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously toward him. But as this never, or rarely, happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and fore thought what we cannot acquire by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure, I seek still to establish it. Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men in their inward meditations. The reasons for its rare employment in investigations of nature are to be found in current mis conceptions, whereof we shall examine the causes here after in our philosophy. Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate discernment. Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable. There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into. If any one asks why I have not at the starting point set forth all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth. This is why I have begun as above. If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth as our standard, he must either be arguing1 in bad faith, or we must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions — that is, to some external influence. Such persons are not conscious of themselves. If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they affirm or doubt ; they say that they know nothing, and they say SPINOZA 15 that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing. Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing-; in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing something which should smack of truth. Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of sciences; for, in what relates to life and con duct, they are compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an oath. If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that they deny, grant, or gain say, so that they ought to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence. Let us now return to our proposition. Up to the pres ent we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts ; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best adapted to aid us in attain ing our perfection; thirdly, we have discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good beginning — namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. Now, in order that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a means of distin guishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea; thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor. When we became ac quainted with this method, we saw that, fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely perfect Being. This is an observation which should be made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of such a being more quickly. Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method, which is, as we have said, to distingtiish and separate the true idea from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. I intend to dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the reader's mind, and also because 16 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING there are some who doubt of true ideas, through not having" attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others. Such persons are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but after ward in a dream, as often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. This state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking. Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give the essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. Such work lies in the province of philosophy. I shall confine myself to what concerns method — that is, to the character of fictitious, false, and doubtful perception, and the means of freeing ourselves therefrom. Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea. Every perception has for its object either a thing con sidered as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. Now <( fiction w is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. I will, therefore, consider these first — I mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or assumed to be understood. For instance, I feign that Peter, whom I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, or something of that kind. With what is such an idea concerned ? It is concerned with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible. I call a thing IMPOSSIBLE, when its existence would imply a con tradiction; NECESSARY, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction; POSSIBLE, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. If the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious hypothesis about it; whence it follows that if there be a God or omniscient Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. For, as regards our selves, when I know that I exist, I cannot hypothesize SPINOZA 17 that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can hy pothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle; nor when I know the nature of God, can I hy pothesize that he exists or does not exist. The same thing must be said of the Chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. From these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that fiction cannot be con cerned with eternal truths. But before proceeding further, I must remark, in pass ing, that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. Thus, the more existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly, and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it under stood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper object. This is worthy of remark. We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly called fictions, though we clearly understand that the thing is not as we imagine it. For instance, I know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. However, examina tion will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as our selves, or can, like us, fall under it. We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, etc., I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, i8 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING or which I might have fallen into, and afterward I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it is still, or may still fall under the same mistake. This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying that I had made the attempt. It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in prob lems, which sometimes involve impossibilities. For in stance, when we say — let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us assume that it burns in some im aginary space, or where there are no physical objects. Such assumptions are freely made, though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. But, though this be so, there is no fiction in the case. For, in the first case, I have merely recalled to memory another candle not burn ing, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out of the question, all that I think of the former. In the second case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no cause for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable, and so on. Thus there is here no fiction, but true and bare assertions. Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with es sences only, or with some reality or existence simultane ously. Of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas, as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less. For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly ; or, when we know the na ture of the soul, we cannot imagine it as square, though SPINOZA ,9 anything may be expressed verbally. But, as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men in stantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts ap pearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men, and infinite other ab surdities of the same kind. Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after 1 have formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby precluded from thinking of it under any other form. For instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example, is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul, I am not able to think of it as square, etc. But these arguments demand further inquiry. First, their upholders must either grant or deny that we can under stand anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be said of understanding as is said of fiction. If they deny it, let us, who know that we do know some thing, see what they mean. They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power, create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. In fact, they regard the soul as a sort of god. Further, they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. For, after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is con strained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith. Our opponents are thus driven to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational refutation. 20 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING While leaving such persons in their error, we will take care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose, namely, that the mind, in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are deriv able from it, the mind will proceed with an uninter rupted series of apt conclusions ; in the same way as it would at once discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it. We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypoth eses, so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved. For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely general, so general that there would be no conception, that is, no idea or connection of sub ject and predicate, in our mind. If there were such a conception we should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place. Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the sub ject and the predicate. Now, if the first idea be not fic titious, and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside. Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex, and does not dis tinguish between the known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making distinctions, it follows, FIRST, that if the idea be of something very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. For a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be known altogether or not at all. SECONDLY, it follows that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each part be regarded SPINOZA 21 separately, all confusion will disappear. THIRDLY, it fol lows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature, or rather is composed of at tention* directed to all such ideas at once, and unac companied by any mental assent. Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and dis tinct, and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. For instance, when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things of that kind. Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction. As for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if the existence of that thing is in itself an eternal truth, fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the thing conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful that such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to consider the order of nature. As for the second sort of fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, to different confused ideas repre senting different things and actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely simple thing connot be feigned, but must be understood, and that a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and the manner of such action. * Observe that fiction regarded in itself, differs only from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the external causes which we per ceive through the senses while awake. It has hence been inferred that representations occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external to us. We shall presently see that error is the dreaming of a waking man ; if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium. 22 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is concerned, and the means of guarding our selves from falling into false perceptions. Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas. The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent — that is as we have already remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude that such representations do not arise from external objects, in fact it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open, or while awake. Thus a false idea is concerned with (or to speak more correctly), attributable to the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in the same way as a fictitious idea. If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances. If attributable to the essence, it is likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary existence, we cannot possi bly be in error with regard to its existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth, like its essence, but contrariwise, the necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external causes, then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the case of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even with actions, such per ceptions are necessarily always confused, being com pounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are per suaded that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts, and the like ; that there are bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about and speak ; that God is deceived, and so on. But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things clearly and distinctly con ceived are either very simple themselves, or are com pounded from very simple ideas — that is, are deduced therefrom. The impossibility of a very simple idea being SPINOZA 23 false is evident to every one who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood. As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. If an architect conceives a building properly constructed, though such a building may never have ex isted, and may never exist, nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same, whether it be put into execution or not. On the other hand, if any one asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far as its as- serter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though Peter actually does exist. The assertion that Peter exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does exist. Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real, whereby the true are distinguished from the false. This reality must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth (we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge), and to know the properties of our understanding. Neither must we say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact that true knowledge consists in know ing things through their primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge, as I have just ex plained it: for thought is said to be true, if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself. Where fore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the actual power and nature of the under standing. For, if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before He cre ated things (a perception which certainly could not arise from any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from the said perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being determined by any 24 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING external object; they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding. Thus, that which con stitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the thought itself and deduced from the nature of the understanding. In order to pursue our investiga tion, let us confront ourselves with some TRUE idea, whose object we know for certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have nothing corresponding to it in nature. With an idea of this kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said, be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view. For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, I invent a cause at my pleasure — namely, a semicircle revolving round its centre, and thus producing a sphere. This is indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. We must observe that this per ception asserts the rotation of a semicircle — which asser tion would be false, if it were not associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause determining a mo tion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion were iso lated. The mind would then only tend to the affirma tion of the sole motion of a semicircle which is not con tained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion. Thus FALSITY consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the con ception we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. Whence it follows that simple ideas can not be other than TRUE — e.g., the simple idea of a semi circle, of motion, of rest, of quantity, etc. Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed, and does not extend further. Where fore we may form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error. It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. It is certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. For when we affirm SPINOZA 25 somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the con cept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas. Thus we have seen that the motion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause determining such a motion. But if it be the nature of a thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts — some in their entirety, others in fragments only — constitute our mind. But there is another point to be considered, which was not worth raising in the case of fiction, but which gives rise to complete deception — namely, that certain things presented to the imagination also exist in the under standing — in other words, are conceived clearly and dis tinctly. Hence, so long as we do not separate that which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. For instance, certain Stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imagined, also, and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are penetrated by none. By combining these ideas, and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these very subtle bodies can not be divided, etc. But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea. We must take care, as has been said, to separate such per ceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience. Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being con ceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident that what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything else. Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the primary elements of nature 26 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING as a whole; whence we proceed without due order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound themselves, and pervert the order of nature. However, if we proceed with as little abstraction as pos sible, and begin from primary elements — that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back as we can reach, — we need not fear any deceptions of this kind. As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned, there is no danger of our confounding it with abstrac tions. For when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really existing in nature. Again, there are many things in nature, the difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding ; so that it may readily happen that such things are confounded together, if they be conceived ab stractedly. But since the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in the understand ing than it does in reality, and has no likeness to mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth. This is, in fact, a being single and infinite ; in other words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being found. Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now to investigate the doubtful idea — that is, to inquire what can cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be re moved. I speak of real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does not really hesitate. The cure of the latter does not fall within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure. Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing doubted of. In other words, if there were only one idea in the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no doubt of certainty present, only a SPINOZA 27 certain sensation. For an idea is in itself nothing" else than a certain sensation; but doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusion with regard to the matter under consideration ; that is, the idea which causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. To take an example. Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by ex perience, or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears. Thus rustics are generally aston ished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the earth. But from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses * doubt arises, and if, after doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things at a dis tance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt is again removed. Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is most certain. We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct idea — in other words, until we reflect on the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and find that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But if we have a knowledge of God eqiial to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed. In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some arch- deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowl edge of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it, it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can possess concerning clear and distinct ideas. Thus, if a man proceeded with our inves tigations in due order, inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association, and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to answer them, he * That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us. But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how they deceive us. 28 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING will never have any ideas save such as are very certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in hand must needs be imperfect. We may, therefore, conclude that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation. These are the points I promised to discuss in this first part of my treatise on method. However, in order not to omit anything which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness. The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding. For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it is remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we forget it. For instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a nar ration. The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the understanding by means of the power where with the imagination or the sense called common is af fected by some particular physical object. I say PARTICULAR, for the imagination is only affected by par ticular objects. If we read, for instance, a single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory. If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another. I say, also PHYSICAL. For the imagination is only affected by physical objects. As, then, the memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the un derstanding, we may conclude that it is different from the understanding, and that in the matter considered in itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness. What, then, is memory ? It is nothing else than the actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the thought of a definite duration of the sensation. This SPINOZA 29 is also shown by reminiscence. For then we think of the sensation, but without the notion of continuous dura tion; thus the idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation or actual memory. Whether ideas are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in my philosophy. If this seems too absurd to any one, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in propor tion to its singularity, as appears from the example of the comedy just cited. Further, a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot help remembering that which is extremely singular and sufficiently intelligible. Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest, originate in the imagination — that is, in certain sensations fortuitous (so to speak) and dis connected, arising not from the power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, sleeping or waking, receives various motions. But one may take any view one likes of the imagin ation so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that the soul is passive with regard to it. The view taken is immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the under standing. Let no one then be astonished that before prov ing the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of imagination of body, and of its composition. The view taken is, I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite, etc. As regards a true idea, we have shown that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas ; that it shows how and why something is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object. This conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true science proceeds from cause to effect ; though the ancients, so far as I know, never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts accord- 30 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING ing to fixed laws; and is, as it were, an immaterial auto maton. Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of a true idea that we need no longer fear con founding truth with falsehood and fiction. Neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which agree there with. We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the mind is entirely passive with regard to them. Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as believ ing that extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another, and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we shall duly show. Again, since words are a part of the imagination — that is, since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory, de pendent on particular bodily conditions — there is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we keep strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed ac cording to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, there fore, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding. This is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the un derstanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often given, such as incorporeal, infinite, etc. So, also, many conceptions really affirmative are expressed nega tively, and vice versa, such as uncreate, independent, infi nite, immortal, etc., inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and, therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. Many things we SPINOZA 31 affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. While we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth. Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. Thus, we put first that which should be last; the true order of progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn. Now, in order at length to pass on to the second part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the means for its attainment. The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange / them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect sub jectively the reality of nature, both as a whole and as » parts. As for the first point, it is necessary ( as we have said ) for our purpose that everything should be conceived, / either SOLELY THROUGH ITS ESSENCE, or THROUGH ITS PROXI MATE CAUSE. If the thing be self-existent, or as is com monly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must be understood through its proximate cause. For, in reality, the knowl edge of an effect is nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause. Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusions from abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself. The best basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate definition. For the understanding can not descend from universal axioms by themselves to particu- 32 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING lar things, since axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the understanding to contemplate one particu lar thing more than another. Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition. This process will be the more fruitful and easy in pro portion as the thing given be better defined. Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this second part of method con sists in the knowledge of the conditions of good defini tion, and the means of finding them. I will first treat of the conditions of definition. A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties. In order to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors, I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition of which is of little moment. Such is a circle. If a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties. Though, as I have said, this is of no importance in the case of figures and other abstractions, it is of great importance in the case of physical beings and realities : for the properties of things are not under stood so long as their essences are unknown. If the latter be passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the succes sion of nature, and we go far astray from our object. In order to be free from this fault, the following rules should be observed in definition: I. If the thing in question be created, the definition must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause. For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be de fined as follows: the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free. This definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause. II. A conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is con sidered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, SPINOZA 33 can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the^sdefinition given of a circle : for from that it clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. That this is a necessary characteristic of a definition is so clear to any one, who reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second condition, every defini tion should be affirmative. I speak of intellectual affirma tion, giving little thought to verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of the language, must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though the idea con tained is affirmative. The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows : I. The exclusion of all idea of cause — that is, the thing must not need explanation by anything outside itself. II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not. * III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other words, the object defined must not be ex plained through abstractions. IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing defined. All these rules become obvious to any one giving strict attention to the matter. I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a con clusion is a particular affirmative essence. The more specialized the idea is, the more is it distinct, and there fore clear. Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should be sought for as diligently as possible. As regards the order of our perceptions, and the man ner in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether there be any being (and, if so, what being) that is the cause of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the utmost possible 3 34 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING extent reflect nature. For it will possess, subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. Thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things — that is, from real enti ties, proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes, from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real entity. Either of these processes interrupts the true progress of the understand ing. But it must be observed that, by the series of causes and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow up the series of particular mutable things, both on account of their multitude, sur passing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same thing, any one of which may be the cause for its existence or non-existence. Indeed, their existence has no connection with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an eternal truth. Neither is there any need that we should understand their series, for the essences of particu lar mutable things are not to be gathered from their series or order of existence, which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic denominations, their rela tions, or, at most, their circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost essence. This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those things as in their true codes, according to which all particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be or be conceived without them. Whence these fixed and eternal things, though they are themselves particular, will nevertheless, owing to their presence and power everywhere, be to us as universals, or genera of definitions of particular mutable things, and as the proximate causes of all things. SPINOZA 35 But, though this be so, there seems to be no small diffi culty in arriving- at the knowledge of these particular things, for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of the human understanding. The arrange ment whereby one thing is understood before another, as we have stated, should not be sought from their series of, existence, nor from eternal things. For the latter are all by nature simultaneous. Other aids are therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal things and their laws; however, this is not the place to recount such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws, and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us. Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of partic ular things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain experiments under fixed rules and arrangement which may suffice to determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain an insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show. Here, to return to my purpose, I will only en deavor to set forth what seems necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things, and to define them under the conditions laid down above. With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so as to examine it and to deduce there from in due order all the legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it. This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation. If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, it will be necessary to supply some foun dation which may direct our thoughts thither. Further, since method is reflective knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be nothing else than 36 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its prop erties, and powers. When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect, according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things, allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers. If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by the faculties and power of the understand ing. The chief part of our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the considerations ad vanced in the second part of the method) necessarily to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and understanding. But, so far, we have not got any rules for finding definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can understand nothing. Nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, the definition of the understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its proper ties, which we know clearly and distinctly. Let us, then enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us examine them, and begin by discussing the instru ments for research which we find innate in us. The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the fol lowing : — I. It involves certainty — in other words, it knows that a thing exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively. II. That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas absolutely, some ideas from others. Thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other SPINOZA 37 thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of quantity. III. Those ideas which the understanding forms abso lutely express infinity ; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. All these are perceptions which do not serve toward understanding quantity, but only to ward determining it. This is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity be per ceived also; we can even prolong the motion so as to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity. IV. The understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas. V. It perceives things not so much under the condition of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an infinite number ; or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining them, it perceives them in a determi nate number, duration, and quantity. VI. The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem so to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused ideas the contrary is the case. They are often formed against our will. VII. The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, which the understanding forms from other ideas : thus, for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved round two centres, or, again, it conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, or a cone cut in an oblique plane, so that the angle of inclination is greater than the angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an infinity of other ways. VIII. The more ideas express perfection of any object, the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not 38 IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple. I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought, such as love, joy, etc. They are nothing to our present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived previously. When perception is removed, all these go with it. False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them (as we have abundantly shown) which causes them to be called false or fictitious ; they are only considered as such through the defectiveness of knowledge. Therefore, false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing con cerning the essence of thought ; this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated ; in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, they too vanish with it. [ The rest of the treatise is wanting. ] THE ETHICS. PART I. CONCERNING GOD. DEFINITIONS. I. BY THAT which is SELF-CAUSED, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. II. A thing is called FINITE AFTER ITS KIND, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is lim ited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. III. By SUBSTANCE, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. IV. By ATTRIBUTE, I mean that which the intellect per ceives as constituting the essence of substance. V. By MODE, I mean the modifications * of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself. VI. By GOD, I mean a being absolutely infinite — that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. Explanation. — I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, in finite attributes may be denied; but that which is abso lutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation. VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action * ^Affectiones* (39) 40 THE ETHICS is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is deter mined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action. VIII. By ETERNITY, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal. Explanation. — Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, there fore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end. AXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else. II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself. III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow. IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ;^ the concep tion of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence. PROPOSITIONS. PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications. Proof. — This is clear from Def. iii. and v. PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are dif ferent, have nothing in common. Proof. — Also evident from Def. iii. For each IT 'st in itself, and be conceived through itself; in othv 5, the conception of one does not imply the conc^ f the other. CONCERNING GOD 41 PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common can not be one the cause of the other. Proof. — If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D. PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attri butes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications. Proof. — Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.), — that is (by Def. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the sub stances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D. PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Proof. — If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications — as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop, i.), — it follows that set ting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly (Def. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another, — that is (by Prop, iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D. "PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance. Proof. — It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i. c. , which have anything common to them both (Prop, ii.), and, therefore (Prop, iii.), one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. Q. E. D. 42 THE ETHICS Corollary. — Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the uni verse nothing is granted, save substances and their modi fications (as appears from Ax. i. and Def. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance. PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of sub stance. Proof. — Substance cannot be produced by anything ex ternal (Corollary, Prop, vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause — that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature. — £> PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite. Proof. — There can be only one substance with an identi cal attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop, vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as , finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by j Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop, vii.); and there would be two substances with an identi cal attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D. Note /. — As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop, vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite. Note II. — No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accus tomed to know them by their primary causes, to com prehend the demonstrations of Prop, vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignor ant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they CONCERNING GOD 43 observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion — think that trees might talk just as well as men — that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition x (II. Def. ii.) PPOP. XI. The first element which constitutes the ac tual being of the human mind, is the idea of some par ticular thing actually existing. Proof. — The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is constituted by certain modes of the attri butes of God, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.) must always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something ac tually existing. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so 88 THE ETHICS far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; and when we say that God has this or that idea , not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or in adequately. Note. — Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my state ments, till they have read to the end. PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be per ceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind. Proof. — Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives it. Note. — This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from II. vii., which see. PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else. Proof. — If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his con- NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 89 stituting our mind, but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind ; now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the ideas of the modi fications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I. xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but (II. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D. Note. — We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individ ual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.* For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must neces sarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality. Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say gen erally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted *«Animata.» 90 THE ETHICS than others for doing many actions or receiving1 many im pressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simul taneous perceptions ; and the more the actions of one body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies. AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest. AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly. LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance. Proof. — The first part of this proposition is, I take it, self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought out still more clearly from I. xv.,note. LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects. Proof. — All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest. LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Proof. — Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.) which (Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 91 individual thing, namely (II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.), in motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Q. E. D. Corollary. — Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body ; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident. For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is at rest. If it afterward comes to pass that A is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A'S previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external cause determining A to a state of rest. AXIOM I. All modes, wherein one body is affected by another body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting ; so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes, accord ing to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body. AXIOM II. When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils in order to continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane. 92 THE ETHICS So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies. Definition. — When any given bodies of the same or dif ferent magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that together they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from other bodies by this fact of union. AXIOM III. In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position; consequently the individual will, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form. Those bodies whose parts are in contact over large superficies, are called HARD; those, whose parts are in contact over small superficies, are called SOFT ; those, whose parts are in motion among one another, are called FLUID. LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if at the same time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change in its actuality (forma). Proof, — Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in re spect of substance: that which constitutes the actuality (for main) of an individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will (by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its na ture as before, both in respect of substance and in re spect of mode. Q.E.D. LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or less, but in such proportion, that they all pre serve the same mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be changed. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 93 Proof. — The same as for the last Lemma. LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality. /V00/. — This proposition is self-evident, for the indi vidual is supposed to retain all that, which, in its defi nition, we spoke of as its actual being. LEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves its nature whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest, whether it be moved in this or that direc tion; so long as each part retains its motion, and pre serves its communication with other parts as before. Proof. This proposition is evident from the defini tion of an individual prefixed to Lemma iv. Note. We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness ; that is, of bodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now conceive another individual com posed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, with out change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways with out changing their actuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infi nite ways, without any change in the individual as a 94 THE ETHICS whole. I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not my object, I have only touched on the question, be cause it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view. POSTULATES. I. The human body is composed of a number of indi vidual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex. II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid, some soft, some hard. III. The individual parts composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies. IV. The human body stands in need for its preserva tion of a number of other bodies, by which it is continu ally, so to speak, regenerated. V. When the fluid part of the human body is deter mined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which impels it. VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety of ways. PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of im pressions. Proof. — The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion, etc. Q. E. D. PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 95 Proof. — The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post, i.) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is com posed (II. viii., Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q. E.D. PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body. Proof. — All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax. iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D. Corollary I. — Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own. Corollary II. — It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitu tion of our own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I. PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a man ner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body. Proof. — This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body — that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, 96 THE ETHICS it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, etc. Q.E.D. Corollary. — The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present. Proof. — When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post, v.); hence (Ax. ii., after Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterward they impinge on the new sur faces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled toward those surfaces by external bodies; con sequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizance — that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the ex ternal body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D. Note. — We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 97 it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii). Furthermore (II. vii., Coroll., II. xvi., Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which con stitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this dis position of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of wrhich the ideas rep resent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature — that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free. PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterward imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also. Proof. — The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body, because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies 7 98 THE ETHICS at once ; therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D. Note. — We now clearly see what MEMORY is. It is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modi fications (affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and associ ation of the modifications of the human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind per ceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first ; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things ; that is, that the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the fruit ; similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for in stance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, etc. ; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, a field, etc. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 99 PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected. Proof. — The human mind is the very idea or knowl edge of the human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post, iv.) the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regen erated ; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.); this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and conse quently (II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D. PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body. Proof.— Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); there fore (II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, conse quently also of the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q.E.D. ioo THE ETHICS PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body. Proof. — That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D. Note. — This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attri bute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma] of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter. PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. Proof. — The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 101 the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. Q. E.D. PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. Proof.— T^Q idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II. xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.) since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Fur ther the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas neces sarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself. Q.E.D. PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. Proof. — The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a cer tain fixed relation (Def. after Lemma iii), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals (Post, i.), whose parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II. iii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch (II. ix. ) as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing, which par- 102 THE ETHICS ticular thing" is prior in the order of nature to the afore said part (II. vii.). We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the hu man body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Coroll.) the human mind does not in volve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Q.E.D. PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the hu man body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Proof. — We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowl edge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body. Proof. — If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said ex ternal body, nor does it in any manner perceive its exist ence. But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far (II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D. Corollary. — In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 103 Proof. — When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually exist ing. Therefore (by II. xxv.), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowl edge of them. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself. Proof. — Every idea of the modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given man ner (II. xvi.). But, inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, etc. Q. E. D. PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused. Proof. — The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies (II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are modes (Post, iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts com posing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are as consequences without premises, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D. Note. — The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct ; as also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as every one may easily see. 104 THE ETHICS PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowl edge of the human mind. Proof. — The idea of a modification of the human body (II. xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi.), the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof. Corollary. — Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifi cations of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modifica tion, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused knowl edge thereof (II. xxviii. and note). Q.E.D. Note. — I say expressly, that the mind has not an ade quate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that ; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below. PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration of our body. Proof. — The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 105 God (I. xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body there fore depends on the common order of nature, or the con stitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration of particular things external to our selves. Proof. — Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I. xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration of our body ; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowl edge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I. xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing is contingent. PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are re ferred to God, are true. Proof. — All ideas which are in God agree in every re spect with their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are all true. Q.E.D. 106 THE ETHICS PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing- positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false. Proof. — If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a posi tive mode of thinking, which should constitute the dis tinctive quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore there is noth ing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true. Proof. — When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our minds; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such an idea is true. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowl edge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. Proof. — There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false ( II. xxxiii) ; but falsity cannot consist in simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not iden tical ; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas in volve. Q.E.D. Note. — In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know ; those who boast of such knowl edge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 107 are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterward learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hun dred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby. PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas. Proof. — All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.) adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D. PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II. above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any par ticular thing. Proof. — If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for in stance, the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either exist or be conceived ; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B'S es sence nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately. Proof. — Let A be something which is common to all bodies, and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole. I say A cannot be con ceived except adequately. For the idea thereof in God will necessarily therefore be adequate (II. vii. Coroll.) io8 THE ETHICS both in so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body (II. xvi. , xxv., xxvii.), involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that is (II. xii. , xiii.), the idea in God will nec essarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as it perceives itself and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q. E. D. Corollary. — Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the fore going Prop.) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all. PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a prop erty of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind. Proof. — If A be that, which is common to and a prop erty of the human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external body and in the whole there will be an adequate idea of A in God (II. vii. Coroll.) both in so far as he has the idea of the hu man body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, A ; the idea of this modification will involve the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi. Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 109 Corollary. — Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body- has more in common with other bodies. PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate. Proof. — This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.) that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many partic ular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Note I. — I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which arc common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours ; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Further more, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those \vho are unshackeled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called SECONDARY derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled TRANSCENDENTAL, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time ; if this number be exceeded the images will begin to be confused; if this number i io THE ETHICS of images which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will be come entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident ( from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll. and xviii. ) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simul taneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call GENERAL, such as man, horse, dog, * etc. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many im ages, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e. g., color, size, etc.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree ; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of par ticular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature ; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND in of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body. It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philoso phers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen. Note II. — From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions: (i.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.). I have set tled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard cer tain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST KIND, OPINION, or IMAGINATION. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things ( II. xxxviii. Coroll. xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call REASON and KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECOND KIND. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowl edge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowl edge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals. ii2 THE ETHICS But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an in tuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second. PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true. Proof. — To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inade quate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are nec essarily true (II. xxxiv.). Q. E.D. PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. Proof. — This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge. PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived. Proof. — A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind (II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind; therefore the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 113 who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q. E. D. Note. — I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking — namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it ? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing ? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth ? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. I think I have thus sufficiently answered these ques tions — namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has true ideas have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas ? Lastly, how can any one be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects ? These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question — as to how a man can be sure ii4 THE ETHICS that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowl edge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object — in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God. PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary. Proof. — It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in them selves — that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as neces sary. Q.E.D. Corollary I. — Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent. Note. — How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simul taneously, the mind, when it afterward imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other — that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yes terday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then that to-day he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop, xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day, NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 115 and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon — that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time ; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, some times James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other — that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagina tion will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things wrhich we thus contemplate, standing in rela tion to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future. Corollary I L — It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quddam cetcrn it at is specie) . Proof. — It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly — that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.) which answer to things common to all, and which (II xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any par ticular thing: which must therefore be conceived with out any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity. PROP. XLV. Every idea of everybody, or of every par- n6 THE ETHICS ticular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Proof. — The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi. ) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the attribute of those ideas — that is (I. vi.), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D. Note. — By existence I do not here mean duration — that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particur lar things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv., Coroll.). PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect. Proof. — The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.), will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be ade quate. Q.E.D. PROP. XL VI I. The human mind has an adequate knowl edge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Proof. — The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.) from which (II. xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 117 (II. xix.) and external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. I. and II. xvii.) as actually existing; therefore (II. xlv. xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D. Note. Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl., and of the excel lence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name of God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake ; they seem to do so, because we think that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbor's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly inter pret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents. n8 THE ETHICS PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will ; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity. Proof. — The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words it cannot have an ab solute faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another etc. Q.E.D. Note.— In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely ab stract or general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as (< lapidity » to this or that stone, or as « man » to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 119 PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inas much as it is an idea, involves. Proof. — There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us conceive a particular volition, namely the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms, that the three in terior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same thing to say, that the con cept A must involve the concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirma tion cannot be made (II. Ax. Hi) without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition ( inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q. E.D. Corollary. — Will and understanding are one and the same. Proof. — Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D. Note. — We have thus removed the cause which is com monly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man acqui esces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the THE ETHICS subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt. However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few addi tional points, and I will furthermore answer the objec tions which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I say «some,» for they will be better appre ciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part. I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, or con ception of the mind and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distin guish between idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three — namely, images, words, and ideas — are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not dis tinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely neces sary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only fig ments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one who reflects on the nature of NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 121 knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not con sist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought. These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is ad vanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understand ing, is that they assert, that they have no need of an in crease in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things \vhich we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive, this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived; in so far as he per ceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dis sents. For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excel- 122 THE ETHICS lent than others ; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced as in the case of Buridan's ass ? Will he per ish of hunger and thirst ? If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would con sequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that any one may dream, I will only set myself to the task of re futing those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible. To the FIRST objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the per ceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive ( in succession ) an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we can not perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of per ception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 123 shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions — in other words, that which is common to all such volitions. As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, com mon or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of indi viduals. To the SECOND objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment; for, when we say that any one suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judg ment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us sup pose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not per ceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present; he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is any one, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwith standing, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends — that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not in volve error (II. xvii., note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings ? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the I24 THE ETHICS same as present to itself; it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or un less the mind perceives that the idea which it possesses of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject. I think that I have anticipated my answer to the THIRD objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it only signi fies that which is common to all ideas, namely an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore in so for as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not m so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle' differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle' as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind are in the same relation to one another as being and not being; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood ( II. xxxv. note and xlvii. note). We must therefore conclude that we are easily de ceived, when we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities. As for the FOURTH objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely,' as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man ; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND 125 how a man should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, etc. It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good. 1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more per fect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquillizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness and blessed ness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be deco rated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happi ness and perfect freedom. 2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our own power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbor, not from any womanish pity, favor, or super stition, but solely by the guidance of reason, accord ing as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III. 4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth ; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that. they may freely do whatsoever things are best. 126 THE ETHICS I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the begin ning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain. PART III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. MOST writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is deter mined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse : he, who succeeds in hitting off the weak ness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted ), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint. I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather (127) 128 THE ETHICS abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action ; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids. DEFINITIONS. I. By an ADEQUATE cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an INADEQUATE or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood. II. I say that we ACT when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause ; that is ( by the foregoing definition ) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 129 takes place within us, or follows from our nature exter nally, we being only the partial cause. III. By EMOTION I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications. N. B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, other wise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive. POSTULATES. I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less. N. B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii. II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post, v.) and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II. xvii.). PROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive. Proof. — In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch as he con stitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise (by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow ( I. 36 ) ; of this effect God is the ade quate cause (III. Def. i.) not inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is ade- 9 130 THE ETHICS quate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily fol lows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive ; this was our second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it posses ses inadequate ideas, and contrariwise, is more or less ac tive in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas. PROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be. Proof. — All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of ex tension; that is (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been de termined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. This was our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, etc. Q.E.D. Note. — This is made more clear by what was said in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 131 of thought, secondly, tinder the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved II. xii. Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely be lieve, until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they conceived that it is merely at the bid ding of the mind that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by ex perience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake: these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at. Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it. But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, 132 THE ETHICS at any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking ? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body> unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of building a single temple. However, I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by •somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body which far sur passes in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much hap pier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE EMOTIONS 133 are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites ; whence it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, be cause our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterward repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by con trary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man be lieves that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld : thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experi ence teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined ; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. Every one shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are assailed by con flicting emotions know not what they wish ; those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a 134 THE ETHICS conditioned state, when it is regarded tinder the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. There fore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are con cealing something, and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should not dare to do when awake. Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free ? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves ( II. xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. There fore, those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open. PROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas. Proof. — The first element, which constitutes the essence of the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is com pounded of many other ideas, whereof some are adequate ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 135 and some inadequate (II. xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive : wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D. Note. — Thus we see, that passive states, are not attrib uted to the mind, except in so far as it contains some thing involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts : I could thus show, that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind. PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself. Proof. — This proposition is self-evident, for the defini tion of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it. Q.E.D. PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other. Proof. — If they could agree together or coexist in the same object, there would then be in the said object something which could destroy it; but this, by the fore going proposition, is absurd; therefore things, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. Proof. — Individual things are modes whereby the attri butes of God are expressed in a given determinate man ner (I. xxv. Coroll.), that is (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given determinate manner the power 136 THE ETHICS of God, whereby God is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavors to persist in its own being. Q.E.D. PROP. VII. The endeavor, wherewith everything en deavors to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question. Proof. — From the given essence of anything certain consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi. ), nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as determined ( I. xxix. ) ; wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavor whereby, either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavors to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or endeavor, where with it endeavors to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in question. Q. E. D. PROP. VIII. The endeavor, whereby a thing endeavors to persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time. Proof. — If it involved a limited time, which should determine the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavor wherewith a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since (III. iv.) it will, by the same power whereby it already exists, always con tinue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external cause, this endeavor involves an indefinite time. PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavor it is conscious. Proof. — The essence of the mind is constituted by ade quate and inadequate ideas (III. iii); therefore (III. vii.), both in so far as it possesses the former, and in so far as ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 137 it possesses the latter, it endeavors to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.) concious of its own en deavor. Note. — This endeavor, when referred solely to the mind, is called WILL, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called APPETITE; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which neces sarily follow all those results which tend to its preserva tion ; and which man has thus been determined to perform. Further, between appetite and desire there is no differ ence, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: DESIRE is APPETITE WITH CONSCIOUSNESS THEREOF. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it. PROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto. Proof. — Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated therein (III. v.). Therefore, neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi.xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi. xiii.,) the first ele ment, that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavor of our mind is the en deavor to affirm the existence of our body ; thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our mind, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea there of increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind. 138 THE ETHICS Proof. — This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv. Note. — Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By PLEASURE therefore in the fol lowing propositions I shall signify A PASSIVE STATE WHEREIN THE MIND PASSES TO A GREATER PERFECTION. By PAIN I shall signify A PASSIVE STATE WHEREIN THE MIND PASSES TO A LESSER PERFECTION. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call STIMULATION (titUlatio) or MERRIMENT (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call SUFFERING or MELANCHOLY. But we must bear in mind, that stimu lation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merri ment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to Prop. ix. of this part ; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which consti tutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we have pointed out in the Coroll. to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii. xviii. and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it in volves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 139 again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist ; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist ; but (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently of our mind, and which is therefore con trary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind. PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body. Proof. — So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard that external body as pres ent (II. xvii.), and consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post, i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi. ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavors to imagine such things. Q.E.D. PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavors, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things. Proof. — So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); neverthe less it will continue to conceive it, until the mind con ceives something else, which excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it 140 THE ETHICS can, will endeavor to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body. Note. — From what has been said we may clearly under stand the nature of Love and Hate. LOVE is nothing else but PLEASURE ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF AN EXTER NAL CAUSE: HATE is nothing else but PAIN ACCOMPANIED BY THE IDEA OF AN EXTERNAL CAUSE. We further SCC, that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter. PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is after ward affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other. Proof. — If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterward the mind con ceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the mind's conceptions indi cate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, when ever it is afterward affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other. PROP. XV. Anything can accidentally be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire. Proof. — Let it be granted that the mind is simultane ously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing proposition it is evi dent that, whenever the mind is afterward affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 141 does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note), it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Simply from the fact that we have re garded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emo tion, we can either love or hate it. proof.— For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that the mind afterward conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, etc. ; and conse quently (III. xii.), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same. Q.E.D. Note. — Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emo tion being known to us; merely, as the phrase is, from SYMPATHY or ANTIPATHY. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next proposition. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms <( sympathy » and (< antipathy, w wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be per mitted to use the same terms to indicate known or man ifest qualities. PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Proof. — The point of resemblance was in the object (by H2 THE ETHICS hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be acci dentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus ( by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D. PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it. Proof.— The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we im agine it with this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resem blance to something else, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D. Note. — This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary emotions, is called VACILLATION; it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination ( II. xliv. note ) ; vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other except as greater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through them selves to one of the emotions, and to the other acciden tally. I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before ; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human body is composed (II. Post, i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same thing- can be affected ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 143 in many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions. PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present. Proof. — So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be non-existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not con ceive it as past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future ( II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or pres ent. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D. Note L — I call a thing past or future, according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many ex periences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note) ; it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue. Note IL — From what has just been said, we under stand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confi dence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment. HOPE is noth ing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the 144 THE ETHICS image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. FEAR on the other hand, is an in constant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes CONFIDENCE and fear becomes DESPAIR. In other words, PLEASURE or PAIN arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, JOY is PLEASURE arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the issue. DISAPPOINTMENT is the PAIN opposed to JOY. PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain ; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure. Proof. — The mind, as far as possible, endeavors to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which it loves. But conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.); therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of an object of love, help the mind's endeavor to conceive the object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavor; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Proof. — The mind (III. xiii.) endeavors to conceive those things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii. note), it endeavors to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 145 mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D. PROP. XXI. He who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will him self be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved. Proof. — The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's endeavor to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates the existence of something feel ing pleasure, so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental en deavor of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love. This was our first point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D. PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love toward that thing. Contrariwise, if we con ceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred toward it. Proof. — He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love, affects us also pleasurably or pain fully — that is, if we conceive the loved object as af fected with the said pleasure or pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accom panied by the idea of an external cause; therefore (III. xiii. note), if we conceive that any one affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love or hatred toward him. Q.E.D. i46 THE ETHICS Note. — Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of PITY, which we may define as PAIN ARISING FROM ANOTHER'S HURT. What term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not. We will call the LOVE TOWARD HIM WHO CONFERS A BENEFIT ON ANOTHER, APPROVAL; and the HATRED TOWARD HIM WHO INJURES ANOTHER, W6 will Call INDIGNATION. We must further remark, that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury. PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Con trariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred. Proof. — In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected, it is destroyed to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure to an extent pro portioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavor to persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected. Q.E.D. Note. — This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop, xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 147 have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only. PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred toward him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love toward him. Proof. — This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xxii., which see. Note. — These and similar emotions of hatred are attrib utable to ENVY, which, accordingly, is nothing else but HATRED, IN SO FAR AS IT IS REGARDED AS DISPOSING A MAN TO REJOICE IN ANOTHER'S HURT, AND TO GRIEVE AT AN OTHER'S ADVANTAGE. PROP. XXV. We endeavor to affirm, concerning our selves, and concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavor to negative every thing, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object. Proof. — That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasur ably or painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavors, as far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it endeavors to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it endeavors to exclude the exist ence of such things as affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavor to affirm concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we conceive to affect ourselves, or the loved object pleasurably. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVI. We endeavor to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavor to deny, con cerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably. Proof. — This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi. Note. — Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. I48 THE ETHICS This feeling is called PRIDE, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. PRIDE, therefore, is PLEASURE SPRINGING FROM A MAN THINKING TOO HIGHLY OF HIMSELF. Again, the PLEASURE WHICH ARISES FROM A MAN THINKING TOO HIGHLY OF ANOTHER is called OVER-ESTEEM. Whereas the PLEASURE WHICH ARISES FROM THINKING TOO LITTLE OF A MAN is called DISDAIN. PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emo tion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus). Proof. — The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of external bodies as pres ent. If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the ex ternal body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are our selves affected with a like emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D. j^ote L — This imitation of emotions, when it is re ferred to pain, is called COMPASSION (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called EMULATION, which is nothing else but THE DESIRE OF ANYTHING ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 149 ENGENDERED IN US BY THE FACT THAT WE CONCEIVE THAT OTHERS HAVE THE LIKE DESIRE. Corollary I. — If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably af fects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love toward him. If, on the other hand, we con ceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred toward him. Proof. — This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi. Corollary II. — We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully. Proof. — If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Corollary III. — We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity. Proof. — That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition ) ; therefore, we shall endeavor to recall every thing which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall endeavor to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q. E.D. Note II. — This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called BENEVOLENCE, and is nothing else but DESIRE ARISING FROM COMPASSION. Concerning love or hate toward him who has done good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note. PROP. XXVIII. We endeavor to bring about whatso ever we concede to conduce to pleasure ; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain. Proof. — We endeavor, as far as possible, to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavor to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavor of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, ISO THE ETHICS is equal to and simultaneous with, the endeavor of the body, or the body's power of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.) Therefore we make an absolute endeavor for its existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believe to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, there fore ( by the first part of this proof ), endeavor to destroy the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavor to do whatsoever we conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrari wise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from. Proof. — From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavor to do whatever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc. Q.E.D. Note. — This endeavor to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call AMBITION, especially when we so eagerly endeavor to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called KINDLINESS. Furthermore I give the name of PRAISE to the PLEAS URE, WITH WHICH WE CONCEIVE THE ACTION OF ANOTHER, WHEREBY HE HAS ENDEAVORED TO PLEASE US; but of BLAME tO the PAIN WHEREWITH WE FEEL AVERSION TO HIS ACTION. PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with * N. B. By « men » in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 151 pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain. Proof. — He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man, (II. xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, will re gard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D. Note. — As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accom panied by the idea of an external cause ; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion : pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will style HONOR, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style SHAME : I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed: other wise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called SELF-COMPLACENCY, and its contrary pain is called REPENTANCE. Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagi nation, and as (III. xxv.) everyone endeavors to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all. PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul. 152 THE ETHICS Proof. — From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing ( III. xxvii.): but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere fact of conceiv ing that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D. Corollary. — From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavors, as far as pos sible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet says: (J I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emo tions I have settled to treat separately. PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other con ditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain. Proof. — Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i. ), that is, the endeavor whereby a man en deavors to persist in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered ; hence the force of desire arising from pleas ure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D. Note. — In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are 204 THE ETHICS contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my propo sitions in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that every one may more readily grasp my meaning. As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him — I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavor as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.) Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accord ance with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavors to preserve his own being, ex cept in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, FIRST, that the foundation of virtue is the en deavor to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; SECONDLY, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it ; THIRDLY and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by exter nal causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv, Part II., that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we con sider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, there fore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of en tirely the same nature are united, they form a combina tion twice as powerful as either of them singly. Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man — nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should OF HUMAN BONDAGE 205 so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavor to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason — that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason — desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honorable in their conduct. Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken this course in order, if pos sible, to gain the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue. Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto proceeded. PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad. Proof. — The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are con scious thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence (cf. the Def. of Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XX. The more every man endeavors, and is able to seek what is useful to him — in other words, to pre serve his own being — the more is he endowed with vir tue ; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Proof. — Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined 206 THE ETHICS solely by the endeavor made by man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavors, and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently (III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q. E. D. Note. — No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good or preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself; which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins — that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind (III. x.). But that a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavor to become non-exist ent, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as every one will see for himself, after a little reflection. PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly and to live rightly, without at the same time wish ing to be, to act, and to live — in other words, to actually exist. Proof. — The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, etc., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence of man — that is (III. vii.), the endeavor made by every one to preserve his own being. There fore, no one can desire, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's own being. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 207 Proof. — The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself, which is obvi ously absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.E.D. Corollary. — The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this princi ple nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived. PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands. Proof. — In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III. Def. i. and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which does not follow from his vir tue. But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D. PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self. Proof. — To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in so far as we under stand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Q.E.D. PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else. Proof. — The endeavor, wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not 208 THE ETHICS from the essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that everyone endeavors to preserve his being. Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should endeavor to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, etc. Q. E.D. PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavor in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are con ducive to understanding. Proof. — The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is naught else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the definition in II. xl. note ii.); therefore (II. xl.) whatso ever we endeavor in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavors, in so far as it reasons, to preserve its own being is nothing else but under standing; this effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavor to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are conducive to understanding. PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understand ing, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding. Proof. — The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the mind (II. xli. xliii. and note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 209 except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, etc. Q. E.D. PROP. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowl edge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God. Proof. — The mind is not capable of understanding any thing higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active only in so far as it understands, and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already shown, the highest that the mind can under stand is God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D. PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature. Proof. — The power of every individual thing, and con sequently the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II. vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and conse quently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III. xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D. 14 210 THE ETHICS PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature. Proof. — We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note ), when it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, which ( III. iv.) is ab surd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Proof. — In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be bad for it. It will therefore neces sarily be either good or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself; but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature, so is it more use ful or better for us, and vice versd, in proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be different there from or contrary thereto. If different, it can neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be con trary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is good — in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in har mony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in OF HUMAN BONDAGE 211 proportion as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versd. Q. E. D. PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony. Proof. — Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note); wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q. E.D. Note. — This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black agree only in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that they do not agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone agree only in the fact that both are finite — wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes — we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither pos sess, really agree in no respect. PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant. Proof. — The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Def. i. ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes in com parison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III. Ivi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected toward the same object, and may therefore be variable and in constant. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another. 212 THE ETHICS Proof. — A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in III. Iv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavor to do the other an injury (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be con trary one to another. Q.E.D. Note. — I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter possesses something which he ( Paul ) also loves; from this it seems at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, Props, xxx. and xxxi. of this Part would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.) that is (Def. of the Emo tions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with pleas ure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be at variance one with another. We can easily OF HUMAN BONDAGE 213 show in like manner, that all other causes of hatred de pend solely on differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures. PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature. Proof. — In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with another. But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.); therefore, whatsoever follows from human nature in so far as it is denned by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavors to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and further, since that which we, in accord ance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another. Q. E.D. Corollary!. — There is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature ( IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. Q.E.D. Corollary II. — As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavors to preserve himself, the more is he endowed 214 THE ETHICS with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural har mony, when they live in obedience to reason ( by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. Q.E.D. Note. — What we have just shown is attested by expe rience so conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone : (< Man is to man a God. » Yet it rarely hap pens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more con venience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misan thropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at length elsewhere. PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein. Proof. — To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavor to do in obedience to reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); there fore (IV. xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God; that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 215 . — Some one may ask how it would be, if the high est good of those who follow after virtue were not com mon to all? Would it not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that man's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as defined by reason ; and that a man could neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who fol lows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God. Proof. — Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv., Coroll. i.); therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavor to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.), which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.) and without it (I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D. Another Proof. — The good, which a man desires for him self and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that 216 THE ETHICS others love it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavor that others should love it also ; and as the good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavor, for the same reason, to bring- about that all should rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater. Note I. — He who, guided by emotion only, endeavors to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially to those who take delight in something different, and accord ingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavor to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who endeavors to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to RELIGION. The desire of well doing, which is engendered by a life according to reason, I call PIETY. Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with him self in friendship, I call HONOR; by HONORABLE I mean that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by BASE I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason ; while infirmity is noth ing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, and to be by them deter mined to act in a manner demanded by the general dis position of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 217 Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop, xviii. of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow- men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own ; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as every one's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I no not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us ; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III. Ivii. note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note. Note II. — In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and in justice. Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note; the time has now come to treat of the re maining terms. But I must first say a few words con cerning man in the state of nature and in society. Even man exists by sovereign natural right, and, con sequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature ; therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own ad vantage according to his own disposition ( IV. xix. and xx.), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavors to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would re main in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to his neighbor (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue (IV. vi.), they are often 218 THE ETHICS drawn in different directions, and being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end can be attained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv. Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves. On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a STATE, while those who live under its protection are called CITI ZENS. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature every one thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pro nounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. SIN, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as MERIT, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 219 Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common con sent master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to one man rather than an other: all things are common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another. From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough. PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an in creased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man. Proof. — Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of percep tion (II. xiv. ); therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or useful ( IV. xxvi. xxvii. ) ; and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable ; contrari wise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it ren ders the body in this respect less capable. Q.E.D. PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preserva tion of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrari wise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad. Proof. — The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation (II. Post. iv. ). But that which consti tutes the specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions one to 220 THE ETHICS another in a certain fixed proportion ( Def . before Lemma iv. after II. xiii. ). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually pos sess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of being- affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character, in other words (see Preface to this Part toward the end, though the point is indeed self- evident), to be destroyed, and consequently totally incapa ble of being affected in an increased number of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D. Note. — The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of the body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally differ ent from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse ; nay, experience would seem to point to the oppo site conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man under goes such changes, that I could hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered there from yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had writ ten to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants ? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. How ever, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I OF HUMAN BONDAGE 221 should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues. PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad. Proof. — For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D. PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: con trariwise, pain in itself is bad. proof^— pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is di minished or checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad. Proof.— Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleas ure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, con sists in all parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.), the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts main tain their former proportion of motion and rest; there fore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hind rance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D. PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stim ulation or pleasure is bad. proof.— Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatid) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest (see its Def., III. xi. note); the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body (IV. vi.), and may remain obsti 222 THE ETHICS nately fixed therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways : therefore (IV. xxxviii. ) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimula tion, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hinder ing the body's capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D. PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive. Proof. — Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi. note); hence love may be exces sive. Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises (III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation. Note.— Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest ; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object,' that it is unable to think of others; and although men' as a rule, are a prey to many emotions — and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same — yet there are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We sometimes see men so ab sorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 223 for they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an am bitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, etc., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases. PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good. Proof. — When we hate a man, we endeavor to destroy him (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavor to do something that is bad. Therefore, etc. Q.E.D. N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred toward men. Corollary. I. — Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising there from, are bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii. Corollary II. — Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in a state unjust. This also is evi dent from III. xxxix., and from the definitions of base ness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note. Note. — Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad ) and laughter I recognize a great differ ence. For laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleas ure ; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly, nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy ? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor any one else, save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and dis comfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which are signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise 224 THE ETHICS man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing- plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theaters, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neigh bor. For the human body is composed of very numer ous parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capa ble of understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail. PROP. XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavors, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, con tempt, etc., toward him. Proof. — All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Cor- oll. i.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavor, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavor to prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love (III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.); there fore he who lives under the guidance of reason will en deavor to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. Q.E.D. Note. — He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But. he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence ; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers ; all these consequences follow so plainly from the OF HUMAN BONDAGE 225 mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail. PROP. XL VI I. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good. Proof. — Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist with out pain. For fear is pain ( Def . of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D. Note. — We may add, that these emotions show defect ive knowledge and an absence of power in the mind ; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappoint ment are signs of a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they never theless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavor to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope ; we endeavor to free our selves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom. PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and dis paragement are always bad. Proof. — These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.) are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D. PROP. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud. Proof. — If we see that anyone rates us too highly, for love's sake, we are apt to become elated (III xli.), or to be pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx. ) ; the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D. PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless. Proof. — Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect 15 226 THE ETHICS which follows, namely, our endeavor to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q. E.D. Note.— He who rightly realizes that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or con tempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavor to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterward regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems unlike a man. PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom. Proof. — Approval is love toward one who has done good to another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. lix.), that is (III. iii.) in so far as it under stands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, etc Q.E.D. Another Proof. — He who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavor to do good is aided; in other words he will feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D. Note.— Indignation as we denned it (Def. of the Emo tions, xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, how- OF HUMAN BONDAGE 227 ever, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him. PROP. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible. Proof. — Self -approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.). But a man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is contemplating himself, he only perceives clearly and distinctly or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such contem plation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D. Note. — Self -approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary (III. Iv. Coroll.) is more and more dis turbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable. PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason. Proof. — Humility is pain arising from a man's contem plation of his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation per ceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but (III. Iv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of 228 THE ETHICS which he determines his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly ( IV. xxvi.), because his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q. E.D. PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm. Proof. — The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain. Note. — As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Re pentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from noth ing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined or linked together in bonds of union ? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humil ity, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed, those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed. PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self. Proof. — This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and xxix. PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates ex treme infirmity of spirit. Proof. — The first foundation of virtue is self-preserva tion (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and conse- OF HUMAN BONDAGE 229 quently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). Therefore, he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions. Note. — Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride ; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.). PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded. Proof. — Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over- estimation of himself ( Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will endeavor to foster by all the means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the company of high- minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D. Note. — It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his under-estimation of other people ; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such being the case, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily 230 THE ETHICS envious (III. xli. note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish. Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises from a comparison be tween his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleas ure, if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults ; whence arises the proverb, <( The un happy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." Con trariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The laws of nature have regard to nature's general or der, whereof man is but a part. I mention this, in pass ing, lest any should think that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other nat ural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring advan tage to man, or inflict injury upon him. PROP. LVIII. Honor (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom. Proof. — This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and also from the definition of an honorable man (IV. xxxvii. note i.). OF HUMAN BONDAGE 231 Note. — Empty honor, as it is styled, is self -approval fostered only by the good opinion of the populace ; when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self- approval, in other words, the highest object of each man's love ( IV. Hi. note ) ; consequently he whose honor is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all good, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honor, then, is really empty, being nothing. The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good in so far as it shows that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honorably; in the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified. There fore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honorably. Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain ; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be useless, if men could easily be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly show. PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are deter mined by emotion wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason. Proof. — To act rationally is nothing else (III. Hi. and 232 THE ETHICS Def. ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleas ure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided ) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an ade quate conception of himself and his actions ( III. iii. and note ). Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. explana tion) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, etc. Q.E.D. Another Proof . — A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad ( as we pointed out in the preface to Part iv.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D. Note. — An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physi cally, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole OF HUMAN BONDAGE 233 arm violently downward, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Part II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things ; there fore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive is called by us blind. PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole. Proof. — Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavor to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office ; for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavor to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D. Note. — As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attrib uted to one part of the body, we generally desire to pre serve our being without taking into consideration our health as a whole : to which it may be added, that the de sires which have most hold over us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future. PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive. 234 THE ETHICS Proof. — Desire ( Def . of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely in the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence de sire, which arises from reason, that is, (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual es sence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activites as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D. PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Proof. — Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the form of eter nity or necessity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.); therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D. Note. — If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future ; consequently it would neces sarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 235 we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence ( II. xliv. note ) we can only determine by imagi nation, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more read ily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.) PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. Proof. — All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III. Hx.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. Note. — Superstitious persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men. Corollary. — Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly. Proof. — Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III. lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV. Ixi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence, under the guidance of rea son we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D. Note. — This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear 236 THE ETHICS of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger, but from love of the public well-being, is guided solely by reason. PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge. Proof. — The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the tran sition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.), and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi. and vii.); therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof (II. xxix.), namely, the knowlege of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D. Corollary, — Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no concep tion of evil. PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two good and the lesser of two evils. Proof. — A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil ; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see Preface to this Part) ; therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guid ance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D. Corollary. — We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D. PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future. OF HUMAN BONDAGE 237 Proof.— \i the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, it would be affected toward what is future in the same way as toward what is present (IV. Ixii.) ; wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. Ixv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, etc. Q.E.D. Corollary. — We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the fore going Proposition as the Corollary to IV. Ixv. is related to the said IV. Ixv. Note. If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop, xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether he will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary im portance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations. PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life. Proof. — A free man is one who lives under the guid ance of reason, who is not led by fear (IV. Ixiii.), but who directly desires that which is good (IV. Ixiii. Cor- oll.), in other words (IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage ; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a medita tion of life. Q.E.D. PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so 238 THE ETHICS long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil. Proof.— I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free" has only adequate ideas; therefore (IV. Ixiv. Coroll.), he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D. Note.— It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence. This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is, the power wherewith he provided solely for man's ad vantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,' and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him ; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this free dom was afterward recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.). PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them. Proof. — Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great ( IV. v. and iii.) : hence, no less virtue or firmness is required ON HUMAN BONDAGE 239 in checking daring than in checking fear ( III. lix. note) ; in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. andxli.),the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D. Corollary, — The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal cour age or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat. Note. — What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, etc. PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the igno rant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favors from them. Proof. — Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition ( III. xxxix. note ) ; wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own esti mate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the igno rant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavor, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favors. Note. — I say, AS FAR AS HE CAN. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favors from them, and consequently to repay such favors in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favors, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offense by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favors, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy. 240 THE ETHICS PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another. Proof. — Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv. and Coroll. i.) only such men endeavor, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D. Note. — The good will, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure good will. Moreover, in gratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, etc. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not un grateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrari wise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt. PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith. Proof — If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free him self from the danger of present death ? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to de ceive ? this may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd. PROP. LXXIII. The man who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent. Proof. — The man who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (IV. Ixiii.): but, in so far as he en deavors to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. Ixvi. note), in so far as he APPENDIX 241 endeavors to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and conse quently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note ii.), to live ac cording to the laws of his country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D. Note. — These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propo sitions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and xlvi. , namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. 1., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavors, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue if capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part. APPENDIX. WHAT I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece- 16 242 THE ETHICS meal, according as I thought each proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads. I. All our endeavors or desires so follow from the ne cessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals. II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: where fore the former are rightly called actions, the latter pas sions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and frag mentary knowledge. III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad. IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to per fect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessed ness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by rea son, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence. V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life : and things are only good in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined APPENDIX 243 by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjov the rational life, are alone called evil. VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways. VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself. VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoy ing the rational life, we may endeavor to remove in whatever way seems safest to us ; on the other hand, what soever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Every one without exception may, by sovereign right of na ture, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest. IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason. X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one toward another, they are at vari ance, and are therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows. 244 THE ETHICS XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness. XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship. XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchful ness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), yet are they gen erally envious and more prone to revenge than to sym pathy. No small force of character is therefore required to take every one as he is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men ; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite their parents. XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship. XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to justice, equity, and honorable living. For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. xxxvii. notes, i. ii. ; xlvi. note; and Ixxiii. note). APPENDIX 245 XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear; but such harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exer cise of reason: the same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety. XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and has regard only to the general advantage. XVIII. In accepting favors, and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. Ixx. note; Ixxi. note). XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of gen eration arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate ; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.). XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely ; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul. XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile offense of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not. XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. Ivii. note). 246 THE ETHICS XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason. XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain toward men arc directly opposed to justice, equity, honor, piety, and religion ; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and vindi cate his own or other men's rights. XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii, note i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby men, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things, strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation, he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity; but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavor, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason. XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fel lowship ; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may. XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and from recom- bining their elements in different forms, is principally the APPENDIX 247 preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their func tions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of thinking ( IV. xxxviii. xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of very many parts of dif ferent nature, which stand in continual need of va ried nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many percep tions. XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed : nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause. XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great splendor. Cer tainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little. XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts of the body, and enable them to per form their functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those 248 THE ETHICS things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and conse quently the desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. ( IV. xliv. note, and Ix. note.) XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to ac count as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we have said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature; no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But con trariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason. XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely ; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelli gence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire APPENDIX 249 anything save that which is necessary, nor yield ab solute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true; wherefore, in so far as we have a right under standing of these things, the endeavor of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole. PART V. OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM. PREFACE. AT LENGTH I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom, I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness ; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my de sign to point out the method and the means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the prov ince of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason ; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions de pended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them : and this someone endeavored to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house dog and the other a hunting dog. For by long training it could be brought about, that the house dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting dog to cease from running after hares. To this (250) OF HUMAN FREEDOM 251 opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon ; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits toward it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul sus pends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a cer tain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits toward the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts; this he endeavors to prove in the (< Passions de 1'ame," I. 50. 252 THE ETHICS He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper directions, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are <( perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits. }> ((< Passions de Tame," I. 27.) But seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any voli tion, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words) ; it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly as serted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises, and would affirm noth ing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body ? What clear and dis tinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter ? Truly I should like him to explain this union through its prox imate cause. But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland and with what force can it hold it suspended ? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by OF HUMAN FREEDOM 253 the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except turning away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; conse quently the strength of one cannot in anywise be deter mined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premises are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is denned by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emo tions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness. AXIOMS. I. If two contrary actions be started in the same sub ject, a change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary. II. The power of an affect is denned by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This axiom is evident from III. vii.) PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifi- 254 THE ETHICS cations of the body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body. Proof. — The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body (II. xviii.), so vice versd (III. ii.) the order and connection of modifica tions of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D. PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to the other thoughts, then will the love or hatred toward that external cause, and also the vacilla tions of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed. Proof. — That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); where fore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q. E. D. PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. Proof. — An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions.). If, there fore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emo tion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II. xxi. and note); therefore (III. iii.) the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D. Corollary. — An emotion therefore, becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is mere known to us. PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 255 Proof. — Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adeqately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q. E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct concep tion. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception. Note. — Seeing that there is nothing which is not fol lowed by an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it follows that every one has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowl edge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces : and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, etc., will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV. Ixi.). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called am bition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an 256 THE ETHICS activity or virtue which is called piety ( IV. xxxvii. note i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring* from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.). PROP. V. An emotion toward a thing, which we con ceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion. Proof. — An emotion toward a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one toward what we conceive to be necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one toward what we conceive as possible, or con tingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note) ; therefore, an emotion toward a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel toward what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, conse quently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D. PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emo tions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it under stands all things as necessary. Proof. — The mind understands all things to be neces sary (I. xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.) feels less emotion toward the things themselves. Q.E.D. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 257 Note. — The more this knowledge, that things are nec essary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, be cause it passes so many years, as it were, in unconscious ness. Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, every one would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature ; and we may note several other instances of the same sort. PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. Proof. — We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV. vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the Def. of Reason in II. xl. note ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the same manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more until they are no longer contrary to it ; to this 17 258 THE ETHICS extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D. PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. Proof. — Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D. Note. — This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii. PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simulta neous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected toward each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause. Proof. — An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emo tion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contem plation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence in other words, its power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less pas sive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contem plation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D. PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. Proof. --The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). OF HUMAN FREEDOM 259 So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavors to understand things (IV. xxvi.), is not im peded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl. note ii. and xlvii. note ) ; consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D. Note. — By this power of rightly arranging and asso ciating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical pre cepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not requited with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (IV. Hi.), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature : in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and wTill 260 THE ETHICS be easily overcome ; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will neverthe less be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the sub ject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, to gether with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and over come them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing ( IV. Ixiii. Coroll. and III. Hx.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honor, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambi tious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loud est against the misuse of honor and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favor by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite OF HUMAN FREEDOM 261 solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them : he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practice these precepts (which indeed are not diffi cult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able for the most part to direct his actions according to the command ments of reason. PROP. XL In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies the mind more. Proof. — In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, all of which ( by hypothesis ) the mind contemplates simultaneously in as sociation with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is mofe frequent, or is more often in full vigor, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D. PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than with others. Proof. — Things, which we clearly and distinctly under stand, are either the common properties of things or de ductions therefrom (see Def. of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate other things in con junction with these than in conjunction with something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D. PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images. Proof. — In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images, so ( II. xviii.) 262 THE ETHICS are there more causes whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D. PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God. Proof. — There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct concep tion (V. iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D. PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Proof. — He who clearly and distinctly understands him self and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D. PROP. XVI. This love toward God must hold the chief place in the mind. Proof. — For this love is associated with all the modifi cations of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D. PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain. Proof. — All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the General Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); there fore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.), he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain. Corollary. — Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently ( Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone. Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 263 Proof. — The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we con template God, we are active (III. iii.) ; consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Love toward God cannot be turned into hate. Note. It maybe objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure. PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavor that God should love him in return. Proof. — For if a man should so endeavor, he would desire (V. xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). There fore, he who loves God, etc. Q.E.D. PROP. XX. This love toward God cannot be stained by by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love. Proof. This love toward God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. xxxvii.) ; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion of envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see Def. of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note) ; but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D. Note. — We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that 264 THE ETHICS this love toward God is the most constant of all the emo tions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body it cannot be destroyed unless the body be destroyed also' As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists: I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V iv note). II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive con- fusedly (V. ii. and iv. note). III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand sur pass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.). IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifica tions* are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to God (V. ix. xi.). V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x note and xii. xiii. xiv.). But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood, it should be specially bserved that the emotions are called by us strong when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emo tion than by another. For the strength of every emotion defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it there- ore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose great- t part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may * Affectiones. Camerer reads a^r/aw— emotions. OF HUMAN FREEDOM 265 be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, etc., arise, except in regard to things whereof no one can be really mas ter. We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowl edge of God, possesses over the emotions; if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Fur ther, it begets a love toward a thing immutable and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into pos session (II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life ; for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emo tions. And this every one may readily have seen for him self, if he has attended to what is advanced in the pres ent note, and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly to Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time to pass on to those mat ters, which appertain to the duration of the mind, with out relation to the body. PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is passed, while the body endures. 266 THE ETHICS Proof. — The mind does not express the actual exist ence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and, consequently, (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine anybody as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything (for Def. of Imagination, see II. xvii. note), or re member things past, except while the body endures (see Def. of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D. PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity. Proof. — God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This essence, therefore, must necessarily be con ceived through the very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D. PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it some thing which is eternal. Proof. — There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily something apper taining to the essence of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration, and may be defined by time — that is (II. viii. Coroll.), we do not assign to it dura tion, except while the body endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D. Note. — This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not OF HUMAN FREEDOM 267 possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such exist ence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be denned in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration. PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God. Proof. — This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll. PROP. XXV. The highest endeavor of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. proof.— The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an ade quate knowledge of the essence of things (see its defini tion II. xl. note ii.) ; and, in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavor of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind. Proof— This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind 268 THE ETHICS of knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as deter mined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the mind desires so to do, in pro portion as it is more capable thereof. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence. Proof.— The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV. xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def. of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue: thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D. PROP. XXVIII. The endeavor or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge. Proof. — This proposition is self-evident. For whatso ever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowl edge (II. xl. noteii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary aud confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of know ing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D. PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Proof. — In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it to that extent conceives duration OF HUMAN FREEDOM 269 which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii. and explanation). There fore to this extent the mind has not the power of con ceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to con ceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). There fore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D. Note. — Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see. PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God. Proof. — Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). There fore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, etc Q.E.D. PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. 270 THE ETHICS Proof. — The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note ii.), whereof accord ingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge Q.E.D. Note.— In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more com pletely conscious of himself and of God ; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premises are plain. PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause. Proof.— From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D. Corollary.— From the third kind of knowledge neces sarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of OF HUMAN FREEDOM 271 God as cause, that is ( Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God. PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal. Proof. — The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I. Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom), the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D. Note. — Although this love toward God has (by the fore going Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the per fections of love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Corollary of the last Proposition. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to ac crue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must con sist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself. PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body en dures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions. Proof. — Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore emotion (see General Def. of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present dis position of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D. Corollary. — Hence it follows that no love save intel lectual love is eternal. Note. — If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death. PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intel lectual love. 272 THE ETHICS Proof. — God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II. Def, vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite per fection; and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause : now this is what we have ( in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as intellectual love. PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind toward God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Proof. — This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.) an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love where with God loves himself. Q.E.D. Corollary- — Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and consequently, that the love of God toward men, and the intellectual love of the mind toward God are identical. Note. — From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, con sists: namely, in the constant and eternal love toward God, or in God's love toward men. This love or blessed ness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is (V. xxxv ) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accom panied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.). Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in OF HUMAN FREEDOM 273 knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I. xv. and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note ii.), is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God, yet that demon stration, though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God. PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. Proof. — This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, etc. Q.E.D. Note. — The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to partic ular things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt. PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death. Proof. — The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.); therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, 18 274 THE ETHICS the greater will be the part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emo tions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind under stands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, etc. Q.E.D. Note. — Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length. PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal. Proof. — He, who possesses a body capable of the great est number of activities, is least agitated by those emo tions which are evil (IV. xxxviii.) — that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; there fore (V. x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God ; whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected with love toward God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D. Note. — Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt but that they OF HUMAN FREEDOM 275 may be of such a nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of per petual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or un happy. For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely con scious of itself, or of God, or of things ; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavor to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the last Proposition. PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive ; and, vice versd, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. Proof. — In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, conse quently (III. iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be re versed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D. 276 THE ETHICS Corollary. — Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D. Note. — Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is re garded without relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity ; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and in finite intellect of God. PROP. XLJ. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part. IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness. Proof. — The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seek ing one's own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high-minded- ness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q. E. D. Note. — The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and generally, OF HUMAN FREEDOM 277 all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to re ceive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the di vine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them. If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would re turn to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not be lieve that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting. PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts. Proof. — Blessedness consists in love toward God (V. xxxvi. and note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge ( V. xxxii. Coroll. ) ; therefore this love ( III. iii. lix. ) must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active ; therefore ( IV. Def . viii. ) it is virtue it self. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand ( V. xxxii. ) ; that is ( V. iii. Coroll. ), so much the more power has it over the emotions, and ( V. xxxviii. ) so much the less is it sub ject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in pro portion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists 278 THE ETHICS solely in the understanding, it follows that no one re joices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D. Note. — I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected ? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. CORRESPONDENCE. LETTER I. (I.*) HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA. [Oldenburg, after complimenting Spinoza, asks him to enter into a philosophical correspondence.] ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, AND MOST WORTHY FRIEND, — So pain ful to me was the separation from you the other day after our meeting in your retreat at Rhijnsburg, that it is my first endeavor, now that I am returned to Eng land, to renew, as far as is possible by correspondence, my intercourse with you. Solid learning, conjoined with courtesy and refinement of manners (wherewith both nature and art have most amply endowed you), carries with it such charms as to command the love of every honorable and liberally-educated man. Let us then, most excellent sir, join hands in sincere friendship, and let us foster the feeling with every zealous endeavor and kind office in our power. Whatever my poor means can fur nish I beg you to look on as your own. Allow me in return to claim a share in the riches of your talents, as I may do without inflicting any loss on yourself. We conversed at Rhijnsburg of God, of extension, of infinite thought, of the differences and agreements be tween these, of the nature of the connection between the human soul and body, and further, of the principles of the Cartesian and Baconian philosophies. But, as we then spoke of these great questions merely cursorily and by the way, and as my mind has been not a little tormented with them since, I will appeal to the * The number of each letter as arranged in Van Vloten's edition is given in parentheses. (279) 280 SPINOZA'S [LETTER II. rights of our newly cemented friendship, and most affectionately beg you to give me at somewhat greater length your opinion on the subjects I have mentioned. On two points especially I ask for enlightenment, if I may presume so far ; FIRST : In what do you place the true distinction between thought and matter ? SECONDLY : What do you consider to be the chief defects in the Car tesian and Baconian philosophies, and how do you think they might best be removed, and something more sound substituted ? The more freely you write to me on these and similar subjects, the more closely will you tie the bonds of our friendship, and the stricter will be the obli gation laid on me to repay you, as far as possible, with similar services. There is at present in the press a collection of physio logical discourses written by an Englishman of noble family and distinguished learning.* They treat of the nature and elasticity of the air, as proved by forty-three experiments ; also of its fluidity, solidity, and other anal ogous matters. As soon as the work is published, I shall make a point of sending it to you by any friend who may be crossing the sea. Meanwhile, farewell, and remember your friend, who is Yours, in all affection and zeal, HENRY OLDENBURG. LONDON, 16-26 Aug., 1661. LETTER II. (II.) SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. [Answer to Letter I. Spinoza defines ^God,^ and <( attribute, » and sends definitions, axioms, and first four propositions of Book I. of Ethics. Some errors of Bacon and Descartes discussed.] ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, — How pleasant your friendship is to me, you may yourself judge, if your modesty will allow you to reflect on the abundance of your own excellences. * Robert Boyle. LETTER II.] CORRESPONDENCE 281 Indeed the thought of these makes me seem not a little bold in entering into such a compact, the more so when I consider that between friends all things, and especially things spiritual, ought to be in common. However, this must lie at the charge of your modesty and kindness rather than of myself. You have been willing to lower yourself through the former and to fill me with the abundance of the latter, till I am no longer afraid to accept the close friendship, which you hold out to me, and which you deign to ask of me in return; no effort on my part shall be spared to render it lasting. As for my mental endowments, such as they are, I would willingly allow you to share them, even though I knew it would be to my own great hindrance. But this is not meant as an excuse for denying to you what you ask by the rights of friendship. I will therefore en deavor to explain my opinions on the topics you touched on; though I scarcely hope, unless your kindness inter vene, that I shall thus draw the bonds of our friendship closer. I will then begin by speaking briefly of God, whom I define as a Being consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or supremely perfect, after its kind. You must observe that by attribute I mean every thing, which is conceived through itself and in itself, so that the conception of it does not involve the conception of anything else. For instance, extension is conceived through itself and in itself, but motion is not. The lat ter is conceived through something else, for the conception of it implies extension. That the definition above given of God is true appears from the fact, that by God we mean a Being supremely perfect and absolutely infinite. That such a Being exists may easily be proved from the definition; but as this is not the place for such proof, I will pass it over. What I am bound here to prove, in order to satisfy the first inquiry of my distinguished questioner, are the following conse quences : FIRST, that in the universe there cannot exist two substances without their differing utterly in essence; SECONDLY, that substance cannot be produced or created — 282 SPINOZA'S [LETTER II. existence pertains to its actual essence; THIRDLY, that all substance must be infinite or supremely perfect after its kind. When these points have been demonstrated, my dis tinguished questioner will readily perceive my drift, if he reflects at the same time on the definition of God. In order to prove them clearly and briefly, I can think of nothing better than to submit them to the bar of your judgment proved in the geometrical method.* I therefore enclose them separately and await your verdict upon them. Again, you ask me what errors I detect in the Carte sian and Baconian philosophies. It is not my custom to expose the errors of others, nevertheless I will yield to your request. The first and the greatest error is, that these philosophers have strayed so far from the knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things; the second is, that they did not know the true nature of the human mind; the third, that they never grasped the true cause of error. The necessity for correct knowledge on these three points can only be ignored by persons completely devoid of learning and training. That they have wandered astray from the knowledge of the first cause, and of the human mind, may easily be gathered from the truth of the three propositions given above ; I therefore devote myself entirely to the demon stration of the third error. Of Bacon I shall say very little, for he speaks very confusedly on the point, and works out scarcely any proofs: he simply narrates. In the first place he assumes that the human intellect is liable to err, not only through the fallibility of the senses, but also solely through its own nature, and that it frames its conceptions in accordance with the analogy of its own nature, not with the analogy of the universe, so that it is like a mirror receiving rays from external objects un equally, and mingling its own nature with the nature of things, etc. Secondly, that the human intellect is, by reason of its own nature, prone to abstractions; such things as are in flux it feigns to be constant, etc. *The allusion is to Eth. I., Beginning — Prop. iv. LETTER III.] CORRESPONDENCE 283 Thirdly, that the human intellect continually aug ments, and is unable to come to a stand or to rest con tent. The other causes which he assigns may all be reduced to the one Cartesian principle, that the human will is free and more extensive than the intellect, or, as Verulam himself more confusedly puts it, that <(the understanding is not a dry light, but receives infusion from the will." (We may here observe that Verulam often employs (< intellect w as synonymous with mind, differing in this respect from Descartes.) This cause, then, leaving aside the others as unimportant, I shall show to be false; indeed its falsity would be evident to its supporters, if they would consider, that will in general differs from this or that particular volition in the same way as whiteness differs from this or that white object, or humanity from this or that man. It is, therefore, as impossible to conceive, that will is the cause of a given volition, as to conceive that humanity is the cause of Peter and Paul. Hence, as will is merely an entity of the reason, and cannot be called the cause of particular volitions, and as some cause is needed for the existence of such volitions, these latter cannot be called free, but are necessarily such as they are determined by their causes ; lastly, according to Descartes, errors are themselves particular volitions; hence it necessarily follows that errors, or, in other words, particular volitions, are not free, but are determined by external causes, and in nowise by the will. This is what I undertook to prove. LETTER III. (III.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [Oldenburg propounds several questions concerning God and his existence, thought, and the axioms of Eth. I. He also informs Spinoza of a philosophical society, and promises to send Boyle's book.] MOST EXCELLENT FRIEND, — Your learned letter has been delivered to me, and read with great pleasure. 2»4 SPINOZA'S [LETTER III. I highly approve of your geometrical method of proof, but I must set it down to my dullness, that I cannot follow with readiness what you set forth with such accuracy. Suffer me, then, I beg, to expose the slow ness of my understanding, while I put the following questions, and beg of you to answer them. First. Do you clearly and indisputably understand solely from the definition you have given of God, that such a Being exists? For my part, when I reflect that definitions contain only the conceptions formed by our minds, and that our mind forms many conceptions of things which do not exist, and is very fertile in multi plying and amplifying what it has conceived, I do not yet see, that from the conception I have of God I can infer God's existence. I am able by a mental combina tion of all the perfections I perceive in men, in animals, in vegetables, in minerals, etc., to conceive and to form an idea of some single substance uniting in itself all such excellences ; indeed my mind is able to multiply and augment such excellences indefinitely; it may thus figure forth for itself a most perfect and excellent Being, but there would be no reason thence to conclude that such a Being actually exists. Secondly. I wish to ask, whether you think it unques tionable, that body cannot be limited by thought, or thought by body; seeing that it still remains undecided, what thought is, whether it be a physical motion or a spiritual act quite distinct from body ? Thirdly. Do you reckon the axioms, which you have sent to me, as indemonstrable principles known by the light of nature and needing no proof ? Perhaps the first is of this nature, but I do not see how the other three can be placed in a like category. The second assumes that nothing exists in the universe save substances and accidents, but many persons would say that time and place cannot be classed either as one or the other. Your third axiom, that THINGS HAVING DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTES HAVE NO QUALITY IN COMMON, is so far from being clear to me, that its contrary seems to be shown in the whole uni verse. All things known to us agree in certain respects LETTER III.] CORRESPONDENCE 285 and differ in others. Lastly, your fourth axiom, that WHEN THINGS HAVE NO QUALITY IN COMMON, ONE CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY ANOTHER, is not so plain to my groping in telligence as to stand in need of no further illumination. God has nothing actually in common with created things, yet nearly all of us believe him to be their cause. As you see that in my opinion your axioms are not established beyond all the assaults of doubt, you will readily gather that the propositions you have based upon them do not appear to me absolutely firm. The more I reflect upon them, the more are doubts suggested to my mind concerning them. As to the first, I submit that two men are two sub stances with the same attribute, inasmuch as both are rational ; whence I infer that there can be two substances with the same attribute. As to the second, I opine that, as nothing can be its own cause, it is hardly within the scope of our intellect to pronounce on the truth of the proposition, that SUB STANCE CANNOT BE PRODUCED EVEN BY ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE. Such a proposition asserts all substances to be self-caused, and all and each to be independent of one another, thus making so many gods, and therefore denying the first cause of all things. This, I willingly confess, I cannot understand, unless you will be kind enough to explain your theory on this sublime subject somewhat more fully and simply, informing me what may be the origin and mode of production of substances, and the mutual interdepend ence and subordination of things. I most strenuously beg and conjure you by that friendship which we have entered into, to answer me freely and faithfully on these points; you may rest assured, that everything which you think fit to communicate to me will remain untampered with and safe, for I will never allow anything to become public through me to your hurt or disadvantage. In our philo sophical society we proceed diligently as far as opportu nity offers with our experiments and observations, lingering over the compilation of the history of mechanic arts, with the idea that the forms and qualities of things can best be explained from mechanical principles, and that all 286 SPINOZA'S [LETTER IV. natural effects can be produced through motion, shape, and consistency, without reference to inexplicable forms or occult qualities, which are but the refuge of ignorance. I will send the book I promised, whenever the Dutch Ambassadors send (as they frequently do) a messenger to the Hague, or whenever some other friend whom I can trust goes your way. I beg you to excuse my prolixity and freedom, and simply ask you to take in good part, as one friend from another, the straightforward and unpol ished reply I have sent to your letter, believing me to be without deceit or affectation, Yours most faithfully, HENRY OLDENBURG. LONDON, 27 Sept., 1661. LETTER IV. (IV.) SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. [Spinoza answers some of Oldenburg's questions and doubts, but has not time to reply to all, as he is just setting out for Amsterdam.] ILLUSTRIOUS SIR:— As I was starting for Amsterdam, where I intend staying for a week or two, I received your most welcome letter, and noted the objections you raise to the three propositions I sent you. Not having time to reply fully, I will confine myself to these three. To the first I answer, that not from every definition does the existence of the thing defined follow, but only (as I showed in a note appended to the three proposi tions) from the definition or idea of an attribute, that is (as I explained fully in the definition given of God) of a thing conceived through and in itself. The reason for this distinction was pointed out, if I mistake not, in the above-mentioned note sufficiently clear at any rate for a philosopher, who is assumed to be aware of the differ ence between a fiction and a clear and distinct idea, and also of the truth of the axiom that every definition or clear and distinct idea is true. When this has been duly LETTER IV.] CORRESPONDENCE 287 noted, I do not see what more is required for the solu tion of your first question. I therefore proceed to the solution of the second, wherein you seem to admit that, if thought does not belong to the nature of extension, then extension will not be limited by thought; your doubt only involves the example given. But observe, I beg, if we say that exten sion is not limited by extension but by thought, is not this the same as saying that extension is not infinite absolutely, but only as far as extension is concerned, in other words, infinite after its kind? But you say: per haps thought is a corporeal action : be it so, though I by no means grant it: you, at any rate, will not deny that extension, in so far as it is extension, is not thought, and this is all that is required for explaining my definition and proving the third proposition. Thirdly. You proceed to object, that my axioms ought not to be ranked as universal notions. I will not dispute this point with you; but you further hesitate as to their truth, seeming to desire to show that their contrary is more probable. Consider, I beg, the definition which I gave of substance and attribute, for on that they all depend. When I say that I mean by substance that which is conceived through and in itself; and that I mean by modification or accident that, which is in some thing else, and is conceived through that wherein it is, evidently it follows that substance is by nature prior to its accidents. For without the former the latter can neither be nor be conceived. Secondly, it follows that, besides substances and accidents, nothing exists really or externally to the intellect. For everything is conceived either through itself or through something else, and the conception of it either involves or does not involve the conception of something else. Thirdly, it follows that things which possess different attributes have nothing in common. For by attribute I have explained that I mean something, of which the conception does not involve the conception of anything else. Fourthly, and lastly, it fol lows that, if two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other. For, as there would 288 SPINOZA'S [LETTER V. be nothing- in common between the effect and the cause, the whole effect would spring from nothing. As for your contention that God has nothing actually in common with created things, I have maintained the exact opposite in my definition. I said that God is a being consisting of in finite attributes, whereof each one is infinite or supremely perfect after its kind. With regard to what you say con cerning my first proposition, I beg1 you, my friend, to bear in mind, that men are not created, but born, and that their bodies already exist before birth, though under different forms. You draw the conclusion, wherein I fully concur, that, if one particle of matter be annihi lated, the whole of extension would forthwith vanish. My second proposition does not make many gods but only one, to wit, a Being consisting of infinite attributes, etc. LETTER V. (V.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [Oldenburg sends Boyle's book, and laments that Spinoza has not been able to answer all his doubts.] MOST RESPECTED FRIEND i — Please accept herewith the book I promised you, and write me in answer your opinion on it, especially on the remarks about nitre, and about fluidity, and solidity. I owe you the warmest thanks for your learned second letter, which I received to-day, but I greatly grieve that your journey to Amster dam prevented you from answering all my doubts. I beg you will supply the omission, as soon as you have leisure. You have much enlightened me in your last letter, but have not yet dispelled all my darkness; this result will, I believe, be happily accomplished, when you send me clear and distinct information concerning the first origin of things. Hitherto I have been somewhat in doubt as to the cause from which, and the manner in which things took their origin; also, as to what is the nature of their connection with the first cause, if such there be. All LETTER VII.] CORRESPONDENCE 289 that I hear or read on the subject seems inconclusive. Do you then, my very learned master, act, as it were, as my torch-bearer in the matter. You will have no reason to doubt my confidence and gratitude. Such is the earn est petition of Yours most faithfully, HENRY OLDENBURG. LETTER VI. (VI.) SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. [Containing detailed criticisms by Spinoza of Robert Boyle's book.] Omitted. LETTER VII. (VII.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [After thanking Spinoza, in the name of himself and Boyle, Olden burg mentions the foundation of the Royal Society, and begs his correspondent to publish his theological and philosophical works.] The body of philosophers which I formerly mentioned to you has now, by the king's grace, been constituted as a Royal Society, and furnished with a public charter, whereby distinguished privileges are conferred upon it, and an excellent prospect afforded of endowing it with the necessary revenues. I would by all means advise you not to begrudge to the learned those works in philosophy and theology, which you have composed with the talent that distin guishes you. Publish them, I beg, whatever be the ver dict of petty theologians. Your country is free; the course of philosophy should there be free also. Your own prudence will, doubtless suggest to you, that your ideas and opinions should be put forth as quietly as possible. 19 290 SPINOZA'S [LETTER VIII. For the rest, commit the issue to fortune* Come, then, good sir, cast away all fear of exciting against you the pigmies of our time. Long enough have we sacrificed to ignorance and pedantry. Let us spread the sails of true knowledge, and explore the recesses of nature more thoroughly than heretofore. Your meditations can, I take it, be printed in your country with impunity; nor need any scandal among the learned be dreaded because of them. If these be your patrons and supporters (and I warrant me you will find them so), why should you dread the carping of ignorance ? I will not let you go, my honored friend, till I have gained my request; nor will I ever, so far as in me lies, allow thoughts of such importance as yours to rest in eternal silence. I earn estly beg you to communicate to me, as soon as you conveniently can, your decision in the matter. Perhaps events will occur here not unworthy of your knowledge. The Society I have mentioned will now proceed more strenuously on its course, and, if peace continues on our shores, will possibly illustrate the republic of letters with some extraordinary achievement. Farewell, excel lent sir, and believe me, Your most zealous and friendly, HENRY OLDENBURG. LETTER VIII. (XL) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [After further replying to Spinoza's criticisms on Boyle's book, Olden burg again exhorts his correspondent to publish.] I NOW proceed to the question which has arisen between us. First, permit me to ask you whether you have finished the important little work, in which you treat ( which are objected to by the learned, for I want to illustrate that treatise with notes, and to remove if possible the prejudices conceived against it. Farewell. LETTER XX. ( LXXI.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. As I SEE from your last letter, the book you propose to publish is in peril. It is impossible not to approve your purpose of illustrating and softening down those pas sages in the (t Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, >J which have given pain to its readers. First I would call attention to the ambiguities in your treatment of God and Nature: a great many people think you have confused the one with the other. Again, you seem to many to take away the authority and value of miracles, whereby alone, as nearly 3°2 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXI. all Christians believe, the certainty of the divine revelation can be established. Again, people say that you conceal your opinion con cerning Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the world, the only Mediator for mankind, and concerning his incarna tion and redemption : they would like you to give a clear explanation of what you think on these three subjects. If you do this and thus give satisfaction to prudent and rational Christians, I think your affairs are safe Fare well. LONDON, 15 Nov., 1675. P.S. — Send me a line, I beg, to inform me whether this note has reached you safely. LETTER XXI. (LXXIII.) SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. DISTINGUISHED SIR,— I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated i$ib. Nov. In it you merely indi cate the points in the theological treatise, which have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn from it, what were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious virtue, and which you formerly mentioned. However, I will speak on the three subjects on which you desire me to disclose my sentiments, and tell you, first, that my opinion concerning God differs widely from that which is ordinarily defended by modern Christians. For I hold that God is of all things the cause immanent, as the phrase is, not transient. I say that all things are in God and move in God, thus agree ing with Paul, and, perhaps, with all the ancient philos ophers, though the phraseology may be different; I will even venture to affirm that I agree with all the ancient Hebrews, in so far as one may judge from their tradi tions, though these are in many ways corrupted. The supposition of some, that I endeavor to prove in the LETTER XXL] CORRESPONDENCE 303 "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus }) the unity of God and Nature (meaning by the latter a certain mass or corpo real matter), is wholly erroneous. As regards miracles, I am of opinion that the revela tion of God can only be established by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles, or in other words, by igno rance. This I have shown at sufficient length in Chapter VI. concerning miracles. I will here only add, that I make this chief distinction between religion and super stition, that the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on knowledge; this, I take it, is the reason why Christians are distinguished from the rest of the world, not by faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by their opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, like everyone else, by mira cles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all malice; thus they turn a faith, which may be true, into superstition. Lastly, in order to disclose my opinions on the third point, I will tell you that I do not think it necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh : but with regard to the Eternal Son of God, that is, the Eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things and especially in the human mind, and above all in Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. For with out this no one can come to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches, what is true or false, good or evil. And, inasmuch as this wisdom was made espe cially manifest through Jesus Christ, as I have said, his disciples preached it, in so far as it was revealed to them through him, and thus showed that they could rejoice in that spirit of Christ more than the rest of mankind. The doctrines added by certain churches, such as that God took upon himself human nature, I have expressly said that I do not understand ; in fact, to speak the truth, they seem to me no less absurd than would a statement, that a circle had taken upon itself the nature of a square. This I think will be sufficient explanation of my opin ions concerning the three points mentioned. Whether it will be satisfactory to Christians you will know better than I. Farewell. 304 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXII. LETTER XXII. (LXXIV.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [Oldenburg wishes to be enlightened concerning the doctrine of fatal ism, of which Spinoza has been accused. He discourses on man's limited intelligence and on the incarnation of the Son of God.] As YOU seem to accuse me of excessive brevity, I will this time avoid the charge by excessive prolixity. Yon expected, I see, that I should set forth those opinions in your writings, which seem to discourage the practice of religious virtue in your readers. I will indicate the mat ter which especially pains them. You appear to set up a fatalistic necessity for all things and actions ; if such is con ceded and asserted, people aver, that the sinews of all laws, of virtue, and of religion, are severed, and that all re wards and punishment are vain. Whatsoever can compel, or involves necessity, is held also to excuse; therefore no one, they think, can be without excuse in the sight of God. If we are driven by fate, and all things follow a fixed and inevitable path laid down by the hard hand of necessity, they do not see where punishment can come in. What wedge can be brought for the untying of this knot, it is very difficult to say. I should much like to know and learn what help you can supply in the matter. As to the opinions which you have kindly disclosed to me on the three points I mentioned, the following in quiries suggest themselves. First, In what sense do you take MIRACLES and IGNORANCE to be synonymous and equivalent terms, as you appear to think in your last letter ? The bringing back of Lazarus from the dead, and the resurrection from death of Jesus Christ seem to surpass all the power of created nature, and to fall within the scope of divine power only; it would not be a sign of culpable ignorance, that it was necessary to exceed the limits of finite intelligence confined within certain bounds. But perhaps you do not think it in harmony with the LETTER XXIII. ] CORRESPONDENCE 305 created mind and science, to acknowledge in the uncre ated mind and supreme Deity a science and power capa ble of fathoming, and bringing to pass events, whose reason and manner can neither be brought home nor ex plained to us poor human pigmies ? (< We are men w ; it appears, that we must <( think everything human akin to ourselves. w Again, when you say that you cannot understand that God really took upon himself human nature, it becomes allowable to ask you, how you understand the texts in the Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, whereof the first says, (< The Word was made flesh, w * and the other, {< For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham. w f Moreover, the whole tenor of the Gospel infers, as I think, that the only begotten Son of God, the Word (who both was God and was with God), showed himself in human na ture, and by his passion and death offered up the sacri fice for our sins, the price of the atonement. What you have to say concerning this without impugning the truth of the Gospel and the Christian religion, which I think you approve of, I would gladly learn. I had meant to write more, but am interrupted by friends on a visit, to whom I cannot refuse the duties of courtesy. But what I have already put on paper is enough, and will perhaps weary you in your philosophiz ing. Farewell, therefore, and believe me to be ever an admirer of your learning and knowledge. LONDON, 16 Dec., 1675. LETTER XXIII. (LXXV.) SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. [ Spinoza expounds to Oldenburg his views on fate and necessity, discriminates between miracles and ignorance, takes the resurrection of *John i. 14. fHeb. ii. 16. 20 3o6 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIII. Christ as spiritual, and deprecates attributing to the sacred writers western modes of speech.] DISTINGUISHED SIR: — At last I see what it was that you begged me not to publish. However, as it forms the chief foundation of everything in the treatise which I intended to bring out, I should like briefly to explain here in what sense I assert that a fatal necessity presides over all things and actions. God I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as every one conceives that it follows from God's nature that God understands himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from the divine nature, yet no one conceives that God is under the compulsion of any fate, but that he understands himself quite freely, though necessarily. Further, this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with divine nor human laws. The principles of morality, whether they receive from God himself the form of laws or institutions, or whether they do not, are still divine and salutary; whether we receive the good, which flows from virtue and the divine love, as from God in the capacity of a judge, or as from the necessity of the divine nature, it will in either case be equally desirable; on the other hand, the evils following from wicked actions and passions are not less to be feared be cause they are necessary consequences. Lastly, in our actions, whether they be necessary or contingent, we are led by hope and fear. Men are only without excuse before God, because they are in God's power, as clay is in the hands of the potter, who from the same lump makes vessels, some to honor, some to dishonor. If you will reflect a little on this, you will, I doubt not, easily be able to reply to any ob jections which may be urged against my opinion, as many of my friends have already done. I have taken miracles and ignorance as equivalent terms, because those, who endeavor to establish God's existence and the truth of religion by means of miracles, seek to prove the obscure by what is more obscure and completely LETTER XXIII.] CORRESPONDENCE 307 unknown, thus introducing a new sort of argument, the reduction, not to the impossible, as the phrase is, but to ignorance. But, if I mistake not, I have sufficiently ex plained my opinion on miracles in the * Theologico-Political M treatise. I will only add here, that if you will reflect on the facts; that Christ did not appear to the council, nor to Pilate, nor to any unbeliever, but only to the faithful ; also that God has neither right hand nor left, but is by his essence not in a particular spot, but everywhere ; that matter is everywhere the same ; that God does not mani fest himself in the imaginary space supposed to be outside the world; and lastly, that the frame of the human body is kept within due limits solely by the weight of the air; you will readily see that this apparition of Christ is not unlike that wherewith God appeared to Abraham, when the latter saw men whom he invited to dine with him. But, you will say, all the Apostles thoroughly believed, that Christ rose from the dead and really ascended to heaven: I do not deny it. Abraham, too, believed that God had dined with him, and all the Israelites believed that God descended, surrounded with fire, from heaven to Mount Sinai, and there spoke directly with them ; whereas, these apparitions or revelations, and many others like them, were adapted to the understanding and opinions of those men, to whom God wished thereby to reveal his will. I therefore conclude, that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was in reality spiritual, and that to the faithful alone, according to their understanding, it was revealed that Christ was endowed with eternity, and had risen from the dead (using DEAD in the sense in which Christ said, (8 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIV. to mention the fact, that Christians interpret spiritually all those doctrines which the Jews accepted literally. I join with you in acknowledging human weakness. But on the other hand, I venture to ask you whether we <( human pigmies >} possess sufficient knowledge of nature to be able to lay down the limits of its force and power, or to say that a given thing surpasses that power? No one could go so far without arrogance. We may, therefore, without presumption explain miracles as far as possible by natural causes. When we cannot explain them, nor even prove their impossibility, we may well suspend our judgment about them, and establish religion, as I have said, solely by the wisdom of its doctrines. You think that the texts in John's Gospel and in Hebrews are inconsistent with what I advance, because you measure oriental phrases by the standards of European speech ; though John wrote his gospel in Greek, he wrote it as a Hebrew. However this may be, do you believe, when Scripture says that God manifested himself in a cloud, or that he dwelt in the tabernacle, or the temple, that God actually assumed the nature of a cloud, a tabernacle, or a temple ? Yet the ut most that Christ says of himself, that he is the Temple of God,* because, as I said before, God had specially man ifested himself in Christ. John, wishing to express the same truth more forcibly, said that <( the Word was made flesh. w But I have said enough on the subject. LETTER XXIV. (LXXVII.) OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [Oldenburg returns to the questions of universal necessity, of miracles, and of the literal and allegorical interpretation of Scripture.] You hit the point exactly, in perceiving the cause why I did not wish the doctrine of the fatalistic necessity of * John ii. 19. Cf. Matt. xxvi. 60; Mark xiv. 58. LETTER XXIV.J CORRESPONDENCE 309 all things to be promulgated, lest the practice of virtue should thereby be aspersed, and rewards and punishments become ineffectual. The suggestions in your last letter hardly seem sufficient to settle the matter, or to quiet the human mind. For if we men are, in all our actions, moral as well as natural, under the power of God, like clay in the hands of the potter, with what face can any of us be accused of doing this or that, seeing that it was impossible for him to do otherwise ? Should we not be able to cast all responsibility on God ? Your inflexible fate, and your irresistible power, compel us to act in a given manner, nor can we possibly act otherwise. Why, then, and by what right do you deliver us up to terrible punishments, which we can in no way avoid, since you direct and carry on all things through supreme necessity, according to your good will and pleasure ? When you say that men are only inexcusable before God, because they are in the power of God, I should reverse the argument, and say, with more show of reason, that men are evi dently excusable, since they are in the power of God. Everyone may plead, <( Thy power cannot be escaped from, O God; therefore, since I could not act otherwise, I may justly be excused. }) Again, in taking miracles and ignorance as equivalent terms, you seem to bring within the same limits the power of God and the knowledge of the ablest men; for God is, according to you, unable to do or pro duce anything, for which men cannot assign a reason, if they employ all the strength of their facul ties. Again, the history of Christ's passion, death, burial, and resurrection seems to be depicted in such lively and genuine colors, that I venture to appeal to your con science, whether you can believe them to be allegorical, rather than literal, while preserving your faith in the narrative ? The circumstances so clearly stated by the Evangelists seem to urge strongly on our minds, that: the history should be understood literally. I have ven tured to touch briefly on these points, and I earnestly beg you to pardon me, and answer me as a friend with 310 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXV. your usual candor. Mr. Boyle sends you his kind regards. I will, another time, tell you what the Royal Society is doing. Farewell, and preserve me in your affection. LONDON, 14 Jan., 1676. LETTER XXV. (LXXVIII.) Written 7 Feb., 1676. SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG. [ Spinoza again treats of fatalism. He repeats that he accepts Christ's passion, death, and burial literally, but his resurrection spiritually.] DISTINGUISHED SIR,— When I said in my former letter that we are inexcusable, because we are in the power of God, like clay in the hands of the potter, I meant to be understood in the sense that no one can bring a com plaint against God for having given him a weak nature, or infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to God of not being endowed with the properties of a sphere, or a child who is tortured, say, with stone, for not being given a healthy body, as a man of feeble spirit, because God has denied to him fortitude, and the true knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is endowed with so weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For the nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows necessarily from its given cause. That every man cannot be brave, and that we can no more command for ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind, nobody can deny, without giving the lie to experience, as well as to reason. <( But, * you urge, (< if men sin by nature, they are excusable w ; but you do not state the conclusion you draw, whether that God can not be angry with them or that they are worthy of blessedness — that is, of the knowledge and love of God. If you say the former, I fully admit that God cannot be LETTER XXV.] CORRESPONDENCE 3*1 angry, and that all things are done in accordance with his will; but I deny that all men ought, therefore, to be blessed — men may be excusable, and, nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways. A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man ; but, never theless, he must needs be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot govern his desires, and keep them in check with the fear of the laws, though his weakness may be excusable, yet he can not enjoy with contentment the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes. I do not think it neces sary here to remind you, that Scripture, when it says that God is angry with sinners, and that he is a Judge who takes cognizance of human actions, passes sentence on them, and judges them, is speaking humanely, and in a way adapted to the received opinion of the masses, inasmuch as its purpose is not to teach phi losophy, nor to render men wise, but to make them obedient. How, by taking miracles and ignorance as equiva lent terms, I reduce God's power and man's knowl edge within the same limits, I am unable to discern. For the rest, I accept Christ's passion, death and burial literally, as you do, but his resurrection I understand allegorically. I admit, that it is related by the Evangelists in such detail, that we cannot deny that they themselves believed Christ's body to have risen from the dead and ascended to heaven, in order to sit at the right hand of God, or that they believed that Christ might have been seen by unbelievers, if they had happened to be at hand, in the places where he appeared to his Disciples; but in these matters they might, without injury to Gospel teach ing, have been deceived, as was the case with other prophets mentioned in my last letter. But Paul, to whom Christ afterward appeared, rejoices that he knew Christ not after the flesh, but after the spirit.* Farewell, hon orable Sir, and believe me yours in all affection and zea) * 2 Cor. v. 16 3 '2 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXV. A. LETTER XXV. A. OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA. [Oldenburg adduces further objections against Spinoza's doctrine of necessity and miracles, and exposes the inconsistency of a partial allegorization of Scripture.] To THE most illustrious Master Benedict de Spinoza Henry Oldenburg sends greetings. In your last letter,* written to me on the ;th of Feb ruary, there are some points which seem to deserve criti cism. You say that a man cannot complain, because God has denied him the true knowledge of himself, and strength sufficient to avoid sins ; forasmuch as to the na ture of everything nothing is competent, except that which follows necessarily from its cause. But I say, that inasmuch as God, the Creator of men formed thereafter his own image, which seems to imply in its concept wis dom, goodness and power, it appears quite to follow, that it is more within the sphere of man's power to have a sound mind than to have a sound body. For physical soundness of body follows from mechanical causes, but soundness of mind depends on purpose and design. You add, that men may be inexcusable,! an^ yet suffer pain in many ways. This seems hard at first sight, and what you add by way of proof, namely, that a dog J mad from having been bitten is indeed to be excused, but yet is rightly killed, does not seem to settle the question. For the killing of such a dog would argue cruelty, were it not necessary in order to preserve other dogs and ani mals, and indeed men, from a maddening bite of the same kind. But if God implanted in man a sound mind, as he is able to do, there would be no contagion of vices to be * Letter XXV. f Surely this is a mistake for « excusable. »— [TR.] f See Letter XXV. Oldenburg misunderstands Spinoza's illustra tion to mean «a dog which goes mad from a bite,» instead of « he who goes mad from the bite of a dog. » LETTER XXV. A.] CORRESPONDENCE 313 feared. And, surely, it seems very cruel, that God should devote men to eternal, or at least terrible tempo rary, torments, for sins which by them could be no wise avoided. Moreover, the tenor of all Holy Scripture seems to suppose and imply, that man can abstain from sins. For it abounds in denunciations, and promises, in declarations of rewards and punishments, all of which seem to militate against the necessity of sinning, and infer the possibility of avoiding punishment. And if this were denied, it would have to be said that the human mind acts no less mechanically than the human body. Next, wThen you proceed to take miracles and ignorance to be equivalent, you seem to rely on this foundation, that the creature can and should have perfect insight into the power and wisdom of the Creator: and that the fact is quite otherwise, I have hitherto been firmly per suaded. Lastly, where you affirm that Christ's passion, death, and burial are to be taken literally, but his resurrection allegorically, you rely, as far as I can see, on no proof at all. Christ's resurrection seems to be delivered in the Gospel as literally as the rest. And on this article of the Resurrection the whole Christian religion and its truth rest, and with its removal Christ's mission and heavenly doctrine collapse. It cannot escape you, how Christ, after he was raised from the dead, labored to convince his Disciples of the truth of the Resurrection properly so called. To want to turn all these things into allegories is the same thing, as if one were to busy one's self in plucking up the whole truth of the Gospel history. These few points I wished again to submit in the interest of my liberty of philosophizing, which I earnestly beg you not to take amiss. Written in LONDON, u Feb., 1676. I will communicate with you shortly on the present studies and experiments of the Royal Society, if God grant me life and health. 3*4 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXVI. LETTER XXVI. (VIII.) SIMON DE VRIES TO SPINOZA. [Simon de Vries, a diligent student of Spinoza's writings and philoso phy, describes a club formed for the study of Spinoza's MS. con. taining some of the matter afterward worked into the Ethics, and asks questions about the difficulties felt by members of the club.] MOST HONORABLE FRIEND:— I have for a long time wished to be present with you; but the weather and the hard winter have not been propitious to me. I sometimes complain of my lot, in that we are separated from each other by so long a distance. Happy, yes most happy, is the fellow-lodger, abiding under the same roof with you, who can talk with you on the best of subjects, at dinner,' at supper, and during your walks. However, though I am far apart from you in body, you have been very fre quently present to my mind, especially in your writings, while I read and turn them over. But as they are not all clear to the members of our club, for which reason we have begun a fresh series of meetings, and as I would not have you think me unmindful of you, I have applied my mind to writing this letter. As regards our club, the following is its order. One of us (that is every one by turn) reads through and, as far as he understands it, expounds and also demonstrates the whole of your work, according to the sequence and order of your propositions. Then, if it happens that on any point we cannot satisfy one another, we have resolved to make a note of it and write to you, so that, if possi ble, it may be made clearer to us, arid that we may be able under your guidance to defend the truth against those who are superstitiously religious and against the Christians, and to withstand the attack of the whole world. Well then, since, when we first read through and expounded them, the definitions did not all seem clear to us, we differed about the nature of definition. Next, in your absence we consulted as our authority a LETTER XXVI. j CORRESPONDENCE 315 celebrated mathematician, named Borel: for he makes mention of the nature of definition, axiom, and postu late, and adduces the opinions of others on the subject. But his opinion is as follows: (< Definitions are cited in a demonstration as premises. Wherefore it is necessary, that they should be accurately known ; otherwise scientific or accurate knowledge cannot be attained by their means. M And elsewhere he says. (< The primary and most known construction or passive quality of a given subject should not be chosen rashly, but with the greatest care; if the construction or passive quality be an impossibility, no scientific definition can be obtained. For instance, if any one were to say, let two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals, the definition would be of non- existences and impossible: hence ignorance rather than knowledge would be deduced therefrom. Again, if the construction or passive quality be possible and true, but unknown or doubtful to us, the definition will not be good. For conclusions arising from what is unknown or doubtful are themselves uncertain or doubtful; they there fore bring about conjecture or opinion, but not certain knowledge. w Jacquet seems to dissent from this opinion, for he thinks that one may proceed from a false premise directly to a true conclusion, as you are aware. Clavius, how ever, whose opinion he quotes, thinks as follows : <( Defi nitions, w he says, <( are artificial phrases, nor is there any need in reasoning that a thing should be defined in a particular way; but it is sufficient that a thing defined should never be said to agree with another thing, until it has been shown that its definition also agrees there with. » Thus, according to Borel, the definition of a given thing should consist, as regards its construction or passive quality, in something thoroughly known to us and true. Clavius, on the other hand, holds that it is a matter of indifference, whether the construction or passive quality be well known and true, or the reverse ; so long as we do not assert, that our definition agrees with anything, before it has been proved. 3l6 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXVI. I should prefer Borel's opinion to that of Clavius. I know not which you would assent to, if to either. As these difficulties have occurred to me with regard to the nature of definition, which is reckoned among- the car dinal points of demonstration, and as I cannot free my mind from them, I greatly desire, and earnestly beg you, when you have leisure and opportunity, to be kind enough to send me your opinion on the matter, and at the same time to tell me the distinction between axioms and definitions. Borel says that the difference is merely nominal, but I believe you decide otherwise. Further, we cannot make up our minds about the third definition.* I adduced to illustrate it, what my master said to me at the Hague, to wit, that a thing may be regarded in two ways, either as it is in itself, or as it is in relation to something else ; as in the case of the intellect, for that can be regarded either under the head of thought or as consisting in ideas. But we do not see the point of the distinction thus drawn. For it seems to us, that, if we rightly conceive thought, we must range it under the head of ideas; as, if all ideas were removed from it, we should destroy thought. As we find the illustration of the matter not sufficiently clear, the mat ter itself remains somewhat obscure, and we need further explanation. Lastly, in the third note to the eighth proposition, the beginning runs thus: « Hence it is plain that, although two attributes really distinct be conceived, that is, one without the aid of the other, we cannot therefore infer, that they constitute two entities or two different sub stances. For it belongs to the nature of substance, that each of its attributes should be conceived through itself, though all the attributes it possesses exist simultaneously in it. » Here our master seems to assume, that the nature of substance is so constituted, that it may have several attributes. But this doctrine has not yet been proved, unless you refer to the sixth definition, of absolutely infinite substance or God. Otherwise, if it be asserted that each substance has only one attribute, and I have * The third definition of the «Ethics», as they now exist. LETTER XXVII. J CORRESPONDENCE 317 two ideas of two attributes. I may rightly infer that, where there are two different attributes, there are also different substances. On this point also we beg you to give a further explanation. Besides I thank you very much for your writings communicated to me by P. Balling, which have greatly delighted me, especially your note on Proposition XIX.* If I can do YOU any service here in anything that is within my power, I am at your disposal. You have but to let me know. I have begun a course of anatomy, and am nearly half through with it: when it is finished, I shall begin a course of chemistry, and thus under your guidance I shall go through the whole of medicine. I leave off, and await your answer. Accept the greeting of Your most devoted S. J. DE VRIES. AMSTERDAM, 24 Feb., 1663. LETTER XXVII. (IX.) SPINOZA TO SIMON DE VRIES. [Spinoza deprecates his correspondent's jealousy of Albert Burgh; and answers that distinction must be made between different kinds of definitions. He explains his opinions more precisely.] RESPECTED FRIEND, — I have received your long wished- for letter, for which, and for your affection toward me, I heartily thank you. Your long absence has been no less grievous to me than to you; yet in the meantime I rejoice that my trifling studies are of profit to you and our friends. For thus while you are away, I in my absence speak to you. You need not envy my fellow- lodger. There is no one who is more displeasing to me, nor against whom I have been more anxiously on my guard; and therefore I would have you and all my ac quaintance warned not to communicate my opinions to * There is no note to (< Ethics, w I. xix. As there is nothing to show what proposition is intended, the old version suppressed the whole pas sage from « Besides I thank you » to « medicine. » 3i8 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXVII. him, except when he has come to maturer years. So far he is too childish and inconstant, and is fonder of novelty than of truth. But I hope, that in a few years he will amend these childish faults. Indeed I am almost sure of it, as far as I can judge from his nature. And so his temperament bids me like him. As for the questions propounded in your club, which is wisely enough ordered, I see that your difficulties arise from not distinguishing between kinds of definition: that is, between a definition serving to explain a thing, of which the essence only is sought and in question, and a definition which is put forward only for purposes of inquiry. The former having a definite object ought to be true, the latter need not. For instance, if some one asks me for a description of Solomon's temple, I am bound to give him a true description, unless I want to talk nonsense with him. But if I have constructed, in my mind, a temple which I desire to build, and infer from the description of it that I must buy such and such a site and so many thousand stones and other materials, will any sane person tell me that I have drawn a wrong conclusion because my definition is possibly untrue ? or will anyone ask me to prove my definition ? Such a person would simply be telling me, that I had not conceived that which I had conceived, or be requiring me to prove, that I had con ceived that which I had conceived; in fact, evidently trifling. Hence a definition either explains a thing, in so far as it is external to the intellect, in which case it ought to be true and only to differ from a proposition or an axiom in being concerned merely with the essences of things, or the modifications of things, whereas the latter has a wider scope and extends also to eternal truths. Or else it explains a thing, as it is conceived or can be con ceived by us ; and then it differs from an axiom or prop osition, inasmuch as it only requires to be conceived absolutely, and not like an axiom as true. Hence a bad definition is one which is not conceived. To explain my meaning, I will take Borel's example — a man saying that two straight lines enclosing a space shall be called w figurals. M If the man means by a straight line the same LETTER XXVII.] CORRESPONDENCE 319 as the rest of the world means by a curved line, his definition is good (for by the definition would be meant some such figure as (), or the like); so long- as he does not afterward mean a square or other kind of figure. But, if he attaches the ordinary meaning to the words straight line, the thing is evidently inconceivable, and therefore there is no definition. These considerations are plainly confused by Borel, to whose opinion you incline. I give another example, the one you cite at the end of your letter. If I say that each substance has only one attribute, this is an unsupported statement and needs proof. But, if I say that I mean by substance that which consists in only one attribute, the definition will be good, so long as entities consisting of several attributes are afterward styled by some name other than substance. When you say that I do not prove, that substance (or being) may have several attributes, you do not perhaps pay attention to the proofs given. I adduced two : First, <( that nothing is plainer to us, than that every being may be conceived by us under some attribute, and that the more reality or essence a given being has, the more attri butes may be attributed to it. Hence a being absolutely infinite must be defined, etc. w Secondly, and I think this is the stronger proof of the two, <(the more attributes I assign to any being, the more am I compelled to assign to it existence ; w in other words, the more I conceive it as true. The contrary would evidently result if I were feigning a chimera or some such being. Your remark that you cannot conceive thought except as consisting in ideas, because, when ideas are removed, thought is annihilated, springs, I think, from the fact that while you a thinking thing, do as you say, you ab stract all your thoughts and conceptions. It is no mar vel that, when you have abstracted all your thoughts and conceptions, you have nothing left for thinking with. On the general subject, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly and plainly, that the intellect, although infinite, belongs to nature regarded as passive rather than nature regarded as active (ad naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturam naturantem}. 32o SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXVIIL However, I do not see how this helps toward under standing the third definition, nor what difficulty the lat ter presents. It runs, if I mistake not, as follows : (< By substance I mean that, which is in itself and is con ceived through itself ; that is, of which the conception does not involve the conception of anything else. By attribute I mean the same thing; except that it is called attribute with respect to the understanding, which attributes to substance the particular nature aforesaid. w This defini tion, I repeat, explains with sufficient clearness what I wish to signify by substance or attribute. You desire, though there is no need, that I should illustrate by an example, how one and the same thing can be stamped with two names. In order not to seem miserly, I will give you two. First, I say that by Israel is meant the third patriarch; I mean the same by Jacob, the name Jacob being given, because the patriarch in question had caught hold of the heel of his brother. Secondly, by a colorless surface I mean a surface, which reflects all rays of light without altering them. I mean the same by a white surface, with this difference, that a surface is called white in reference to a man looking at it, etc. LETTER XXVIIL (X.) SPINOZA TO SIMON DE VRIES. [Spinoza, in answer to a letter from De Vries now lost, speaks of the experience necessary for proving a definition, and also of eternal truths.] RESPECTED FRIEND, — You ask me if we have need of experience, in order to know whether the definition of a given attribute is true. To this I answer that we never need experience, except in cases when the existence of the thing cannot be inferred from its definition, as, for instance, the existence of modes (which cannot be inferred from their definition) ; experience is not needed, when the existence of the things in question is not distinguished from LETTER XXIX.] CORRESPONDENCE 321 their essence, and is therefore inferred from their defini tion. This can never be taught us by any experience, for experience does not teach us any essences of things; the utmost it can do is to set our mind thinking about definite essences only. Wherefore, when the existence of attributes does not differ from their essence, no experi ence is capable of attaining it for us. To your further question, whether things and their modifications are eternal truths, I answer; Certainly. If you ask me, why I do not call them eternal truths, I answer, in order to distinguish them, in accordance with general usage, from those propositions, which do not make manifest any particular thing or modification of a thing ; for example, NOTHING COMES FROM NOTHING. These and such like propositions are, I repeat, called eternal truths simply, the meaning merely being, that they have no standpoint external to the mind, etc. LETTER XXIX. (XII.) SPINOZA TO L. M. (LEWIS MEYER). DEAREST FRIEND, — I have received two letters from you, one dated Jan. n, delivered to me by our friend, N. N., the other dated March 26, sent by some unknown friend to Leyden. They were both most welcome to me, especially as I gathered from them, that all goes well with you, and that you are often mindful of me. I also owe and repay you the warmest thanks for the courtesy and consideration, with which you have always been kind enough to treat me: I hope you will believe, that I am in no less degree devoted to you, as, when occasion offers, I will always endeavor to prove, as far as my poor powers will admit. As a first proof, I will do my best to answer the questions you ask in your letters. You request me to tell you, what I think about the Infinite; I will most readily do so. 21 322 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIX. Everyone regards the question of the Infinite as most difficult, if not insoluble, through not making a distinc tion between that which must be infinite from its very nature, or in virtue of its definition, and that which has no limits, not in virtue of its essence, but in virtue of its cause; and also through not distinguishing between that which is called infinite, because it has no limits, and that, of which the parts cannot be equalled or expressed by any number, though the greatest and least magnitude of the whole may be known; and, lastly, through not distinguishing between that, which can be understood but not imagined, and that which can also be imagined. If these distinctions, I repeat, had been attended to, inquirers would not have been overwhelmed with such a vast crowd of difficulties. They would then clearly have understood, what kind of infinite is indivisible and possesses no parts; and what kind, on the other hand, may be divided without involving a contradiction in terms. They would further have understood, what kind of infinite may, without solecism, be conceived greater than another infinite, and what kind cannot be so con ceived. All this will plainly appear from what I am about to say. However, I will first briefly explain the terms SUBSTANCE, MODE, ETERNITY, and DURATION. The points to be noted concerning substance are these : First, that existence appertains to its essence; in other words, that solely from its essence and definition its existence follows. This, if I remember rightly, I have already proved to you by word of mouth, without the aid of any other propositions. Secondly, as a conse quence of the above, that substance is not manifold, but single: there cannot be two of the same nature. Thirdly, every substance must be conceived as in finite. The modifications of substance I call MODES. Their defi nition, in so far as it is not identical with that of sub stance, cannot involve any existence. Hence, though they exist, we can conceive them as non-existent. From this it follows, that, when we are regarding only the essence LETTER XXIX. j CORRESPONDENCE 323 of modes, and not the order of the whole of nature, we cannot conclude from their present existence, that they will exist or not exist in the future, or that they have existed or not existed in the past; whence it is abund antly clear, that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different from the existence of modes. From this difference arises the distinction between ETERNITY and DURATION. DURATION is only applicable to the existence of modes; ETERNITY is applicable to the existence of substance, that is, the infinite faculty of ex istence or being (infinitum existendi sive — invitd Latini- tate — essendi fruitionem). From what has been said it is quite clear that when, as is most often the case, we are regarding only the es sence of modes and not the order of nature, we may freely limit the existence and duration of modes without destroying the conception we have formed of them; we may conceive them as greater or less, or may divide them into parts. Eternity and substance, being only conceivable as infinite, cannot be thus treated without our conception of them being destroyed. Wherefore it is mere foolishness, or even insanity, to say that extended sub stance is made up of parts or bodies really distinct from one another. It is as though one should attempt by the aggregation and addition of many circles to make up a square, or a triangle, or something of totally different es sence. Wherefore the whole heap of arguments, by which philosophers commonly endeavor to show that extended substance is finite, falls to the ground by its own weight. For all such persons suppose, that corporeal substance is made up of parts. In the same way, others who have persuaded themselves that a line is made up of points, have been able to discover many arguments to show that a line is not infinitely divisible. If you ask, why we are by nature so prone to attempt to divide extended sub stance, I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways, namely, by abstraction or superficially, as we imagine it by the aid of the senses, or as substance, which can only be accomplished through the understand ing. So that, if we regard quantity as it exists in the 324 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIX. imagination (and this is the more frequent and easy method), it will be found to be divisible, finite, com posed of parts, and manifold. But, if we regard it as it is in the understanding, and the thing be conceived as it is in itself (which is very difficult), it will then, as I have sufficiently shown you before, be found to be infinite, in divisible, and single. Again, from the fact that we can limit duration and quantity at our pleasure, when we conceive the latter abstractedly as apart from substance, and separate the former from the manner whereby it flows from things eternal, there arise TIME and MEASURE; TIME for the pur pose of limiting duration, MEASURE for the purpose of limiting quantity, so that we may, as far as is possible, the more readily imagine them. Further, inasmuch as we separate the modifications of substance from substance itself, and reduce them to classes, so that we may, as far as is possible, the more readily imagine them, there .arises NUMBER, whereby we limit them. Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure, time, and number, are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that all who have endeavored to understand the course of nature, by means of such notions, and without fully understanding even them, have entangled themselves so wondrously, that they have at last only been able to extricate themselves by breaking through every rule and admitting absurdities even of the grossest kind. For there are many things which cannot be conceived through the imagination but only through the understanding, for instance, substance, eternity, and the like; thus, if any one tries to explain such things by means of conceptions which are mere aids to the imagination, he is simply assisting his imagination to run away with him. Nor can even the modes of sub stance ever be rightly understood, if we confuse them with entities of the kind mentioned, mere aids of the reason or imagination. In so doing we separate them from substance, and the mode of their derivation from eternity, without which they can never be rightly under stood. To make the matter yet more clear, take the LETTER XXIX.] CORRESPONDENCE 325 following example : when a man conceives of duration abstractedly, and, confusing it with time, begins to divide it into parts, he will never be able to understand how an hour, for instance, can elapse. For in order that an hour should elapse, it is necessary that its half should elapse first, and afterward half of the remainder, and again half of the half of the remainder, and if you go on thus to infinity, subtracting the half of the residue, you will never be able to arrive at the end of the hour. Wherefore many, who are not accustomed to distinguish abstractions from realities, have ventured to assert that duration is made up of instants, and so in wishing to avoid Charybdis have fallen into Scylla. It is the same thing to make up duration out of instants, as it is to make number simply by adding up naughts. Further, as it is evident from what has been said, that neither number, nor measure, nor time, being mere aids to the imagination, can be infinite ( for, otherwise, num ber would not be number, nor measure measure, nor time time ) ; it is hence abundantly evident, why many who confuse these three abstractions with realities, through being ignorant of the true nature of things, have actu ally denied the Infinite. The wretchedness of their reasoning may be judged by mathematicians, who have never allowed themselves to be delayed a moment by arguments of this sort, in the case of things which they clearly and distinctly perceive. For not only have they come across many things, which cannot be expressed by number (thus showing the in adequacy of number for determining all things ) ; but also they have found many things, which cannot be equalled by any number, but surpass every possible number. But they infer hence, that such things surpass enumeration, not because of the multitude of their component parts, but because their nature cannot, without manifest con tradiction, be expressed in terms of number. As, for instance, in the case of two circles, non-concentric, whereof one incloses the other, no number can express the inequalities of distance which exist between the two circles, nor all the variations which matter in motion in 326 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIX. the intervening space may undergo. This conclusion is not based on the excessive size of the intervening space. However small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of this small portion will surpass all numerical expression. Nor, again, is the conclusion based on the fact, as in other cases, that we do not know the maximum and the minimum of the said space. It springs simply from the fact, that the nature of the space between two non-con centric circles cannot be expressed in number. There fore, he who would assign a numerical equivalent for the inequalities in question, would be bound, at the same time, to bring about that a circle should not be a cir cle. The same result would take place — to return to my subject — if one were to wish to determine all the motions undergone by matter up to the present, by reducing them and their duration to a certain number and time. This would be the same as an attempt to deprive corporeal sub stance, which we cannot conceive except as existent, of its modifications, and to bring about that it should not possess the nature which it does possess. All this I could clearly demonstrate here, together with many other points touched on in this latter, but I deem it superfluous. From all that has been said, it is abundantly evident that certain things are in their nature infinite, and can by no means be conceived as finite; whereas there are other things, infinite in virtue of the cause from which they are derived, which can, when conceived abstractedly, be divided into parts, and regarded as finite. Lastly, there are some which are called infinite or, if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be expressed in number, which may yet be conceived as greater or less. It does not follow that such are equal, because they are alike incapable of numerical expression. This is plain enough, from the example given, and many others. Lastly, I have put briefly before you the causes of error and confusion, which have arisen concerning the question of the infinite. I have, if I mistake not, so explained them that no question concerning the infinite remains untreated, or cannot readily be solved from what I have LETTER XXIX. A.] CORRESPONDENCE 327 said; wherefore, I do not think it worth while to detain you longer on the matter. But I should like it first to be observed here, that the later Peripatetics have, I think, misunderstood the proof given by the Ancients who sought to demonstrate the existence of God. This, as I find it in a certain Jew named Rabbi Ghasdai, runs as follows: <(If there be an infinite series of causes, all things which are, are caused. But nothing which is caused can exist necessarily in virtue of its own nature. Therefore, there is nothing in nature, to whose essence existence necessarily belongs. But this is absurd. Therefore, the premise is absurd also. w Hence the force of the argument lies not in the impossibility of an actual infinite or an infinite series of causes; but only in the absurdity of the assumption that things, which do not necessarily exist by nature, are not conditioned for existence by a thing, which does by its own nature necessarily exist. I would now pass on, for time presses, to your second letter: but I shall be able more conveniently to reply to its contents, when you are kind enough to pay me a visit. I therefore beg that you will come as soon as possible; the time for traveling is at hand. Enough. Farewell, and keep in remembrance, Yours, etc. RHIJNSBURG, 20 April, 1663. LETTER XXIX. A. SPINOZA TO LEWIS MEYER. DEAR FRIEND, — The preface you sent me by our friend De Vries, I now send back to you by the same hand. Some few things, as you will see, I have marked in the margin; but yet a few remain, which I have judged it better to mention to you by letter. First, where on page 4 yotl giye the reader to know on what occasion I com posed the first part; I would have you likewise explain 328 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXIX.A. there, or where you please, that I composed it within a fortnight. For when this is explained none will suppose the exposition to be so clear as that it cannot be bet tered, and so they will not stick at obscurities in this and that phrase on which they may chance to stumble. Secondly, I would have you explain, that when I prove many points otherwise than they be proved by Descartes, 'tis not to amend Descartes, but the better to preserve my order, and not to multiply axioms overmuch: and that for this same reason I prove many things which by Descartes are barely alleged without any proof, and must needs add other matters which Descartes let alone. Lastly, I will earnestly beseech you, as my especial friend, to let be everything you have written toward the end against that creature, and wholly strike it out. And though many reasons determine me to this request, I will give but one. I would fain have all men readily believe that these matters are published for the common profit of the world, and that your sole motive in bring ing out the book is the love of spreading the truth; and that it is accordingly all your study to make the work acceptable to all, to bid men, with all courtesy to the pursuit of genuine philosophy, and to conbult their com mon advantage. Which every man will be ready to think when he sees that no one is attacked, nor anything advanced where any man can find the least offense. Notwithstanding, if afterward the person you know of, or any other, be minded to display his ill-will, then you may portray his life and character, and gain applause by it. So I ask that you will not refuse to be patient thus far, and suffer yourself to be entreated, and believe me wholly bounden to you, and Yours with all affection B. DE SPINOZA. VOORBURG, Aug. 3, 1663. Our friend De Vries had promised to take this with him ; but seeing he knows not when he will return to you, I send it by another hand. Along with this I send you part of the scholium to Prop, xxvii. Part II. where page 75 begins, that you LETTER XXX. J CORRESPONDENCE 329 may hand it to the printer to be reprinted. The matter I send you must of necessity be reprinted, and fourteen or fifteen lines added, which may easily be inserted. LETTER XXX. (XVII.) SPINOZA TO PETER BALLING. [Concerning omens and phantoms. The mind may have a confused presentiment of the future.] BELOVED FRIEND,— Your last letter, written, if I mistake not, on the 26th of last month, has duly reached me. It caused me no small sorrow and solicitude, though the feeling sensibly diminished when I reflected on the good sense and fortitude, with which you have known how to despise the evils of fortune, or rather of opinion, at a time when they most bitterly assailed you. Yet my anxiety increases daily; I therefore beg and implore you by the claims of our friendship, that you will rouse your self to write me a long letter. With regard to OMENS, of which you make mention in telling me that, while your child was still healthy and strong, you heard groans like those he uttered when he was ill and shortly after ward died, I should judge that these were not real groans, but only the effect of your imagination; for you say that, when you got up and composed yourself to listen, you did not hear them so clearly either as before or as afterward, when you had fallen asleep again. This, I think, shows that the groans were purely due to the im agination, which, when it was unfettered and free, could imagine groans more forcibly and vividly than when you sat up in order to listen in a particular direction. I think I can both illustrate and confirm what I say by another oc currence, which befell me at Rhijnsburg last winter. When one morning, after the day had dawned, I woke up from a very unpleasant dream, the images, which had presented themselves to me in sleep, remained before my eyes just as vividly as though the things had been real, especially 330 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXX. the image of a certain black and leprous Brazilian whom I had never seen before. This image disappeared for the most part when, in order to divert my thoughts, I cast my eyes on a book, or something else. But, as soon as I lifted my eyes again without fixing my attention on any particular object, the same image of this same negro appeared with the same vividness again and again, until the head of it gradually vanished. I say that the same thing which occurred with regard to my inward sense of sight, occurred with your hearing; but as the causes were very different, your case was an omen and mine was not. The matter may be clearly grasped by means of what I am about to say. The effects of the imagina tion arise either from bodily or mental causes. I will proceed to prove this, in order not to be too long, solely from experience. We know that fevers and other bodily ailments are the causes of delirium, and that persons of stubborn disposition imagine nothing but quarrels, brawls, slaughterings, and the like. We also see that the imagin ation is to a certain extent determined by the character of the disposition, for, as we know by experience, it follows in the tracks of the understanding in every respect, and arranges its images and words, just as the understanding arranges its demonstrations and connects one with another; so that we are hardly at all able to say what will not serve the imagination as a basis for some image or other. This being so, I say that no effects of imagination springing from physical causes can ever be omens of future events ; inasmuch as their causes do not involve any future events. But the effects of imagination, or images originating in the mental dispo sition, may be omens of some future event; inasmuch as the mind may have a confused presentiment of the future. It may, therefore, imagine a future event as forcibly and vividly, as though it were present; for instance a father (to take an example resembling your own) loves his child so much that he and the beloved child are, as it were, one and the same. And since (like that which I demonstrated on another occasion) there must necessarily exist in thought the idea of the essence LETTER XXXI.] CORRESPONDENCE 331 of the child's states and their results, and since the father, through his union with his child, is a part of the said child, the soul of the father must necessarily par ticipate in the ideal essence of the child and his states, and in their results, as I have shown at greater length elsewhere. Again, as the soul of the father participates ideally in the consequences of his child's essence, he may (as I have said) sometimes imagine some of the said conse quences as vividly as if they were present with him, provided that the following conditions are fulfilled: I. If the occurrence in his son's career be remarkable. II. If it be capable of being readily imagined. III. If the time of its happening be not too remote. IV. If his body be sound, in respect not only of health but of free dom from every care or business which could outwardly trouble the senses. It may also assist the result, if we think of something which generally stimulates similar ideas. For instance, if while we are talking with this or that man we hear groans, it will generally happen that, when we think of the man again, the groans heard when we spoke with him will recur to our mind. This, dear friend, is my opinion on the question you ask me. I have, I confess, been very brief, but I have furnished you with material for writing to me on the first oppor tunity, etc. VOORBURG, 20 July, 1664. LETTER XXXI. (XVIII.) WILLIAM DE BLYENBERGH TO SPINOZA. UNKNOWN FRIEND AND SIR,— I have already read sev eral times with attention your treatise and its appendix recently published. I should narrate to others more be comingly than to yourself the extreme solidity I found 332 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXXL in it, and the pleasure with which I perused it. But I am unable to conceal my feelings from you, because the more frequently I study the work with attention, the more it pleases me, and I am constantly observing some thing which I had not before remarked. However, I will not too loudly extol its author, lest I should seem in this letter to be a flatterer. I am aware that the gods grant all things to labor. Not to detain you too long with wondering who I may be, and how it comes to pass that one unknown to you takes the great liberty of writ ing to you, I will tell you that he is a man who is im pelled by his longing for pure and unadulterated truth, and desires during this brief and frail life to fix his feet in the ways of science, so far as our human faculties will allow; one who in the pursuit of truth has no goal before his eyes save truth herself; one who by his sci ence seeks to obtain as the result of truth neither honor nor riches, but simple truth and tranquillity; one who, out of the whole circle of truths and sciences, takes de light in none more than in metaphysics, if not in all branches at any rate in some ; one who places the whole delight of his life in the fact, that he can pass in the study of them his hours of ease and leisure. But no one, I rest assured, is so blessed as yourself, no one has car ried his studies so far, and therefore no one has arrived at the pitch of perfection which, as I see from your work, you have attained. To add a last word, the present writer is one with whom you may gain a closer acquaintance, if you choose to attach him to you by enlightening and interpenetrating, as it were, his halting medita tions. But I return to your treatise. While I found in it many things which tickled my palate vastly, some of them proved difficult to digest. Perhaps a stranger ought not to report to you his objections, the more so as I know not whether they will meet with your approval. This is the reason for my making these prefatory remarks, and asking you, if you can find leisure in the winter evenings, and, at the same time, will be willing to answer the diffi culties which I still find in your book, and to forward me LETTER XXXI.] CORRESPONDENCE 333 the result, always under the condition that it does not interrupt any occupation of greater importance or pleas ure ; for I desire nothing more earnestly than to see the promise made in your book fulfilled by a more detailed exposition of your opinions. I should have communicated to you by word of mouth what I now commit to paper; but my ignorance of your address, the infectious disease,* and my duties here, prevented me. I must defer the pleasure for the present. However, in order that this letter may not be quite empty, and in the hope that it will not be displeasing to you, I will ask you one question. You say in various passages in the (< Principia, w and in the <( Metaphysical Reflections," either as your own opinion, or as explain ing the philosophy of Descartes, that creation and pre servation are identical (which is, indeed, so evident to those who have considered the question as to be a primary notion) ; secondly, that God has not only created substances, but also motions in substances — in other words, that God, by a continuous act of creation preserves, not only substances in their normal state, but also the motion and the endeavors of substances. God, for in stance, not only brings about by his immediate will and working (whatever be the term employed), that the soul should last and continue in its normal state; but he is also the cause of his will determining, in some way, the movement of the soul — in other words, as God, by a continuous act of creation, brings about that things should remain in existence, so is he also the cause of the movements and endeavors existing in things. In fact, save God, there is no cause of motion. It therefore follows that God is not only the cause of the substance of mind, but also of every endeavor or motion of mind, which we call volition, as you frequently say. From this statement it seems to follow necessarily, either that there is no evil in the motion or volition of the mind, or else * The plague, which had prevailed on the Continent during 1664, was introduced into London in the very month in which this letter was written, perhaps from Holland. 334 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXXI. that God directly brings about that evil. For that which we call evil comes to pass through the soul, and, conse quently, through the immediate influence and concurrence of God. For instance, the soul of Adam wishes to eat of the forbidden fruit. It follows from what has been said above, not only that Adam forms his wish through the influence of God, but also, as will presently be shown, that through that influence he forms it in that particular manner. Hence, either the act forbidden to Adam is not evil, inasmuch as God himself not only caused the wish, but also the manner of it, or else God directly brought about that which we call evil. Neither you nor Descartes seem to have solved this difficulty by saying that evil is a negative conception, and that, as such, God cannot bring it about. Whence, we may ask, came the wish to eat the forbidden fruit, or the wish of devils to be equal with God? For since (as you justly observe) the will is not some thing different from the mind, but is only an endeavor or movement of the mind, the concurrence of God is as necessary to it as to the mind itself. Now the concur rence of God, as I gather from your writings, is merely the determining of a thing in a particular manner through the will of God. It follows that God concurs no less in an evil wish, in so far as it is evil, than in a good wish in so far as it is good, in other words he determines it. For the will of God being the absolute cause of all that exists, either in substance or in effort, seems to be also the primary cause of an evil wish, in so far as it is evil. Again, no exercise of volition takes place in us, that God has not known from all eternity. If we say that God does not know of a particular exercise of volition, we attribute to him imperfection. But how could God gain knowledge of it except from his decrees ? Therefore his decrees are the cause of our volitions, and hence it seems also to follow that either an evil wish is not evil, or else that God is the direct cause of the evil and brings it about. There is no room here for the theological dis tinction between an act and the evil inherent in that act. For God decrees the mode of the act no less than the LETTER XXXII.] CORRESPONDENCE 335 act, that is, God not only decreed that Adam should eat, but also that he should necessarily eat contrary to the command given. Thus it seems on all sides to follow, either that Adam's eating contrary to the command was not an evil, or else that God himself brought it to pass. These, illustrious sir, are the questions in your treatise, which I am unable at present, to elucidate. Either alter native seems to me difficult of acceptance. However, I await a satisfactory answer from your keen judgment and learning, hoping to show you hereafter how deeply indebted I shall be to you. Be assured, illustrious sir, that I put these questions from no other motive than the desire for truth. I am a man of leisure, not tied to any profession, gaining my living by honest trade, and devot ing my spare time to questions of this sort. I humbly hope that my difficulties will not be displeasing to you. If you are minded to send an answer, as I most ardently hope, write to, etc, WILLIAM DE BLYENBERGH. DORDRECHT, 12 Dec., 1664. LETTER XXXII. (XIX.) SPINOZA TO BLYENBERGH. [Spinoza answers with his usual courtesy the question propounded by Blyenbergh. ] UNKNOWN FRIEND, — I received, at Schiedam, on the 26th of December, your letter dated the i2th of Decem ber, inclosed in another written on the 24th of the same month. I gather from it your fervent love of truth, and your making it the aim of all your studies. This com pelled me, though by no means otherwise unwilling, not only to grant your petition by answering all the questions you have sent, or may in future send, to the best of my ability, but also to impart to you everything in my power, which can conduce to further knowledge and sincere 336 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XXXII. friendship. So far as in me lies, I value, above all other things out of my own control, the joining hands of friend ship with men who are sincere lovers of truth. I believe that nothing in the world, of things outside our own con trol, brings more peace than the possibility of affectionate intercourse with such men; it is just as impossible that the love we bear them can be disturbed (inasmuch as it is founded on the desire each feels for the knowledge of truth), as that truth once perceived should not be assented to. It is, moreover, the highest and most pleasing source of happiness derivable from things not under our own control. Nothing save truth has power closely to unite different feelings and dispositions. I say nothing of the very great advantages which it brings, lest I should detain you too long on a subject which, doubtless, you know already. I have said thus much, in order to show you better how gladly I shall embrace this and any future opportunity of serving you. In order to make the best of the present opportunity, I will at once proceed to answer your question. This seems to turn on the point ( as I have already clearly shown in my ap pendix to (J has been published with a view of more conven iently making known my ideas to my friends and the curious in such matters. I hear that ... is very clever in the same subject, doubtless he is well known to you. If you could obtain for me his opinion and kind attention, you would greatly increase my obligation to you. The paper explains itself. I believe you have already received the <( Prodromo * of Francis Lana the Jesuit, written in Italian. Some remarkable observations on optics are contained in it. John Oltius too, a young Swiss very learned in these matters, has published <( Physico-Mechanical Reflections Concerning Vision » ; in which he announces a machine for the polishing all kinds of glasses, very simple and of universal applicability, and also declares that he has discovered a means of collecting all the rays coming from different points of an object, so as to obtain an equal number of corresponding points, but only under conditions of a given distance and form of object. My proposal is, not that the rays from all points should be collected and rearranged (this is with any object or LETTER L1L] CORRESPONDENCE 377 distance impossible at the present stage of our knowledge) ; the result I aim at is the equal collection of rays from points outside the optic axis and in the optic axis, so that the apertures of glasses could be made of any size desired without impairing the distinctness of vision. But this must stand according to your skilled verdict. Farewell, and believe me, distinguished sir, your obedient servant, GODFREY LEIBNITZ, J. U. D., Councillor of the Elector of Mainz. FRANKFORT. 5 Oct., 1671 (new style). LETTER LII. (XLVI.) SPINOZA TO LEIBNITZ. [Answer to the foregoing letter.] MOST LEARNED AND DISTINGUISHED SIR, — I have read the paper you were kind enough to send me, and return you many thanks for the communication. I regret that I have not been able quite to follow your meaning, though you explain it sufficiently clearly, whether you think that there is any cause for making the apertures of the glasses small, except that the rays coming from a single point are not collected accurately at another single point, but in a small area which we generally call the mechanical point, and that this small area is greater or less in proportion to the size of the aperture. Further, I ask whether the lenses which you call « pandochae » correct this fault, so that the mechanical point or small area, on which the rays coming from a single point are after refraction collected, always preserves the same proportional size, whether the aperture be small or large. If so, one may enlarge the aperture as much as one likes, and consequently these lenses will be far superior to those of any other shape known to me ; if not, I hardly see why you praise them so 37» SPINOZA'S [LETTER LII. greatly beyond common lenses. For circular lenses have everywhere the same axis; therefore, when we employ them, we must regard all the points of an object as placed in the optic axis; although all the points of the object be not at the same distance, the difference arising thence will not be perceptible, when the objects are very remote ; be cause then the rays coming from a single point would, as they enter the glass, be regarded as parallel. I think your lenses might be of service in obtaining a more distinct representation of all the objects, when we wish to include several objects in one view, as we do, when we employ very large convex circular lenses. However, I would rather suspend my judgment about all these details, till you have more clearly explained your meaning, as I heartily beg you to do. I have, as you requested, sent the other copy of your paper to Mr. . . . He answers, that he has at present no time to study it, but he hopes to have leisure in a week or two. I have not yet seen the <( Prodromo }> of Francis Lana, nor the <( Physico-Mechanical Reflections w of John Oltius. What I more regret is, that your (( Physical Hypothesis w has not yet come to my hands, nor is there a copy for sale here at the Hague. The gift, therefore, which you so liberally promised me will be most acceptable to me; if I can be of use to you in any other matter, you will always find me most ready. I hope you will not think it too irksome to reply to this short note. Distinguished Sir, Yours sincerely, B. DE SPINOZA. THE HAGUE, 9 Nov., 1671. P.S. Mr. Diemerbroech does not live here. I am, therefore, forced to intrust this to an ordinary letter carrier. I doubt not that you know someone at the Hague, who would take charge of our letters; I should like to hear of such a person, that our correspondence might be more conveniently and securely taken care of. If the <( Tractatus Theologico-Politicus * has not yet come to your hands, I will, unless you have any objection, send you a copy. Farewell. LETTER LIII.) CORRESPONDENCE 379 LETTER LIII. (XLVII.) FABRITIUS TO SPINOZA. [ Fabritius, under the order and in the name of the Elector Palatine, offers Spinoza the post of Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg, under very liberal conditions.] MOST RENOWNED SIR, — His Most Serene Highness the Elector Palatine,* my most gracious master, commands me to write to you, who are, as yet, unknown to me, but most favorably regarded by his Most Serene Highness, and to inquire of you, whether you are willing to accept an ordinary professorship of Philosophy in his illustrious university. An annual salary would be paid to you, equal to that enjoyed at present by the ordinary profes sors. You will hardly find elsewhere a prince more favorable to distinguished talents, among which he reck ons yourself. You will have the most ample freedom in philosophical teaching, which the prince is confident you will not misuse, to disturb the religion publicly estab lished. I cannot refrain from seconding the prince's injunction. I therefore most earnestly beg you to reply as soon as possible, and to address your answer either under cover to the Most Serene Elector's resident at the Hague, Mr. Grotius, or to Mr. Gilles Van der Hele, so that it may come in the packet of letters usually sent to the court, or else to avail yourself of some other con venient opportunity for transmitting it. I will only add, that if you come here, you will live pleasantly a life worthy of a philosopher, unless events turn out quite contrary to our expectation and hope. So farewell. I remain, illustrious Sir, Your devoted admirer, I. LEWIS FABRITIUS. Professor of the Academy of Heidelberg, and Councillor of the Elector Palatine. HEIDELBERG, 16 Feb., 1673. * Charles Lewis, Elector, 1632-1680. 380 SPINOZA'S [LETTER XLIV. LETTER LIV. (XLVIII.) SPINOZA TO FABRITIUS. (Spinoza thanks the Elector for his kind offer, but, owing to his unwillingness to teach in public, and other causes, humbly begs to be allowed time to consider it.] DISTINGUISHED SIR, — If I had ever desired to take a professorship in any faculty, I could not have wished for any other than that which is offered to me, through you, by His Most Serene Highness the Elector Palatine, espe cially because of that freedom in philosophical teaching, which the most gracious prince is kind enough to grant, not to speak of the desire which I have long entertained, to live under the rule of a prince, whom all men admire for his wisdom. But since it has never been my wish to teach in public, I have been unable to induce myself to accept this splendid opportunity, though I have long deliberated about it. I think in the first place, that I should aban don philosophical research if I consented to find time for teaching young students. I think, in the second place, that I do not know the limits, within which the freedom of my philosophical teaching would be confined, if I am to avoid all appearance of disturbing the publicly estab lished religion. Religious quarrels do not arise so much from ardent zeal for religion, as from men's various dis positions and love of contradiction, which causes them to habitually distort and condemn everything, however rightly it may have been said. I have experienced these results in my private and secluded station, how much more should I have to fear them after my elevation to this post of honor. Thus you see, distinguished Sir, that I am not holding back in the hope of getting something better, but through my love of quietness, which I think I can in some measure secure, if I keep away from lecturing in public. LETTER LV.l CORRESPONDENCE 381 I therefore most earnestly entreat you to beg of the Most Serene Elector, that I may be allowed to consider further about this matter, and I also ask you to concil iate the favor of the most gracious prince to his most devoted admirer, thus increasing the obligations of your sincere friend, B. DE S. THE HAGUE, 30 March, 1673. LETTER LV. (LI.) HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA. [A friend asks Spinoza's opinion about ghosts. J DISTINGUISHED SIR, — My reason for writing to you is, that I want to know your opinion about apparitions and ghosts or spectres; if you admit their existence, what do you think about them, and how long does their life last? For some hold them to be mortal, others immortal. As I am doubtful whether you admit their existence, I will proceed no further. Meanwhile, it is certain, that the ancients believed in them. The theologians and philosophers of to-day are hitherto agreed as to the existence of some creatures of the kind though they may not agree as to the nature of their essence. Some assert that they are composed of very thin and subtle matter, others that they are spiritual. But, as I was saying before, we are quite at cross pur poses, inasmuch as I am doubtful whether you would grant their existence; though as you must be aware, so many instances and stories of them are found through out antiquity, that it would really be difficult either to deny or to doubt them. It is clear that, even if you con fess that they exist, you do not believe that some of them are the souls of the dead, as the defenders of the Romish faith would have it. I will here end, and will say noth- 382 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LVL ing about war and rumors, inasmuch as our lot is cast in an age, etc. Farewell. 14 Sept., 1674. LETTER LVL (LII.) SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL. [Spinoza answers that he does not know what ghosts are, and can gain no information from antiquity. (The Hague, Sept, 1674.)] DEAR SIR,— Your letter, which I received yesterday, was most welcome to me, both because I wanted to hear news of you, and also because it shows that you have not utterly forgotten me. Although some might think it a bad omen, that ghosts are the cause of your writing to me, I, on the contrary, can discern a deeper meaning in the circumstance; I see that not only truths, but also things trifling and imaginary may be of use to me. However, let us defer the question, whether ghosts are delusions and imaginary, for I see that not only denial of them, but even doubt about them seems very singular to you, as to one who has been convinced by the numerous histories related by men of to-day and the ancients. The great esteem and honor, in which I have always held and still hold you, does not suffer me to contradict you, still less to humor you. The middle course, which I ' shall adopt, is to beg you to be kind enough to select from the numerous stories which you have read, one or two of those least open to doubt, and most clearly demonstra ting the existence of ghosts. For to confess the truth, I have never read a trustworthy author, who clearly showed that there are such things. Up to the present time I do not know what they are, and no one has ever been able to tell me. Yet it is evident, that in the case of a thing so clearly shown by experience we ought to know what it is; otherwise we shall have great difficulty in gather ing from histories that ghosts exist. We only gather that something exists of nature unknown. If philosophers choose to call things which we do not know « ghosts/ I LETTER LVII.] CORRESPONDENCE 383 shall not deny the existence of such, for there are an infinity of things, which I cannot make out. Pray tell me, my dear Sir, before I explain myself further in the matter, What are these ghosts or spectres ? Are they children, or fools, or madmen ? For all that I have heard of them seems more adapted to the silly than the wise, or, to say the best we can of it, resembles the pastimes of children or of fools. Before I end, I would submit to you one consideration, namely, that the desire which most men have to narrate things, not as they really happened, but as they wished them to happen, can be illustrated from the stories of ghosts and spectres more easily than from any others. The principal reason for this is, I believe, that such stories are only attested by the narrators, and thus a fabricator can add or suppress circumstances, as seems most convenient to him, without fear of anyone being able to contradict him. He com poses them to suit special circumstances, in order to justify the fear he feels of dreams and phantoms, or else to confirm his courage, his credit, or his opinion. There are other reasons, which lead me to doubt, if not the actual stories, at least some of the narrated circumstances ; and which have a close bearing on the conclusion we are endeavoring to derive from the aforesaid stories. I will here stop, until I have learned from you what those stories are, which have so completely convinced you, that you regard all doubt about them as absurd, etc. LETTER LVII. (LIII.) HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA. MOST SAGACIOUS SIR, — You have sent me just the an swer I expected to receive, from a friend holding an opinion adverse to my own. But no matter. Friends may always disagree on indifferent subjects without injury to their friendship. 3&4 SPINOZA'S LETTER LVII. You ask me, before you gave an opinion as to what these spectres or spirits are, to tell you whether they are children, fools, or madmen, and you add that everything you have heard of them seems to have proceeded rather from the insane than the sane. It is a true proverb, which says that a preconceived opinion hinders the pur suit of truth. I, then, believe that ghosts exist for the following rea sons: first, because it appertains to the beauty and per fection of the universe, that they should ; secondly, because it is probable that the Creator created them, as being more like himself than are embodied creatures; thirdly, because as body exists without soul, soul exists without body; fourthly and lastly, because in the upper air, region, or space, I believe there is no obscure body without inhabitants of its own; consequently, that the measureless space between us and the stars is not empty, but thronged with spiritual inhabitants. Perhaps the highest and most remote are true spirits, whereas the lowest in the lowest region of the air are creatures of very thin and subtle substance, and also invisible. Thus I think there are spirits of all sorts, but, perhaps, none of the female sex. This reasoning will in no wise convince those who rashly believe that the world has been created by chance. Daily experience, if these reasons be dismissed, shows that there are spectres, and many stories, both new and old, are current about them. Such may be found in Plutarch's book (< De viris illustribus, " and in his other works; in Suetonius's « Lives of the Caesars, » also in Wierus's and Lavater's books about ghosts, where the subject is fully treated and illustrated from writers of all kinds. Cardano, celebrated for his learning, also speaks of them in his books « De Subtilitate, » « De Varietate," and in his (< Life » ; showing, by experience, that they have appeared to himself, his relations, and friends. Melancthon, a wise man and a lover of truth, testifies to his experience of them, as also do many others. A cer tain burgomaster, learned and wise, who is still living, once told me that he heard by night the noise of work- LETTER LVIL] CORRESPONDENCE 385 ing in his mother's brew-house, going on just as it does while beer is being brewed in the day; this he attested as having occurred frequently. The same sort of thing has happened to me and will never fade from my mem ory; hence I am convinced by the above-mentioned expe riences and reasons that there are ghosts. As for evil spirits who torture wretched men in this life and the next, and who work spells, I believe the stories of them to be fables. In treatises about spirits you will find a host of details. Besides those I have cited, you may refer to Pliny the Younger, bk. vii., the letter to Sura; Suetonius, "Life of Julius Caesar, }) ch. xxxii. ; Valerius Maximus, I. viii., § § 7, 8; and Alexander ab Alex- andro, <( Dies Geniales. w I am sure these books are access ible to you. I say nothing of monks and priests, for they relate so many tales of souls and evil spirits, or as I should rather say of spectres, that the reader becomes wearied with their abundance. Thyraeus, a Jesuit, in the book about the apparition of spirits, also treats of the question. But these last named discourse on such sub jects merely for the sake of gain, and to prove that pur gatory is not so bad as is supposed, thus treating the question as a mine, from which they dig up plenteous store of gold and silver. But the same cannot be said of the writers mentioned previously, and other mod erns, who merit greater credit from their absence of bias. As an answer to the passage in your letter, where you speak of fools and madmen, I subjoin this sentence from the learned Lavater, who ends with it his first book on ghosts or spectres. (( He who is bold enough to gainsay so many witnesses, both ancient and modern, seems to me unworthy of credit. For as it is a mark of frivolity to lend incontinent credence to everyone who says he has seen a ghost ; so, on the other hand, rashly and flatly to contradict so many trustworthy historians, Fathers, and other persons placed in authority would argue a remark able shamelessness. M 21 Sept., 1674. 25 386 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LVIII. LETTER LVIII. (LIV.) SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL. [Spinoza treats of the necessary creation of the world — he refutes his friend's arguments and quotations.] DEAR SIR, — I will rely on what you said in your letter of the 2ist of last month, that friends may disagree on indifferent questions, without injury to their friendship, and will frankly tell you my opinion on the reasons and stories, whereon you base your conclusion, that THERE ARE GHOSTS OF EVERY KIND, BUT PERHAPS NONE OF THE FEMALE SEX. The reason for my not replying sooner is that the books you quoted are not at hand, in fact I have not found any except Pliny and Suetonius. However, these two have saved me the trouble of consulting any other, for I am persuaded that they all talk in the same strain and hanker after extraordinary tales, which rouse men's astonishment and compel their wonder. I confess that I am not a little amazed, not at the stories, but at those who narrate them. I wonder that men of talent and judgment should so employ their readiness of speech, and abuse it in endeavoring to convince us of such trifles. However, let us dismiss the writers, and turn to the question itself. In the first place, we will reason a little about your conclusion. Let us see whether I, who deny that there are spectres or spirits, am on that account less able to understand the authors, who have written on the subject; or whether you, who assert that such beings exist, do not give to the aforesaid writers more credit than they deserve. The distinction you drew, in admit ting without hesitation spirits of the male sex, but doubt ing whether any female spirits exist, seems to me more like a fancy than a genuine doubt. If it were really your opinion, it would resemble the common imagination that God is masculine, not feminine. I wonder that those, who have seen naked ghosts, have not cast their eyes on LETTER LVIIL] CORRESPONDENCE 387 those parts of the person, which would remove all doubt; perhaps they were timid, or did not know of this dis tinction. You would say that this is ridicule, not reason ing: and hence I see, that your reasons appear to you so strong and well-founded, that no one can (at least in your judgment) contradict them, unless he be some per verse fellow, who thinks the world has been made by chance. This impels me, before going into your reasons, to set forth briefly my opinion on the question, WHETHER THE WORLD WAS MADE BY CHANCE. But I answer, that as it is clear that chance and necessity are two contraries, so it is also clear, that he, who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature, must utterly deny that the world has been made by chance; whereas, he who affirms, that God need not have made the world, confirms, though in different language, the doctrine that it has been made by chance; inasmuch as he maintains that it proceeds from a wish, which might never have been formed. However, as this opinion and theory is on the face of it absurd, it is commonly very unanimously admitted, that God's will is eternal, and has never been in different ; hence it must necessarily be also admitted, you will observe, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature. Let them call it will, understanding, or any name they like, they come at last to the same con clusion, that under different names they are expressing one and the same thing. If you ask them, whether the divine will does not differ from the human, they answer, that the former has nothing in common with the latter except its name; especially as they generally admit that God's will, understanding, intellect, essence, and nature are all identical; so I, myself, lest I should confound the divine nature with the human, do not assign to God human attributes, such as will, understanding, attention, hearing, etc. I therefore say, as I have said already, that THE WORLD IS A NECESSARY EFFECT OF THE DIVINE NATURE, AND THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN MADE BY CHANCE. I think this is enough to persuade you, that the opinion of those (if such there be), who say that the world has been made by chance, is entirely contrary to mine; and, 388 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LV1II. relying on this hypothesis, I proceed to examine those reasons which lead you to infer the existence of all kinds of ghosts. I should like to say of these reasons gener ally, that they seem rather conjectures than reasons, and I can with difficulty believe, that you take them for guiding reasons. However, be they conjectures or be they reasons, let us see whether we can take them for foundations. Your first reason is, that the existence of ghosts is needful for the beauty and perfection of the universe. Beauty, my dear sir, is not so much a quality of the ob ject beheld, as an effect in him who beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, or if our constitution were different, what now appears beautiful to us would seem misshapen, and what we now think misshapen we should regard as beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but ugly near; thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to God, are neither ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that God has created the world, so that it might be beau tiful, is bound to adopt one of the two alternatives, either that God created the world for the sake of men's pleasure and eyesight, or else that he created men's pleasure and eyesight for the sake of the world. Now, whether we adopt the former or the latter of these views, how God could have furthered his object by the creation of ghosts, I cannot see. Perfection and imperfection are names, which do not differ much from the names beauty and ugliness. I only ask, therefore (not to be tedious), which would contribute most to the perfect adornment of the world, ghosts, or a quantity of monsters, such as centaurs, hydras, harpies, satyrs, gryphons, arguses, and other similar inventions ? Truly the world would be handsomely bedecked, if God had adorned and embel lished it, in obedience to our fancy, with beings, which any one may readily imagine and dream of, but no one can understand. Your second reason is, that because spirits express God's image more than embodied creatures, it is probable LETTER LVIII.] CORRESPONDENCE 389 that he has created them. I frankly confess, that I am as yet in ignorance, how spirits more than other crea tures express God. This I know, that between finite and infinite there is no comparison; so that the differ ence between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is no less than the difference between God and the least created thing. This argument, therefore, is beside the mark. If I had as clear an idea of ghosts as I have of a triangle or a circle, I should not in the least hesitate to affirm that they had been created by God; but as the idea I possess of them is just like the ideas, which my imagination forms of harpies, gryphons, hydras, etc., I cannot consider them as anything but dreams, which differ from God as totally, as that which is not differs from that which is. Your third reason (that as body exists without soul, so soul should exist without body) seems to me equally absurd. Pray tell me, if it is not also likely, that memory, hearing, sight, etc., exist without bodies, because bodies exist without memory, hearing, sight, etc., or that a sphere exists without a circle, because a circle exists without a sphere ? Your fourth, and last reason, is the same as your first, and I refer you to my answer given above. I will only observe here, that I do not know which are the highest or which the lowest places, which you conceive as exist ing in infinite matter, unless you take the earth as the centre of the universe. For if the sun or Saturn be the centre of the universe, the sun or Saturn, not the earth, will be the lowest. Thus, passing by this argument and what remains, I conclude, that these and similar reasons will convince no one of the existence of all kinds of ghosts and spectres, unless it be those persons, who shut their ears to the understanding, and allow themselves to be led away by superstition. This last is so hostile to right reason, that she lends willing credence to old wives' tales for the sake of discrediting philosophers. As regards the stories, I have already said in my first letter, that I do not deny them altogether, but only the 390 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LIX. conclusion drawn from them. To this I may add, that I do not believe them so thoroughly, as not to doubt many of the details, which are generally added rather for ornament than for bringing out the truth of the story or the conclusion drawn from it. I had hoped, that out of so many stories you would at least have produced one or two, which could hardly be questioned, and which would clearly show that ghosts or spectres exist. The case you relate of the burgomaster, who wanted to infer their existence, because he heard spectral brewers work ing in his mother's brew-house by night, and making the same noises as he was accustomed to hear by day, seems to me laughable. In like manner it would be tedious here to examine all the stories of people, who have written on these trifles. To be brief, I cite the instance of Julius Caesar, who, as Suetonius testifies, laughed at such things and yet was happy, if we may trust what Suetonius says in the 59th chapter of his life of that leader. And so should all, who reflect on the human imagination, and the effects of the emotions, laugh at such notions; what ever Lavater and others, who have gone dreaming with him in the matter, may produce to the contrary. LETTER LIX. (LV.) HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA. [ A continuation of the arguments in favor of ghosts, which may be summarized as follows: I say a thing is done by chance, when it has not been the subject of will on the part of the doer ; not when it might never have happened.— Necessity and freedom, not necessity and chance, are contraries. — If we do not in some sense attribute human qualities to God, what meaning can we attach to the term ? — You ask for absolute proof of the existence of spirits ; such proof is not obtainable for many things, which are yet firmly believed. — Some things are more beautiful intrinsically than others. — As God is a spirit, spirits resemble him more than embodied creatures do. — A ghost cannot be conceived as clearly as a triangle : can you say that your own idea of God is as clear as your idea of a triangle ? — As a circle exists without a sphere, so a sphere exists without a circle. — LETTER LX. CORRESPONDENCE 39! We call things higher or lower in proportion to their distance from the earth. — All the Stoics, Pythagoreans, and Platonists, Empedocles, Maximus Tyrius, Apuleius, and others, bear witness to ghosts ; and no modern denies them. It is presumption to sneer at such a body of testimony. Caesar did not ridicule ghosts, but omens, and if he had listened to Spurina he would not have been murdered. ] LETTER LX. (LVI.) SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL. [Spinoza again answers the argument in favor of ghosts. ( The Hague, 1674-)] DEAR SIR, — I hasten to answer your letter, received yesterday, for if I delay my reply, I may have to put it off longer than I should like. The state of your health would have made me anxious, if I did not understand that you are better. I hope you are by this time quite well again. The difficulties experienced by two people following different principles, and trying to agree on a matter, which depends on many other questions, might be shown from this discussion alone, if there were no reason to prove it by. Pray tell me, whether you have seen or read any philosophers, who hold that the world has been made by chance, taking chance in your sense, namely, that God had some design in making the world and yet has not kept to the plan he had formed. I do not know, that such an idea has ever entered anyone's mind. I am likewise at a loss for the reasons, with which you want to make me believe, that chance and necessity are not contraries. As soon as I affirm that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles necessarily, I deny that they are thus equal by chance. As soon as I affirm that heat is a necessary effect of fire, I deny that it is a chance effect. To say that necessary and free are two contrary terms, seems to me no less absurd and repugnant to reason. For no one can deny, that God freely knows himself and all else, yet all with one voice grant that God knows himself necessarily. Hence as it 392 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LX. seems to me, you draw no distinction between constraint or force and necessity. Man's wishes to live, to love, etc., are not under constraint, but nevertheless are necessary; much more is it necessary that God wishes to be, to know, and to act. If you will also reflect, that indiffer ence is only another name for ignorance or doubt, and that a will always constant and determined in all things is a necessary property of the understanding, you will see that my words are in complete harmony with truth. If we affirm, that God might have been able not to wish a given event, or not to understand it, we attribute to God two different freedoms, one necessary, the other in different; consequently we shall conceive God's will as different from his essence and understanding, and shall thus fall from one absurdity into another. The attention, which I asked for in my former letter, has not seemed to you necessary. This has been the reason why you have not directed your thoughts to the main issue, and have neglected a point which is very im portant. Further, when you say that if I deny, that the opera tions of seeing, hearing, attending, wishing, etc., can be ascribed to God, or that they exist in him in any emi nent fashion, you do not know what sort of God mine is ; I suspect that you believe there is no greater perfection than such as can be explained by the aforesaid attri butes. I am not astonished; for I believe that, if a triangle could speak, it would say, in like manner, that God is eminently triangular, while a circle would say that the divine nature is eminently circular. Thus each would ascribe to God its own attributes, would assume itself to be like God, and look on everything else as ill- shaped. The briefness of a letter and want of time do not al low me to enter into my opinion on the divine nature, or the questions you have propounded. Besides, sug gesting difficulties is not the same as producing reasons. That we do many things in the world from conjecture is true, but that our reflections are based on conjectures is false. In practical life we are compelled to follow LETTER LX.] CORRESPONDENCE 393 what is most probable; in speculative thought we are compelled to follow truth. A man would perish of hun ger and thirst, if he refused to eat or drink, till he had obtained positive proof that food and drink would be good for him. But in philosophic reflection this is not so. On the contrary, we must take care not to admit as true anything, which is only probable. For when one falsity has been let in, infinite others follow. Again, we cannot infer that because sciences of things divine and human are full of controversies and quar rels, therefore their whole subject-matter is uncertain; for there have been many persons so enamored of contradiction, as to turn into ridicule geometrical axioms. Sextus Empiricus and other sceptics, whom you quote, declare, that it is false to say that a whole is greater than its part, and pass similar judgments on other axioms. However, as I pass over and grant that in default of proof we must be content with probabilities, I say that a probable proof ought to be such that, though we may doubt about it, we cannot maintain its contrary; for that which can be contradicted resembles not truth but falsehood. For instance, if I say that Peter is alive, because I saw him yesterday in good health, this is a probability, in so far as no one can maintain the con trary; but if anyone says that he saw Peter yesterday in a swoon, and that he believed Peter to have departed this life to-day, he will make my statement seem false. That conjecture about ghosts and spectres seems false, and not even probable, I have shown so clearly, that I can find nothing worthy of answer in your reply. To your question, whether I have of God as clear an idea as I have of a triangle, I reply in the affirmative. But if you ask me, whether I have as clear a mental image of God as I have of a triangle, I reply in the negative. For we are not able to imagine God, though we can understand him. You must also here observe, that I do not assert that I thoroughly know God, but that I understand some of his attributes, not all nor the greater part, and it is evident that my ignorance of very many does not hinder the knowledge I have of some. 394 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LX. When I learned Euclid's Elements, I understood that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and this property of a triangle I perceived clearly, though I might be ignorant of many others. As regards spectres or ghosts, I have hitherto heard attributed to them no intelligible property: they seem like phantoms, which no one can understand. When you say that spectres, or ghosts, in these lower regions (I adopt your phraseology, though I know not why matter below should be inferior to matter above ) consist in a very thin rarefied and subtle substance, you seem to me to be speaking of spiders' webs, air, or vapors. To say, that they are invisible, seems to me to be equivalent to say ing that they do not exist, not to stating their nature; unless, perhaps, you wish to indicate, that they render themselves visible or invisible at will, and that the imagination, in these as in other impossibilities, will find a difficulty. The authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, does not carry much weight with me. I should have been astonished, if you had brought forward Epicurus, Democ- ritus, Lucretius, or any of the atomists, or upholders of the atomic theory. It is no wonder that persons, who have invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles, should have also devised spectres and ghosts, and given credence to old wives' tales, in order to take away the reputation of Democritus, whom they were so jealous of, that they burned all the books which he had published amid so much eulogy. If you are inclined to believe such witnesses, what reason have you for denying the miracles of the Blessed Virgin, and all the Saints ? These have been described by so many famous philosophers, theologians, and historians, that I could produce at least a hundred such authorities for every one of the former. But I have gone further, my dear Sir, than I intended: I do not desire to cause any further annoyance by doctrines which I know you will not grant. For the principles which you follow are far different from my own. LETTER LXIL] CORRESPONDENCE 395 LETTER LXI. (LVII.) . . TO SPINOZA. [Philosophers often differ through using words in different senses. Thus in the question of free will Descartes means by free, constrained by no cause. You mean by the same, undetermined in a particular way by a cause. The question of free will is threefold :— I. Have we any power whatever over things external to us ? II. Have we absolute power over the intentional movements of our own body ? III. Have we free use of our reason? Both Descartes and yourself are right according to the terms employed by each (8th October, 1674)-] LETTER LXII. (LVIIL) SPINOZA TO ... (THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 1674.) [Spinoza gives his opinions on liberty and necessity.] SIR;— Our friend, J. R., has sent me the letter which you have been kind enough to write to me, and also the judgment of your friend as to the opinions of Descartes and myself regarding free will. Both inclosures were very welcome to me. Though I am, at present, much occupied with other matters, not to mention my delicate health, your singular courtesy, or, to name the chief motive, your love of truth, impels me to satisfy your inquiries, as far as my poor abilities will permit. What your friend wishes to imply by his remark before he appeals to experience, I know not. What he adds, that WHEN ONE OF TWO DISPUTANTS AFFIRMS SOMETHING WHICH THE OTHER DENIES, BOTH MAY BE RIGHT, IS true, if he means that the two, though using the same terms, are thinking of different things. I once sent several exam ples of this to our friend J. R., and am now writing to tell him to communicate them to you. 396 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXII. I, therefore, pass on to that definition of liberty, which he says is my own ; but I know not whence he has taken it. I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. Thus also God under stands himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of his nature, that he should understand all things. You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given deter minate manner. In order that this may be clearly under stood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause,' a certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which it con tinues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, not necessarily, because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true of any individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some exter nal cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner. Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined. Thus an in fant believes that it desires milk freely; an angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance, a timid child thinks he wishes freely to run away. Again, a drunken man thinks, that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words, which afterward, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid. So the delirious, the garrulous, LETTER LXIL] CORRESPONDENCE 397 and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their mind, not that they are car ried away by impulse. As this misconception is innate in all men, it is not easily conquered. For, although experience abundantly shows, that men can do anything rather than check their desires, and that very often, when a prey to conflicting emotions, they see the better course and follow the worse, they yet believe themselves to be free; because in some cases their desire for a thing is slight, and can easily be overruled by the re collection of something else, which is frequently present in the mind. I have thus, if I mistake not, sufficiently explained my opinion regarding free and constrained necessity, and also regarding so-called human freedom: from what I have said you will easily be able to reply to your friend's objec tions. For when he says, with Descartes, that he who is constrained by no external cause is free, if by being con strained he means acting against one's will, I grant that we are in some cases quite unrestrained, and in this respect possess free will. But if by constrained he means acting necessarily, although not against one's wrill (as I have ex plained above), I deny that we are in any instance free. But your friend, on the contrary, asserts that WE MAY EMPLOY OUR REASON ABSOLUTELY, THAT IS, IN COMPLETE FREEDOM; and is, I think, a little too confident on the point. FOR WHO, he says, COULD DENY, WITHOUT CONTRA DICTING HIS OWN CONSCIOUSNESS, THAT I CAN THINK WITH MY THOUGHTS, THAT I WISH OR DO NOT WISH TO WRITE ? I should like to know what consciousness he is talking of, over and above that which I have illustrated by the exam ple of the stone. As a matter of fact I, without, I hope, contradicting my consciousness, that is my reason and experience, and with out cherishing ignorance and misconception, deny that I can by any absolute power of thought think, that I wish or do not wish to write. I appeal to the consciousness, which he has doubtless experienced, that in dreams he has not the power of thinking that he wishes, or does not 39» SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXII. wish to write; and that, when he dreams that he wishes to write, he has not the power not to dream that he wishes to write. I think he must also have experienced, that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking of the same object, but according as the body is more capable for the image of this or that object being excited in it, so is the mind more capable of thinking of the same object. When he further adds, that the causes for his applying his mind to writing have led him, but not constrained him to write, he merely means (if he will look at the question impartially), that his disposition was then in a state, in which it could easily be acted on by causes, which would have been powerless under other circum stances, as for instance, when he was under a violent emotion. That is, causes, which at other times would not have constrained him, have constrained him, in this case, not to write against his will, but necessarily to wish to write. As for his statement, that IF WE WERE CONSTRAINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES, NO ONE COULD ACQUIRE THE HABIT OF VIRTUE, I know not what is his authority for saying, that firmness and constancy of disposition cannot arise from predestined necessity, but only from free will. What he finally adds, that IF THIS WERE GRANTED, ALL WICKEDNESS WOULD BE EXCUSABLE, I meet with the ques tion, What then ? Wicked men are not less to be feared, and are not less harmful, when they are wicked from necessity. However, on this point I would ask you to refer to my « Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, » Part II., chap. viii. In a word, I should like your friend, who makes these objections, to tell me, how he reconciles the human virtue, which he says arises from the free decision of the mind, with God's pre-ordainment of the universe. If, with Des cartes, he confesses his inability to do so, he is endeavor ing to direct against me the weapon which has already pierced himself. But in vain. For if you examine my opinion attentively, you will see that it is quite consist ent, etc. LETTER LXIII.] CORRESPONDENCE 399 LETTER LXIII. (LIX.) TO SPINOZA. [The writer exhorts Spinoza to publish the treatises on <( Ethics w and on the ^Improvement of the Understanding. » Remarks on the definition of motion. On the difference between a true and an adequate idea.] MOST EXCELLENT SIR, — When shall we have your method of rightly directing the reason in the acquisition of unknown truths, and your general treatise on physics ? I know you have already proceeded far with them. The first has already come to my knowledge, and the second I have become aware of from the Lemmas added to the sec ond part of the (< Ethics }> ; whereby many difficulties in physics are readily solved. If time and opportunity per mit, I humbly beg from you a true DEFINITION OF MOTION and its explanation; also to know how, seeing that ex tension in so far as it is conceived in itself is indivisible, immutable, etc., we can infer b priori, that there can arise so many varieties of it, and consequently the exist ence of figure in the particles of any given body, which are, nevertheless, in every body various, and distinct from the figures of the parts, which compose the reality of any other body. You have already, by word of mouth, pointed out to me a method, which you employ in the search for truths as yet unknown. I find this method to be very excellent, and at the same time very easy, in so far as I have formed an opinion on it, and I can assert that from this single discovery I have made great prog ress in mathematics. I wish, therefore, that you would give me a true definition of an adequate, a true, a false, a fictitious, and a doubtful idea. I have been in search of the difference between a true and an adequate idea. Hitherto, however, I can ascertain nothing except after inquiring into a thing, and forming a certain con cept or idea of it. I then (in order to elicit whether this true idea is also an adequate idea of its object) inquire, what is the cause of this idea or concept* when this is 400 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXIII. ascertained, I again ask, What is the cause of this prior concept ? and so I go on always inquiring for the causes of the causes of ideas, until I find a cause of such a kind, that I cannot find any cause for it, except that among all the ideas which I can command this alone exists. If, for instance, we inquire the true origin of our errors, Descartes will answer, that it consists in our giving assent to things not yet clearly perceived. But supposing this to be the true idea of the thing, I nevertheless shall not yet be able to determine all things necessary to be known concerning it, unless I have also an adequate idea of the thing in question; in order to obtain such, therefore, I inquire into the cause of this concept, how it happens that we give assent to things not clearly understood — and I answer, that it arises from defective knowledge. But here I cannot inquire further, and ask what is the cause, that we are ignorant of certain things; hence I see that I have detected an adequate idea of the origin of our errors. Here, meanwhile, I ask you, whether, see ing that many things expressed in infinite modes have an adequate idea of themselves, and that from every ade quate idea all that can be known of its object can be inferred, though more readily from some ideas than others, whether, I say, this may be the means of knowing which idea is to be preferred ? For instance, one adequate idea of a circle consists in the equality of its radii; another adequate idea consists in the infinite right angles equal to one another, made by the intersection of two lines, etc., and thus we have infinite expressions, each giving the adequate nature of a circle. Now, though all the proper ties of a circle may be inferred from every one of them, they may be deduced much more easily from some than from others. So also he, who considers lines applied to curves, will be able to draw many conclusions as to the measurement of curves, but will do so more readily from the consideration of tangents, etc. Thus I have wished to indicate how far I have progressed in this study; I await perfection in it, or, if I am wrong on any point, correction; also the definition I asked for. Farewell. 5 Jan., 1675. LETTER LXIV.] CORRESPONDENCE 401 LETTER LXIV. (LX.) SPINOZA TO ... [The difference between a true and an adequate idea is merely extrinsic, etc. The Hague, Jan., 1675.] HONORED SIR. — Between a true and an adequate idea, I recognize no difference, except that the epithet true only has regard to the agreement between the idea and its object, whereas the epithet adequate has regard to the nature of the idea in itself; so that in reality there is no difference between a true and an adequate idea beyond this extrinsic relation. However, in order that I may know, from which idea out of many all the properties of its object may be deduced, I pay attention to one point only, namely, that the idea or definition should express the efficient cause of its object. For instance, in inquiring into the properties of a circle, I ask, whether from the idea of a circle, that it consists of infinite right angles, I can deduce all its properties. I ask, I repeat, whether this idea involves the efficient cause of a circle. If it does not, I look for another, namely, that a circle is the space described by a line, of which one point is fixed, and the other movable. As this definition explains the efficient cause, I know that I can deduce from it all the properties of a circle. So, also, when I define God as a supremely perfect Being, then, since that definition does not express the efficient cause (I mean the efficient cause internal as well as external ) I shall not be able to infer therefrom all the properties of God; as I can, when I define God as a Being, etc. (see « Ethics, » I. Def. vi.). As for your other inquiries, namely, that concerning motion, and those per taining to method, my observations on them are not yet written out in due order, so I will reserve them for another occasion. As regards your remark, that he "who considers lines applied to curves makes many deductions with regard to 26 402 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXV. the measurement of curves, but does so with greater facility from the consideration of tangents, " etc. , I think that from the consideration of tangents many deductions will be made with more difficulty, than from the consid eration of lines applied in succession; and I assert abso lutely, that from certain properties of any particular thing ( whatever idea be given ) some things may be discovered more readily, others with more difficulty, though all are concerned with the nature of the thing. I think it need only be observed, that an idea should be sought for of such a kind, that all properties may be inferred, as has been said above. He who is about to deduce all the properties of a particular thing, knows that the ultimate properties will necessarily be the most difficult to dis cover, etc. LETTER LXV. (LXIII.) G. H. SCHALLER TO SPINOZA. [Schaller asks for answers to four questions of his friend Tschirn hausen on the attributes of God, and mentions that Tschirnhausen has removed the unfavorable opinion of Spinoza lately conceived by Boyle and Oldenburg.] MOST DISTINGUISHED AND EXCELLENT SIR, — I should blush for my silence, which has lasted so long, and has laid me open to the charge of ingratitude for your kind ness extended to me beyond my merits, if I did not reflect that your generous courtesy inclines rather to excuse than to accuse, and also know that you devote your leisure, for the common good of your friends, to serious studies, which it would be harmful and injurious to disturb without due cause. For this reason I have been silent, and have mean while been content to hear from friends of your good health : I send you this letter to inform you, that our noble friend von Tschirnhausen is enjoying the same in England, and has three times in the letters he has sent me bidden LETTER LXV.] CORRESPONDENCE 403, me convey his kindest regards to the master, again bidding me request from you the solution of the following ques tions, and forward to him your hoped-for answer: would the master be pleased to convince him by positive proof, not by a reduction to the impossible, that we cannot know any attributes of God, save thought and extension ? Further, whether it follows that creatures constituted under other attributes can form no idea of extension ? If so, it would follow that there must be as many worlds as there are attributes of God. For instance, there would be as much room for extension in worlds affected by other attributes, as there actually exists of extension in our world. But as we perceive nothing save thought besides extension, so creatures in the other world would perceive nothing besides the attributes of that world and thought. Secondly, as the understanding of God differs from our understanding as much in essence as in existence, it has, therefore, nothing in common with it; therefore (by "Ethics," I. iii.), God's understanding cannot be the cause of our own. Thirdly (in (< Ethics," I. x. note), you say, that NOTHING IN NATURE IS CLEARER THAN THAT EVERY ENTITY MUST BE CONCEIVED UNDER SOME ATTRIBUTE (this I thoroughly understand), AND THAT THE MORE IT HAS OF REALITY OR BEING, THE MORE ATTRIBUTES APPERTAIN TO IT. It Seems to follow from this, that there are entities possessing three, four, or more attributes (though we gather from what has been demonstrated that every being consists only of two attributes, namely, a certain attribute of God and the idea of that attribute). Fourthly, I should like to have examples of those things which are immediately produced by God, and those which are produced through the means of some in finite modification. Thought and extension seem to be of the former kind; understanding in thought and mo tion in extension seem to be of the latter. And these are the points which our said friend von Tschirnhausen joins with me in wishing to have ex plained by your excellence, if perchance your spare time allows it. He further relates, that Mr. Boyle and Old- 404 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXVI. enburg had formed a strange idea of your personal char acter, but that he has not only removed it, but also given reasons, which have not only led them back to a most worthy and favorable opinion thereof, but also made them value most highly the tt Theologico- Political Treatise.* Of this I have not ventured to inform you, because of your health. Be assured that I am, and live, Most noble sir, for every good office your most devoted servant, G. H. SCHALLER. AMSTERDAM, 25 July, 1675. Mr. a Gent and J. Rieuwerts dutifully greet you. LETTER LXVI. (LXIV.) SPINOZA TO ... [Spinoza answers by reference to the first three books of the « Ethics. »] DEAR SIR, — I am glad that you have at last had occa sion to refresh me with one of your letters, always most welcome to me. I heartily beg that you will frequently repeat the favor, etc. I proceed to consider your doubts : to the first I answer, that the human mind can only acquire knowledge of those things which the idea of a body actually existing involves, or of what can be inferred from such an idea. For the power of anything is defined solely by its essence (« Ethics, » III. vii.); the essence of the mind (« Ethics, w II. xiii.) consists solely in this, that it is the idea of body actually existing; therefore, the mind's power of understanding only extends to things, which this idea of body contains in itself, or which follow therefrom. Now this idea of body does not involve or express any of God's attributes, save extension and thought. For its object (ideatum), namely, body (by <( Ethics, w II. vi.) has LETTER LXVL] CORRESPONDENCE 405 God for its cause, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of extension, and not in so far as he is re garded under any other; therefore ("Ethics," I. Ax. vi.), this idea of the body involves the knowledge of God, only in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of extension. Further, this idea, in so far as it is a mode of thinking, has also (by the same proposition) God for its cause, in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is regarded under any other attribute. Hence (by the same axiom) the idea of this idea involves the knowledge of God, in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of thought, and not in so far as he is regarded under any attribute. It is therefore plain, that the human mind, or the idea of the human body neither involves nor expresses any at tributes to God save these two. Now from these two attributes, or their modifications, no other attribute of God can ( (< Ethics, w I. x.) be inferred or conceived. I therefore conclude that the human mind cannot attain knowledge of any attribute of God besides these, which is the propo sition you inquire about. With regard to your question, whether there must be as many worlds as there are at tributes, I refer you to "Ethics," II. vii. note. Moreover, this proposition might be proved more readily by a reduction to the absurd; I am accustomed, when the proposition is negative, to employ this mode of demonstration as more in character. However, as the question you ask is positive, I make use of the positive method, and ask, whether one thing can be produced from another, from which it differs both in essence and existence; for things which differ to this extent seem to have nothing in common. But since all particular things, except those which are produced from things similar to themselves, differ from their causes both in essence and existence, I see here no reason for doubt. The sense in which I mean that God is the efficient cause of things, no less of their essence than of their ex istence, I think has been sufficiently explained in (< Ethics }> I. xxv. note and corollary. The axiom in the note to « Ethics0 I. x., as I hinted at the end of the said note, is 406 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXVII. based on the idea which we have of a Being absolutely infinite, not on the fact, that there are or may be beings possessing three, four or more attributes. Lastly, the examples you ask for of the first kind are, in thought, absolutely infinite understanding; in exten sion, motion and rest; an example of the second kind is the sum of the whole extended universe (fades totius universi), which, though it varies in infinite modes, yet remains always the same. Cf. <( Ethics }) II. note to Lemma vii. before Prop. xiv. Thus, most excellent Sir, I have answered, as I think, the objections of yourself and your friend. If you think any uncertainty remains, I hope you will not neglect to tell me, so that I may, if possible, remove it. THE HAGUE, 29 July, 1675. LETTER LXVII. (LXV.) . . . TO SPINOZA. [A fresh inquiry as to whether there are two or more attributes of God. ] DISTINGUISHED SIR, — I should like a demonstration of what you say : namely, that the soul cannot perceive any attributes of God, except extension and thought. Though this might appear evident to me, it seems possible that the contrary might be deduced from <( Ethics w II. vii. note ; perhaps because I do not rightly grasp the meaning of that passage. I have therefore resolved, distinguished Sir, to show you how I make the deduction, earnestly begging you to aid me with your usual courtesy, wher ever I do not rightly represent your meaning. I reason as follows: — Though I gather that the universe is one, it is not less clear from the passage referred to, that it is expressed in infinite modes, and therefore that every individual thing is expressed in infinite modes. Hence it seems to follow, that the modification constituting my LETTER LXVIIL] CORRESPONDENCE 407 mind, and the modification constituting my body, though one and the same modification, is yet expressed in infi nite ways — first, through thought; secondly, through ex tension ; thirdly, through some attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, seeing that there are in God infinite attributes, and the order and connection of the modifications seem to be the same in all. Hence arises the question: Why the mind, which represents a cer tain modification, the same modification being expressed not only in extension, but in infinite other ways, — why, I repeat, does the mind perceive that modification only as expressed through extension, to wit, the human body, and not as expressed through any other attributes ? Time does not allow me to pursue the subject further; perhaps my difficulties will be removed by further re flection. LONDON, 12 Aug., 1675. LETTER LXVIIL (LXVI.) SPINOZA TO [In this fragment of a letter Spinoza refers his friend to « Ethics, » I. x. and II. vii. note.] DISTINGUISHED SIR,— . . . But in answer to your objection I say, that although each particular thing be expressed in infinite ways in the infinite understanding of God, yet those infinite ideas, whereby it is expressed, cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, but infinite minds; seeing that each of these in finite ideas has no connection with the rest, as I have explained in the same note to <( Ethics, w II. vii., and as is also evident from I. x. If you will reflect on these 4o8 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXVIII.A. passages a little, you will see that all difficulty vanishes, etc. THE HAGUE, 18 August, 1675. LETTER LXVIII.A. G. H. SCHALLER TO SPINOZA. [ Schaller relates to Spinoza Tschirnhausen's doings in France, and letter to him, and makes known to Spinoza the answers contained in that letter to Spinoza's objections in Letter LXVIII. and the request of Leibnitz to see Spinoza's unpublished writings.] AMSTERDAM, 14 Nov., 1675. MOST LEARNED AND EXCELLENT MASTER, MY MOST VENERABLE PATRON, — I hope that you duly receive my letter with 's method,* and likewise, that you are up to the present time in good health, as I am. But for three months I had no letter from our friend von Tschirnhausen, whence I formed sad conjectures that he had made a fatal journey, when he left England for France. Now that I have received a letter, in my full ness of joy I felt bound, according to his request, to communicate it to the master, and to let you know, with his most dutiful greeting, that he has arrived safely in Paris, and found there Mr. Huygens, as we had told him, and consequently has in every way sought to please him, and is thus highly esteemed by him. He mentioned, that the master had recommended to him Huygens 's con versation, and made very much of him personally. This greatly pleased Huygens; so he answered that he like wise greatly esteemed you personally, and he has now received from you a copy of the <( Theologico-Political Treatise, * which is esteemed by many there, and it is eagerly inquired, whether there are extant any more of the same writer's works. To this Mr. von Tschirnhausen * See the next letter. LETTER LXVIII.A.] CORRESPONDENCE 409 replied that he knew of none but the Demonstrations in the first and second parts of the « Cartesian Principles. » But he mentioned nothing about the master, but what I have said, and so he hopes that he has not displeased you herein. ******* To the objection that you last made he replies, that those few words which I wrote at the master's dicta tion, * explained to him your meaning more thoroughly, and that he has favorably entertained the said reasonings (for by these two methods f they best admit of explana tion). But two reasons have obliged him to continue in the opinion implied in his recent objection. Of these the first is, that otherwise there appears to be a contra diction between the fifth and seventh propositions of the second book. For in the former of these it is laid down, that the objects of ideas are the efficient causes of the ideas, which yet seems to be refuted by the quotation, in the proof of the latter, of the fourth axiom of Part I. « Or, as I rather think, I do not make the right applica tion of this axiom according to the author's intention, which I would most willingly be told by him, if his leisure permits it. The second cause which prevented me from following the explanation he gives was, that thereby the attribute of thought is pronounced to extend much more widely than other attributes. But since every one of the attributes contributes to make up the essence of God, I do not quite see how this fact does not contradict the opinion just stated. I will say just this more, that if I may judge the minds of others by my own, there will be great difficulty in understand ing the seventh and eighth propositions of Book II., and this for no other reason than that the author has been pleased (doubtless because they seemed so plain to him) to accompany the demonstrations annexed to them with such short and laconic explanations. w * Letter LXVIII. f That is, I think, hearing from the author criticized what his precise meaning is, and attending carefully to his arguments in favor of the opinion thus precisely ascertained. — [Tn.] 4io SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXVIII.A. He further mentions, that he has found at Paris a man called Leibnitz, remarkably learned, and most skilled in various sciences, as also free from the vulgar prejudices of theology. With him he has formed an intimate acquaintance, founded on the fact that Leibnitz labors with him to pursue the perfection of the intellect, and in fact, reckons nothing better or more useful. Von Tschirnhausen says, that he is most practiced in ethics, and speaks without any stimulus of the passions by the sole dictate of reason. He adds, that he is most skilled in physics, and also in metaphysical studies concerning God and the soul. Finally, he concludes that he is most worthy of having communicated to him the master's writings, if you will first give your permission, for he believes that the author will thence gain a great advant age, as he promises to show at length, if the master be so pleased. But if not, do not doubt, in the least, that he will honorably keep them concealed as he has prom ised, as in fact he has not made the slightest mention of them. Leibnitz also highly values the (< Theologico-Polit- ical Treatise,* on the subject of which he once wrote the master a letter, if he is not mistaken. And therefore I would beg my master, that, unless there is some reason against him, you will not refuse your permission in accordance with your gracious kindness, but will, if pos sible, open your mind to me, as soon as may be, for after receiving your answers I shall be able to reply to our friend von Tschirnhausen, which I would gladly do on Tuesday evening, unless important hindrances cause my master to delay. Mr. Bresser, on his return from Cleves, has sent here a large quantity of the beer of that country ; I suggested to him that he should make a present to the master of half a ton, which he promised to do, and added a most friendly greeting. Finally, excuse my unpracticed style and hurried writ ing, and give me your orders, that I may have a real occasion of proving myself, most excellent sir, Your most ready servant, G. H. SCHALLER. LETTER LXVIII.B.] CORRESPONDENCE 411 LETTER LXVIII.B. SPINOZA TO SCHALLER. [Spinoza answers all the points in Schaller's letter, and hesitates to intrust his writings to Leibnitz.] MOST EXPERIENCED SIR, AND VALUED FRIEND, — I was much pleased to learn from your letter, received to-day, that you are well, and that our friend von Tschirnhausen has happily accomplished his journey to France. In the conversation which he had about me with Mr. Huygens, he behaved, at least in my opinion, very judiciously; and besides, I am very glad that he has found so convenient an opportunity for the purpose which he intended. But what it is he has found in the fourth axiom of Part I. that seems to contradict Proposition v. of Part II. I do not see. For in that proposition it is affirmed, that the essence of every idea has for its cause God, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing; but in that axiom, that the knowledge or idea of a cause depends on the knowledge or idea of an effect. But, to tell the truth, I do not quite follow, in this matter, the meaning of your letter, and suspect that either in it, or in his copy of the book, there is a slip of the pen. For you write, that it is affirmed in Proposition v. that the objects of ideas are the efficient causes of the ideas, whereas this is exactly what is expressly denied in that proposition, and I now think that this is the cause of the whole confusion. Ac cordingly it would be useless for me at present to try to write at greater length on this subject, but I must wait till you explain to me his mind more clearly, and till I know whether he has a correct copy. I believe that I have an epistolary acquaintance with the Leibnitz he mentions. But why he, who was a counselor at Frank fort, has gone to France, I do not know. As far as I could conjecture from his letters, he seemed to me a man of liberal mind, and versed in every science. But yet I think it imprudent so soon to intrust my writings to 412 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXIX. him. I should like first to know what is his business in France, and the judgment of our friend von Tschirn- hausen, when he has been longer in his company, and knows his character more intimately. However, greet that friend of ours in my name, and let him command me what he pleases, if in anything I can be of service to him, and he will find me most ready to obey him in everything. I congratulate my most worthy friend Mr. Bresser on his arrival or return, and also thank him heartily for the promised beer, and will requite him, too, in anyway that I can. Lastly, I have not yet tried to find out your relation's method, nor do I think that I shall be able to apply my mind to trying it. For the more I think over the thing in itself, the more I am persuaded that you have not made gold, but had not sufficiently eliminated that which was hidden in the antimony. But more of this another time : at present I am prevented by want of leisure. In the meanwhile, if in anything I can assist you, you will always find me, most excellent sir, your friend and de voted servant, B. DE SPINOZA. THE HAGUE, 18 Nov., 1675. LETTER LXIX. (LXXX.) . . . TO SPINOZA. [ The writer asks for explanations of some passages in the letter about the infinite (XXIX.).] DISTINGUISHED SIR, — In the first place I can with great difficulty conceive, how it can be proved, a priori, that bodies exist having motion and figure, seeing that, in extension considered absolutely in itself, nothing of the kind is met with. Secondly, I should like to learn from you, how this passage in your letter on the infinite is to be understood: "THEY DO NOT HENCE INFER THAT SUCH THINGS ELUDE NUMBER BY THE MULTITUDE OF THEIR COM- LETTER LXX.] CORRESPONDENCE 413 PONENT PARTS. » For, as a matter of fact, all mathema ticians seem to me always to demonstrate, with regard to such infinities, that the number of the parts is so great, as to elude all expression in terms of number. And in the example you give of the two circles, you do not ap pear to prove this statement, which was yet what you had undertaken to do. For in this second passage you only show that they do not draw this conclusion from «THE EXCESSIVE SIZE OF THE INTERVENING SPACE, » Or from the fact that (( WE DO NOT KNOW THE MAXIMUM AND THE MINIMUM OF THE SAID SPACE*; but you do not demonstrate, as you intended, that the conclusion is not based on the multitude of parts, etc. 2 May, 1676. LETTER LXX. (LXXXL) SPINOZA TO ... [Spinoza explains his view of the infinite.] DISTINGUISHED SIR,— My statement concerning the in finite, that an infinity of parts cannot be inferred from a multitude of parts, is plain when we consider that if such a conclusion could be drawn from a multitude of parts, we should not be able to imagine a greater multi tude of parts; the first-named multitude, whatever it was, would have to be the greater, which is contrary to fact. For in the whole space between two non-concentric cir cles we conceive a greater multitude of parts than in half that space, yet the number of parts in the half, as in the whole of 'the space, exceeds any assignable number. Again from extension, as Descartes conceives it, to wit, a quiescent mass, it is not only difficult, as you say, but absolutely impossible, to prove the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as it is in itself, will continue at rest, and will only be determined to motion by some more pow erful external cause; for this reason I have not hesitated 414 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXXI. on a former occasion to affirm, that the Cartesian princi ples of natural things are useless, not to say absurd. THE HAGUE, 5 May, 1676. LETTER LXXI. (LXXXII.) . . . TO SPINOZA. [How can the variety of the universe be shown a priori from the Spino- zistic conception of extension ?] MOST LEARNED SIR, — I wish you would gratify me in this matter by pointing out how, from the conception of extension, as you give it, the variety of the universe can be shown a priori. You recall the opinion of Descartes, wherein he asserts, that this variety can only be deduced from extension, by supposing that, when motion was started by God, it caused this effect in extension. Now it appears to me, that he does not deduce the existence of bodies from matter at rest, unless, perhaps, you count as nothing the assumption of God as a motive power; you have not shown how such an effect must, a priori, necessarily follow from the nature of God. A difficulty which Descartes professed himself unable to solve as being beyond human understanding. I therefore ask you the question, knowing that you have other thoughts on the matter, unless perhaps there be some weighty cause for your unwillingness hitherto to disclose your opinion. If this, as I suppose, be not expedient, give me some hint of your meaning. You may rest assured, that whether you speak openly with me, or whether you em ploy reserve, my regard for you will remain unchanged. My special reasons for making the requests are as fol lows: I have always observed in mathematics, that from a given thing considered in itself, that is, from the defi nition of a given thing, we can only deduce a single property; if, however, we require to find several proper- LETTER LXXIL] CORRESPONDENCE 415 ties, we are obliged to place the thing defined in rela tion to other things. Then from the conjunction of the definitions of these things new properties result. For instance, if I regard the circumference of a circle by itself, I can only infer that it is everywhere alike or uniform, in which property it differs essentially from all other curves; I shall never be able to infer any other properties. But if I place it in relation with other things, such as the radii drawn from the centre, two in tersecting lines, or many others, I shall be able hence to deduce many properties; this seems to be in opposition to Prop. xvi. of your <( Ethics, » almost the princi pal proposition of the first book of your treatise. For it is there assumed as known, that from the given defini tion of anything several properties can be deduced. This seems to me impossible, unless we bring the thing de fined into relation with other things; and, further, I am for this reason unable to see, how from any attribute regarded singly, for instance, infinite extension, a variety of bodies can result; if you think that this conclusion cannot be drawn from one attribute considered by itself, but from all taken together, I should like to be instructed by you on the point, and shown how it should be con ceived. Farewell, etc. PARIS, 23 June, 1676. LETTER LXXIL (LXXXIII.) SPINOZA TO ... [Spinoza gives the required explanation. Mentions the treatise of Huet, etc.] DISTINGUISHED SIR, — With regard to your question as to whether the variety of the universe can be deduced a priori from the conception of extension only, I believe I have shown clearly enough already that it cannot; and 416 SPINOZA'S [LETTER LXXIII. that, therefore, matter has been ill-defined by Descartes as extension; it must necessarily be explained through an attribute, which expresses eternal and infinite essence. But perhaps, some day, if my life be prolonged, I may discuss the subject with you more clearly. For hitherto I have not been able to put any of these matters into due order. As to what you add; namely, that from the definition of a given thing considered in itself we can only deduce a single property, this is, perhaps, true in the case of very simple things (among which I count figures), but not in realities. For, from the fact alone, that I define God as a being to whose essence belongs existence, I infer several of his properties; namely, that he neces sarily exists, that he is one, unchangeable, infinite, etc. I could adduce several other examples, which, for the present, I pass over. In conclusion, I ask you to inquire, whether Huet's treatise (against the (